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ABSTRACT
Since nearly every water resources management choice has two
or more sides, differences must be resolved in decision making.
Equitable resolution requires an understanding of the reasons for the
differences. These reasons originate in that implemented plans have
physical-environmental, economic,
social, cultural, and political
impacts at levels ranging from local to national or international in
scope.
Decisions are made by individuals and groups impacted in all
of these dimensions and at all of these levels; the decisions generate
additional impacts; and the entire interactive process changes water
management practice in ways outside the control of anyone decision
point or even decision dimension.
The objective of this study is to
conceptualize this process in a way that will help in establishing
institutional mechanisms for reconciling differences among levels of
analysis.
The conceptualization used viewed differences in choices being
made at the various levels of analysis as associated with perspective
differences having value, jurisdication, action, and temporal elements.
The possible combinations of differences within and between
these elements were used to identify ten categories of institutional
obstacles to efficient water planning (differences in values, conflicts between value and jurisdiction, etc.).
The history of water
resources planning in the Colorado River basin was then examined to
identify 17 specific institutional obstacles, and a computerized
policy simulation was applied to levels of analysis in the Uintah
basin of Utah to identify three more.
These 20 obstacles were
shown to be broadly distributed over the ten categories, and the
nature of the obstacles defined provides valuable insight into the
common characteristics of the major institutional obstacles to water
management.
The principles of logic as applicable to rationality in decision
making were then used to identify two root causes of levels I conflicts.
If alternatives are evaluated from a single perspective, the
ostensible causal relationships commonly used lead to estimates of the
sum of the consequences from the parts of a water management program
being far more than the total consequences of the entire program.
Looked at another way, since available water resources planning tools
do not properly allocate consequences from interact ive processes to
individual causal sources, decisions made to achieve a desired impact
are not based on reliable information.
In fact, different decisions
made over time from a single perspective have conflicting impacts.
When multiple perspectives are considered, one finds that individual
values do not aggregate linearly in forming social values, many
actions are not efficient in achieving preferred values, and decision
makers are not able to implement their plans as desired.
Real world
situations combine interacting perspectives and partial contributions.
Nine recommendations are made on what to do next in improving
water resources planning in an interactive, nonlinear world.
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CHAPTER I
LEVELS OF WATER RESOURCES PLANNING

Introduction
As economic growth and technological
advances have added to the complexity of
interactions of water availability and
use with the economy, env ironment, and
society, systems analysis techniques have
become increasingly important in water
resources planning. The systems approach has
led to considerable improvement in understanding these interactions so that quantitat ive models could be developed to represent
the interactions in design optimization.
Analysis leading to a reasonable decision
in the presence of interactive relationships
amounts to solving a relational problem.
Problems caused by economic, envi ronmental,
and social impacts are all relational.
While much more research is needed
to understand and solve the relational
problems in project and other water management opt imizat ion, the top ic of th is report
is much narrower.
The subject here is the
subset of relational problems that must be
solved in opt imizing the planning process.
The issues of this subset are called the
problems of levels of analysis.
Why do
pl&nners for different jurisdictions come
to different conclusions on a given management issue?
Why do water resources groups
pursue different courses of act ion than do
land management groups?
Why do planners so
often encounter major resistance from the
putlic when they try to proceed to implementation? What can be done to bring diverse
viewpoints together, improve the efficiency
of the planning process, and thereby improve
resource management?
These are some of the
issues in solving problems in levels of
analysis.
Problem Setting in the Colorado
River Basin
Individuals make countless water use
decisions daily.
These individual decisions
aggregate into the use society makes of
its water and related land resources.
Water resources planners review current
and potential water use for opportunities to
make more beneficial use of water and for
problems that can be ameliorated.
They
define action alternatives, collect information on their consequences, and present their
resulting evaluations for discussion and
decision making.

When water is abundant, each user
can pursue his own interest with little
effect on others.
As the demand for water
becomes almost as large as the average annual
runoff, conflicts among users and opportunities for cooperation for mutual benefit
multiply. The planning must be more thorough
to lay the foundation for objective development and management decisions.
Three principal factors make the need
for careful planning increase with demand.
First, the increasing marginal cost, in
both economic and environmental terms, of
developing additional water justifies greater
planning effort to get the most for more
money spent and to avoid unnecessary environmental and social costs from the greater
impact of larger projects.
Second, when
nearly all the available water is being used,
the system loses its resilience in coping
with external events that reduce supply or
increase demand.
This loss necessitates
greater and more effective interaction
between land and water planning. Third, the
greater marginal benefit from the last units
of water used just if ies greater management
effort to prevent the waste of a more valuable commodity.
New demands that develop after all
the water nature supplies has been put to use
can only be supplied by taking water previously used by others.
In discussions
of such shifts, former users and those
with the new demands, including people who
identify with both groups, are likely to have
quite different views of the exchange, and
tbe negotiation is complicated because
changes that occur often have significant
effects on still other groups.
Water
exchanges among individuals in water short
areas consequently become quite sensitive in
the community and are closely regulated by
water rights officials.
Proposals to change
government water management policy become
very sensitive in the political arena.
Such a situation exists in the Southwestern United States, where the Colorado
River and its tributarieR supply I') million
people in seven states.
The water from the
Colorado supports 8.0 percent of the nat ion's
population with less than 1.5 percent of the
annual runoff in a region where high temperatures and long growing seasons add
greatly to water requirements.
Perennial
water shortages result in continual con
flicts and discussion of trade offs in

water allocations among users.
These dialogues make the Colorado River Basin an ideal
area to study the economic, political, and
cultural linkages that connect people's lives
in their efforts LO obtain water and use it
benef ic ially.

Impact Relationships
As diagramed on Figure 1, a decision
on a new water project or policy as depicted
by a black dOL in the center of the figure
scatters impacts in many direct Ions shown
as economic, governmental, social, cultural,
and physical-natural dimensions.
Impacts
in each dimension vary from very local to
very broad concerns.
For example, impacts
in the social dimension range from those
on individuals to lhose on society as a
whole.

the Sel of Relational Problems
The set of relat ionsh ips important
to water resources planning can be divided
between impact relationships and decision
relationships.
Impact relationships cause
impacts from decisions made, and decision
relationships influence decisions contemplated.
The impact relat ional problems
include forecasting impacts that will occur
and avoiding undesirable impacts.
The
decision relational problems include bringing
the best information into the decision
making and compromising conflicting decisions
being made at various levels.

Figure 1.

Partial
system.

representation

of

The linkages causing these impacts
generally radiate outward from the center. A
decision may affect an individual and then
affect others indirectly as they perceive
what happens.
A decision affects individuals, directly and indirectly, and because
it does so, it also affects families.
When
these more localized effects are more numerous they aggregate to affect groups. Effects

interconnected
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dimensions

and elements

in a

planning

maker considers, wants to consider, or even
is capable of considering all the information
on all impacts along all five dimensions.
Instead, each reviews data on what, from his
perspect ive, appear to be key variables or
indicators of harm or merit. l Perspective
thus serves as a filter that reduces the
total set of relevant information to a lesser
set that its user can assimiiate, but the
reduction process is very biased.
Methods
for reducing this bias are the key to solving
the "level of analysis" problem.

on many groups change communities, and
effects on communities aggregate to change
society.
As the effects radiate outward,
they also cross from one dimension to another.
As
examples, economic effects
on consumers can affect families as well as
can social effects on individuals.
Experimental effects on water quality or on industrial employment can alter cultural
va lues.
Each po int along a d imens ion may be
defined as a level of impact.
Each level
of impact includes many elements, specifically many "consumers, neighborhoods,
individuals, behaviors, or small drainage basins.
The elements at a level vary from many small
units near the center to fewer but much
larger units further out.
For example, there
may be millions of consumers, thousands of
firms, scores of industr ies, and one or two
national economies affected by a given
decision.

Decision making in water resources
management is a collect ive process.
Each
actor decides according to his perception of
h is best interest. Each acts on the bas is of
perceived information and reacts to perceived
actions or statements of others.
It is these
relational interactions among decision
makers that are the primary focus of this
study.
Specifically, what methods and
procedures exist or can be developed to
define interest and coordinate act ions for
the mutual benefit of the diverse individuals, groups, organizations, and levels of
decision making in the total water planning
process? The importance of this question has
been recognized for sometime, but no one has
made much progress in ofganizing a theory
that can be used to achieve effective
methods and testing it against empirical
information.

The impacts radiating l outward from a new
project or policy tend to be damped at the
higher impact levels.
An effect that completely changes a neighborhood may not even
be noticed at the national level, or major
alterations in behavior may occur within
fixed cultural norms.
Decision Relationships
Each element at each level is also a
locus of decision making.
An impacted
consumer may respond in a variety of ways.
One consumer is likely to respond quite
differently than another.

Received View as a Theoretical Basis
Conceptually, the linkages within and
among the various levels of analysis are not
well understood, although certain ones have
received much attention in various social
sc iences. "Examples include the problem of
exernalit ies in economics and polit ical
science; the problem of sub-optimization
in business; that of conflict resolution in
political science; and that of interest
aggregation in economics, political science,
and sociology.
The results of these var ious
stud ies can best be appl ied by find ing a
common thread of applicable theory.
One
common ground exists iri the ph ilosoph ical,
logical, and semantic issues that these
ef forts employed In def In Ing "perspect Ive,"
"point of view," and "level of analYSIS."
Common issues include:

The top level decision makers in the
nat ional economy may also respond, but two
important trends can be observed as one goes
to higher decision making levels.
First, the
dec is ion mak ing process involves more part ic ipants and occurs through more complex
interactive processes. Second, the decisions
made become more powerful in the impact they
exert.
Decisions to alter the course
of the nat ional economy have a much greater
impact than do those of an individual consumer changing his buying habits.
The decision making within a given
element responds to some combination of
the original stimulus and perceived effects
on or responses by other elements, either
on the same or on other dimens ions.
Decisions by elements will often be different
from one another and may be either complementary or competitive in nature.

How can a planning perspective
identified and/or defined?

be

What is involved in the definition of
a planning system?

From the viewpoint of the general
welfare of society, information on impacts
along all five dimensions is relevant to
making water USE decisions as well as many
other decisions that indirectly affect water
ava ilability or use, for example, by changing
the runoff characteristics of the land
surface, the need for water by mUnicipal or
industrial users, etc.
No one decision

lIn the TechCom study hundreds of
indicators and variables were identified
for nine primary goals related to water
resources
planning
(Technical Committee
of the Water Resources Centers of the Th irteen Western States, 1974).
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What are the conceptual categories
that best describe interactions among
planninp, perspectives and levels?

many decisions made by indivIdual "property
managers."
They include persons who own
land, lease from a landlord, or work for a
corporation; they include farmers with water
rights and home owners who water their
lawns.
Each person bases his decision on
some kind of analysis (informed, uninformed,
or misinformed; superficial or profound) from
which he concludes that certain land or
water use is beneficial from his point of
view.
Each dec is ion is to var ious degrees
influenced by the characteristics and
availability of the resources and by the
way others use or do not use adjacent lands
or waters.

Whether purposefully or incidentally,
assumptions used in answering the above
questions underlie any attempt to coordinate
and/or integrate planning for a complex
system.
A proper understanding of the
conceptual issues related to levels of
analysis must be coupled with a technical
understanding of such varied areas as hydrology, economic analysis, environmental
impact, institutional setting, and social
well-being.
It is within the contexts of
both the conceptual prerequis ites and planning aClualities that the aims and objectives
of this study should be understood.

As a property manager IS benef it from
land or water use is affected by the activities of his neighbors, he is motivated to
influence them to adopt certain uses and
avoid others.
He may exercise personal and
social pressures to advance h is private
interest.
If individual efforts to control
these external effects fail in matters which
many people th ink important, the not ion of
general or public interest creates a role for
government in guiding individual land and
water use decision making toward some acceptable public standards.
Laws, regulations,
financial incentives, and other means are
employed to confine individual choices within
the bounds of acceptability as defined by
some higher level of analysis.
These in
struments can be used at public interest
levels varying from the local community to
the nat ion as a whole.
Communit ies monitor
the act ions of individuals, states monitor
the actions of communities, etc.

Because of the diversity of interrelated
actors, an operational theory needs to begin
with a shared language or understanding of
such key terms as "relat ional problems,"
It leve Is
of analys is," "perspect ives," and
"points of view."
The kind of shared language needed is one like that characterized
as "received view" among philosophers on
the nature of scientific theory.
These
philosophers have been able to develop a
profound understanding of how to structure
sc ient if ic theory because a "received view"
was consensually understood to identify a
specified set of conditions for a theory
to be accepted as a theory (Suppe, 1977).
Planners need consensual understanding of
conditions for a plan to be accepted as a
plan.
In order to lay a foundat ion for the
needed consensus, the present study will
begin with a review of the observed relat ional problems, issues, and parameters that
characterize the study region and sub-regions
(Colorado River Basin, State of Utah, and
U intah Bas in), and that have been discussed
in the context of nat ional water resources
planning.

The public interest as seen at a given
level is def ined by actors in the pol i tical
and gove rnme n tal a rena wh ich impact sand
is impacted by the decisions that emerge.
For example, actors work through local
government leaders to establish a community
viewpoint (more accurately a dynamically
changing viewpoint responding to a wide
variety of influences).
The governmental
actors then use instruments available to them
to build projects or to confine individual,
private choices within the bounds of community acceptabililY.
Ideally, all community
decisions should originate from some kind of
analysis that has concluded that a given
action would promote the public interest and
that a certain action plan is the most suited
to achieve the desired results.

Decision Points in Land and Water Use
In focusing on levels of analysis
problems, it is useful to examine the alternatIves for land and water use and the
decision points choosing amon~ them. The use
alternat ives can be characterized in several
ways.
Patterns of land use, for instance,
are of ten ca tegor ized in terms of woods,
pasture, farms, homes, factories, etc., and
can be displayed as a spat fal conf i!!urat ion
at a given point in time.
This pattern
chanp,es as parcels shift from one use to
another.
Patterns of water use may be
def ined in terms of power generat ion, waste
dilution, fish habitat, etc., or water
diverted. from the stream for agricultural,
induslrial, or municipal supply.
The decision poinls occur at the individual, community, slate, regional, and
national
levels in lhe governmental dimens ion, and
over a correspondinp, range of levels along
the olher dimensions shown on Figure 1.

As the quantilY and quality of available
water is affected by upstream land and waler
use and in turn affects the quantity and
quality of water available for those downstream, communities need to be motivaled
towa;:-d land and water use policy in conformance with state or regional public inleresl.
Some level of governmenl high enouV,h lo
inlernalize bOlh beneficial and adverse
external effects may well find i l necessary
to influence community policy to in lurn
influence individual property manager decisions (the flood plain management program for
example) or to implement direct construction

The patterns of land and water use
at a given point in time are the product of
4

of necessary facilit ies (a water supply
reservoir for example).
Implementable
incentives are needed to ach ieve a combined
pattern of land and water use to achieve the
general good.

tion, the basin states are responsible
to Insure that 1.5 million acre-feet water of
specified quality is delivered to Mexico
annually.
One could begin a discussion of the
myriad interconnections among decision levels
in the region with just about any issue or
geograph ical area.
One interes t ing account
(Lich tens tein, 1977) follows the course of
the Colorado River, beginning at its headwaters.
Alternatively one might start with
the Denver metropolitan area which lies
outside the drainage area but draws more than
70 percent of its water from the Colorado
(Hundley, 1970).
For our purpose, it is
useful to develop the relational questions
and issues by beginning with the Imperial
Valley in California, near the downstream end
of the rive!:.

In an hierarchial system of jurisdict ional governments, a number of arenas
are available for establishing consensus and
implement ing programs.
Decision systems are
found at the property manager, town, county,
regional council of governments, state,
inters t ate compact, and nat ional levels.
Each level possesses its own viewpoint with
respect to all five impact dimensions (Figure
1), and each has its own limitations on what
it can and cannot do.
Each jurisdiction has
its own access to informat ion (correct or
incorrect), its own capability for evaluation
of alternat ives, its own resources to implement the selected courses of action, and its
own legal and institutional restrictions on
its activities.
The total decision making
and "planning" system for land and water use
combines all these levels deciding, inter
acting, adjusting, and continually changing
in both perception and viewpoint.

The Imperial Valley was a desert before
irrigation began with Colorado water.
Now the valley produces an estimated one-half
bi llion dollars worth of agr icul t ural commodit ies annually and supplies vef,etable
markets in all parts of the country.
The
Imperial Irrigation District, the largest
single user of Colorado water, imports close
to 3 million acre feet of water from the
Lower Colorado River, or about two-thirds of
California's allocated 4.4 million acre feet.
The rema inder of California's share as well
as additional Colorado water, bringing
California's total annual use to about 5.1
million acre feet, is transported to the
Southern California coastal plain where it
provides about 50 percent of the water for
the San Diego and Los Angeles areas.

At each level, the decision process is
affected by what participants observe or know
of the problems and selected solutions at
hi
er or at lower levels, or at the same
level in other jurisdictions.
The water and
related land use management practices within
the Colorado River Basin thus result from a
decision making system functioning at many
levels and at many locat ions at each lower
level.
The success or failure of any effort
to influence these practices cannot be
adequately evaluated at anyone level alone
because the interactions among the levels of
analysis must be taken into account.

A number of water use issues within
California emerge from this situation.
California is presently using about 0.7
million acre feet of water officially allocated to Arizona and Nevada.
When these
other Lower Basin states claim their water,
which California users will have to give up
what they now have?
Will they be able to
obtain replacement water from Northern
California or from saline water converllion?
Who should pay the cost for the imported
water or for ocean water conversion? Whilt is
the optimum allocatlOn of water within the
State of California and what values should be
used or are affected by such an optimum?
What pr iori ties should govern water allocat ion among the different areas in Southern
California and the state as a whole, and how
should various interests be weighted?
For
instance, should municipal use drive out
agr icultural use?
How should the water
rights of California Indian tribes affect the
allocation of water?
What planning process
should California implement to insure that
the distribution of water among different
users will be equitable and efficient?

Illustrative Relational Problems
in the Colorado River Basin
In order to illustrate the wide scope
of relational issues faced by water resources
planners, it is helpful to describe some of
the link
s in decision making in the
Colorado R
r Bas in.
The current linkages
among the various levels of analYSis are in
turn strongly influenced by historical
1 inkages that produced the ex ist ing context
of the legal agreements, court decisions, and
water rights that govern water allocation.
For example, Colorado River water is allocated among seven states through the
Colorado River Compact of 1922, a u.s.
Supreme Court decree in Arizona vs. California (376 U.S. 340, 1964) and the Colorado
River Basin Project Act--PL 90-537 (USDI,
Bureau of Reclamation, 1975).2
In addi-

These kinds of questions can be repeilted
for every state in the bas in, for the ref' ion
IH:
a whole, and for the e n t ire co u n t r v •
Tbey can be answered in some sor t of ob jective sense by specialists evaluating -the

2The water rights of many Indian tribes
in the region have not been finally settled,
so that some signlficant uncertainties about
water allocations remain at the state levels.
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The problem of salinity control
cannot be narrowly construed.
Decisions concerning salinity
control have implications for water
resource development in t he bas in.
Water resource development decisions have environmental and
social implications of the most
far-reaching kind.
Decisions
affecting the basin as a whole need
to be examined systematically and
comprehensively, but no eXIsting
institution has a basin-wide
interest and perspect ive as lts
primary focus (Utah Water Research
Laboratory, 1975).

trade offs scientifically, but actual choicei
are more often made through the collective
decision making of many actors at diverse
levels.
Furthermore, many of these choices
do nOl make a great deal of sense from a
purely objective viewpoint.
The difficulties in rationally planning
an
timum water allocation at the state
leve are compounded at the basin level where
the constraints of political feasibility are
greater.
The significance of politics can
be demonstrated by speculating how plann
might proceed if only economic efficiency
were cons idered.
One poss ible outcome could
be that water diversions to most of Arizona
and Southern California would not be justi
fied on the basis of opportunity cost calculations. Water used in the Imperial Valley
might be more efficiently used in other parts
of the basin.
Long-run economic efficiency
might favor resettlement of populations from
Arizona, Nevada
and California to other
areas in the bas in or the country.
Another
poss ible outcome would be that such considerations as milder climate and greater
availability of other factors of production
in the Lower Basin would make it economically
efficient to reallocate water from the Upper
to the Lower Basin.

Thus salinity control measures cause numerous
conflict situations.
One major conflict IS
illustrated by the ins istence of the states
in the Upper Basin that they will not tolerate interference with their deve
to
reduce salinity for farmers, munic pal, and
other users in the Lower Basin (Utah Water
Research Laboratory, 1975: p. 99).
The water quantity and quality interrelationships described in this section are
only suggestive of the many relational
problems that pertain to water supply and
quality issues.
Other relational issues
related to energy, economic development,
recreation, environmental quality, and social
welfare are just as important.

As one more possibility, it may be
economically feasible for both Upper and
Lower Basins to import water from the Columbia River, although just the study of this
possibility has already created conflicts
with the Northwest states (Idaho Water
Resources Research Institute, 1976).
The
point is that none of these reallocations
is possible because political factors far
out-weigh economic efficiency when one is
dealing with complel<,
-scale planning
systems.

Wit h res p e c t top rob 1 ems i n 1 eve 1 s
of analysis, all the important interact ions
among decision makers acting at various
levels along the various dimensions of Figure
1 influence water policy.
All need to be
considered in an effective forma"l planni
framework.
How can this be done? Can it
done at all?
Progress in this direction can
only be made by int
ating the conceptual,
procedural, and inst
tional components of
the planning system in an organizing framework that guides the planning process.

In addition to these water quantity
problems, salinity has become a major problem
in the Lower Basin.
Further Increases
in salinity may cripple agriculture in some
areas.
Wh ile damage est imat ion presents
difficult technical problems (Utah Water
Research Laboratory, 1975:
p. 232-244), a
Bureau of Reclamation (1974) approximation
estimates a possible reduction of $16 per
acre in net farm income for the Imperial
Valley if salinity increases by 320 mg/l
by the year 2000.
Costs to other Lower
Basin areas are similar or higher. Since the
salts that reach the valley originate in all
areas of the basin, an effect ive program to
reduce salinity needs to involve almost
everyone upstream. Furthermore, the entire
country is affected as the federal government
bears the cos t of the desalt
plant at the
Cali[0rnia-Mexico border to ensure that water
of appropr late guaU ty enters Mex ico.

Research Objectives
General Objectives
The two previous sections have tried
Lo convey the complex context faced by
water resources planners because of the
ny and varied impact relationships afecting elements over a range of levels
along several dimensions.
The complexity
increases as the impacts generate feedback
linkages to multiple decision points.
The planner rightly seeks optimality as
he weighs tradeoffs among alternat lves but
he must also rec
nize the constraints
the options being se
ed at other declsion
points create for the decisions that he
would like to implement.
The processes
of impact, cholce at other decislon points,
and formal planning decisions interact
dynamically in response to mull iple external
stimuli as resource availability, technological ca~ability, environmental health, and
many other conditions change.
The general

I t is compt [caled to determine what
sal inity control measures are most efficient,
e qui tab 1 e , and e f f e c t i v e, and how s u c h
measures can be best implemented.
One
writer describes the basic difficulty as
follows:
6

object ive of th is study is to help planners
who must work in th is context by 1) developi ng a conceptual representat ion of thei r
levels of analysis problems and 2) suggesting
institutional mechanisms to help integrate
different planning perspectives in achieving
common goals.

interactions, conflicts, and planning activit ies in a large river basin.
The region has
been studied extensively, so that large
amounts of data are available, facilitating
the identification and invest
ation of
levels of analysis problems.
In addit lon,
each area has major water planning challenges
due to water scarcity and quality control
problems. Some of the problems were outlined
earlier in this chapter for the Colorado
Basin.
Additionally, in Utah and the Uintah
Basin, special problems are posed by energy
development and by emerging population
pressures.

General Procedure
The general approach to accomplish
these planning objectives will begin by
ident Hying important levels of analysis
problems as seen in 1) the history of
planning decisions within a portion of
the Colorado River Basin (Chapter II) and
2) the current state of the water resources
planning art (Chapter Ill).
A simulation
mode 1 (PROPDEMM) for express ing preferences
from three levels of analysis (basin, state,
and local) will then be used in trying
to understand these problems in greater
depth (Chapter IV).
Out of
efforts,
specific problems will be defined and used as
a bas is for the conceptual deve lopment and
suggestion of institutional mechanisms in the
second part of this report.

The conceptual foundation was complemented by simulation of decision making
at the various levels.
The model needed to
portray several levels of analys is in isolation and also interrelate them.
PROPDEMM II
was chosen because it could do th is as I t
evaluates large amounts of planning information in concise formats.
PROPDEMM II simulates planning decisions
from three cross-impact matrices that represent the socio-political, socio-economic-environmental, and course-of-action components.
The model links the three matr ices through
the concept of "value impact" postulated to
be the fundament al element of any policy or
planning situation.
In addition, PROPDEMM II
is among the politically most realistic
simulations in that it gives explicit expression to political factors such as the power
of interest groups, their commitment to
certain values, the rigidity of their positions, their interactions historically, and
their concern with costs of public programs.

Research Framework Activities,
and Metbo s

a

The research procedure combined 1)
conceptualization and theory, 2) application,
and 3) analysis.
The methods included
a mail survey and personal interviews,
content analys is of newspapers, and the
appl icat ion
of a
computer
s imulat ion
(PROPDEMM I I, a programmed policy decis ion
making model).
The results of the conceptual/theoretical analysis and the follow
simulation were synthesized in recommendations for dealing with institutional
issues and concerns.

Simulation of the major plann
-related
interactions within each of the three systems
provided compar isons that could be used to
identify levels issues and problems that need
to be addressed.
Because the three systems
are hierarchically ordered (the Uintah Basin
is part of the State of Utah, which is
turn de
nds for most of its water on the
Colorado iver), the interrelationships among
them can be more easily traced and examined.
The results could be used to analyze how
interrelationships among interest groups,
socio-economic-environmental factors, and
courses-of-action for different levels of
planning affect or are affected by each
other.

From the start of the project, levels
of analysis problems were found to be very
important in numerous contexts, but previous
in-depth analyses with practical relevance
were lacking.
It was therefore decided to
begin with development of a conceptual
framework that could provide a foundation for
dealing with levels of analys is problems in
water resource planning pract ice.
To th is
end, a large scale literature review was
undertaken to identify the theoretical as
well as applied
work that has
been accomplished with respect to levels of analYS]s. Considerable theoretical work relating
to social choice, levels, and relational
problems has been done in economics, systems
theory and cybernetics, philosophy, sociology, and political science.

Summary
The interdependence of dec is ion mak ing
at various levels along the five dImensions
shown in Figure I with water use and management effort necessitates comprehensIve,
integrative planning practices.
Unfortunately, relatively little practical knowledge
and understanding exists about the nature and
funct ioning of complex, inlerrelated impact
and decis ion systems. What is worse, a large
number of decis ion makers and planners are
only vaguely aware that limitations to their
understanding of how impacts interact with

The applicat ion was based on the lhree
"planning syslems" defined by the Colorado
River Basin, the State of Utah, and the
Uintah Basin in Northwestern Utah.
These
three levels provide an excellent example
of the complexities that characterize the
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The Colorado River Basin provides
numerous ex
of the kinds of analytical
and synthet c problems that need to be
resolved in regional plann
These problems, as a class, may be termed relational
problems.
Wh He relat ional problems encompass all
of interactions, levels of
refer to interrelationships
mak ing, part icularly characterized by some hierarchical ordering, as
exemplified, for instance, by various layers
of government.
Levels of analys is problems
present perh
the most difficult conceptual
and pract
obs tacles to improved comprehensive river basin planning. To develop the
necessary understanding for dealing with
relat ional and levels of analys is problems,
this study will examine both the context of
plann
inquiry and that of planning pract ice, respect ively through philosoph ical and
simulation ana

decisions may well be resulting in very poor
decisions.
Planners need a conceptual
understanding that is descr ipt ive of the
complexity of activities that impact upon one
another, rooted in experience, and able to
improve practice.

One way to begin is to identify and
examine the kinds of water and land use
dec is ions.
I t is apparent that patterns of
water and land use are the combined result of
decisions made by a number of individuals
with different degrees of influence.
The
various social, economic, and political
interests lead to specific viewpoints and
perspectives that affect the planning system
as a whole.
They must somehow be taken into
account in the overall planning process.
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CHAPTER I I
THE "LEVELS OF ANALYSIS" PROBLEM IN CURRENT
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING

ments for limited capital resources considering the consequent economic, environmental, and social effects, 2) to develop
a design (whether for a multipurpose reservoir or a flood-plain zon
regulation) that
will indeed perform satis
ctorily in its
intended function, and 3) to work out such
details of project implementation as developing working institutional arrangements
for project management, raising the necessary
finances, securing needed political approval,
and getting user groups to make proper use of
project output.

Introduction
Water resources planning may be broadly
defined to encompass the design, implementation, and operation of schemes to reduce
flood damage, supply water, protect water
quality, generate hydroelectric power,
provide navigable waterways, provide opportunity for water-oriented recreation, or
otherwise increase the benefits people derive
from water resources.
The purposes of planning are to select worthy schemes, to
develop functional designs, and to provide
cost-effective implementation. The work that
planners do, however, is often under used or
ignored in actual selection, design, and
implementation processes.
To return to the
decision framework presented with Figure
1, decisions are made on these points at many
levels using many degrees of analysis.
Some
use the results of the planning, and others
do not.
Thus, whether the plan is ever
implemented as planned or not, the planning
does have a benef icial impact to those who
can use the information disseminated.
Nevertheless, many plans are never implemented because of obstacles of the "levels of
analysis" sort.
The purpose here is to
identify some of these principal obstacles
and explore ways to reduce them.

The Planning Process
The process for water resources planning
widely accepted as an ideal was outlined by
Fox (1963), as:
1.
To plan on the basis of objectives
and criteria specified by legislative action
or achieved through group consensus prior to
beginning the planning.
The principles
and standards adopted by the Water Resources
Council (1973) have since become the official
federal criteria, and more recently a number
of changes to them are being seriously
cons idered.

The strategy will begin from an examinat ion of the purposes of water resources
planning and the conventional procedure
for achieving those purposes.
It will
review how the i~creased complexity of modern
society has expanded the scope of planning
considerations and changed planning processes.
A comparison between needs for
ch ange tha t h ave been me t and those tha t have
not will provide insight into institutional
qbstacles.
Four components of each level of
analysis will then be used to classify
institutional relationships in planning,
identify conflict situations, and select
examples for use in developini!, a better
understanding of institutional obstacles or
levels of analysiS problems.

2.
To expand these broad criteria
into quantifiable indices of project per
formance that can be compared to determine
the relative merits of the des
alternatives.
3.
To collect the data relevant to
water resources management or pro ct design in the area under study and then to
use that data to evaluate alternative courses
of action by comparing them in terms of the
selected indices.
4.
To select throu!!,h sllch an ilniilysis
by professionals the s ini!,le best plan or
mas t promis ing group of plans.
A group
of plans would be selected if nonquantifiable
factors or conflicts among objectives make
it impossible for professional analysis to
decide what is best.

Purposes of Water Resources Planning

5. To expose the selected plan or ~roup
of plans to public discussion for final
selection or for revision as necessary.

The threefold purpose of water resources
planning is 1) to select water development
or management schemes that are worthy invest-
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6.
To finalize the design and
implement the selected plan.

land use (movin!!, hi!!,hly damageable development out of the flood plain for example)
rather than by constructing more facilities.
The title of the
rinciples and standards
specified for plann
by the Water Resources
Council (1973) notes that they are to be
applied to both water and related land
resources.
Interactions between land and
water use that need to be cons idered (James
and Lee, 1971, p. 501-503) include 1) the
extent to which land use determines the
demand for flood control, irrigation, recreation facilities, etc.; 2) deterioration
in water quality as pollution from city
streets or agricultural chemicals are washed
into streams; 3) changes in the runoff
process as the los s of fores t land reduces
soil moisture and snow pack and as urbanizat ion speeds storm runoff and reduces low
flows; 4) the extra erosion and sedimentation
induced by logging, improper soil conservation practices on agricultural land, or
construction activities; and 5) increases in
precipitation associated with forestation or
urbanization.

then

In execution, the definition of a worthy
project varies \vith the viewpoint of the
evaluator, and project selection is highly
dependent on prevailing public opinion.
Detailed design is largely performed by
technicians and ends up being highly dependent on standards that have come to be
genera lly accepted by the profess ion.
The
implementation arrangements have largely been
worked out through political compromise
rather than thoughtful analysis of alternatives.
Expanding Scope of Planning
Considerations
A wa ter resources planner migh t, for
example, be charged \vith selecting, designing, and facilitating implementation of a
scheme for flood damage reduction for a given
community.
In a typical situation, he would
de termi ne an acceptable leve 1 of protect ion
(usually against at least the lOa-year flood
for an urban area), collect the needed data,
perform alternative designs, and select as
optimal the design maximizing benefits net of
cost.
The plan, which might be a protective
levee, would be discussed at a public meeting
and implemented once benef lclaries obtained
the necessary funding through the political
process.
In another example, an irrigation
planner might recommend a small dam diverting
water into a canal to the service area.

The Importance of land-water-use relationships is maximum at locations where major
land use change is occurring.
Urbanization
has an important effect in growing cities.
Coal and oil shale development are likely to
have a major impact in the Colorado River
Bas in.
Transpor tat ion f ac 11 It les are 1m
port ant in determining land use and hence
the need and spatial pattern for water
resources development.
Policy on providing
or not providing water and sewer facilities
can be important in shap ing urban development.

As the need for larger projects to
solve larger problems and the need to minimize unnecessary magnification of downstream
flood peaks and provide a dependable water
supply during extended droughts turned both
flood control and irrigation technologies to
reservoirs, one large reservoir was found to
be more economical than two smaller ones, and
the multiple-purpose (combining in this
case flood control with irrigation) project
began (Linsley and Franzini, 1964, p. 619626).
As a number of reservoirs came
to be built along a river (the Columbia,
Missouri, or Tennessee), benefits could be
increased by coord inated operat ion, and
multi-project systems (combining reservoirs
in a river basin) began (Krutilla and Eckstein, 1958, p. 61-68). As it became obvious
that project construction had important
environmental and social as well as economic
effects, multiple objective planning was
recommended (Hufschmidt, 1969).

Expansions to the Planning Process
As outlined in the previOUS section,
planning process has been faced \vith
expand~ng 1) from single to multiple purpose
projects, 2) from single to multiple project
systems, 3) from single to multiple plann
objectives, and 4) from water to more comprehensive planning incorporating interactions
of water with land and other related resources.
The first expansion required
engineering expertise existing within a
single agency to cooperate in a common
design and has been executed so successfully
that the overwhelming majority of the reservoirs bu ilt in recent years have been multiple purpose.
The second expansion required
appl icat ion of the expert ise of a s in~le
diSCipline, systems analysis or operations
research, to solve a well-structured optimization problem a;1d has been generally successful.
The third expansion reauired the
cooperative effort of multiple disciplines in
developing new methodology for reconcil
differences among multiple viewpoints,
and multiple objective planning efforts have
not yet succeeded in doing much more than
slOWing the planning process to the point
where very few plans are being implemented
and the critical water management decisions
are being made outside the formal framework.
the

As water and land resources become
more fully utilized, the need to account for
a wide variety of interactions between them
is becoming increasingly important (Whipple
et a1., 1976).
For example, the need for an
expanded water supply as well as the quantity
and quality of the flow in the stream
depend on land use within the basin.
Indeed,
the movement to increase emphasis on nonstructural measures was an attempt to achieve
the benefiEs of water planning by changing
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national economic development goal of v:ater
resources management as bounded by all
the complex constraints 1 imi t
pract ical
planning choices for real systems.
i.Jork ing
techniques for collective optimization with
respect to several relevant goals (economic,
environmental, and social) as an operational
form of mult iple object ive planning are an
order of magnitude further from reality.

The fourth expansion requires working interact ion between professional groups educated
from widely differing perspectives in developing methodology to deal with processes
so complex that even researchers operating at
the front ier of knowledge do not really
understand them.
In summary, the planning process has
successfully expanded from single to multiple
purpose projects and from single to multiple
project systems.
It has not been able to
expand from single to multiple objectives
nor to integrate water with land and regional
planning.
The explanation for this dif
ference logically lies in the differences in
the obstacles to success.

Wi th respect to f inanci ng a~G staff
,
there is not a team of planners that does
not cIa iIr. that it could do a better job 'i.' i th
more resources, nor is there a team that
could not organize more efficiently to do a
better job with the resources at hand.
All
of these technical obstacles are important.
Each deserves further research, but all are
outside the scope of the issues in levels
of analysis.

Every experienced water resources
pIa nne r kn ows tha t there is too much uncertainty in available information, methods,
and understanding of the problems to ever be
sure that one has really arrived at the
best plan.
A planner can always prof it from
additional information and points of view.
In the following discussion on how to identify, define, and overcome the obstacles to
comprehensive planning, the goal is by no
me~ns to show how to sell a plan produced by
experts to a doubtful or a hostile public.
It is rather to contribute guidelines
that can help planners listen better to
various publics and thereby do a better job
of achieving consensus solutions.

Institutional Obstacles to Comprehensive
Planning
The symptoms of institutional obstacles
to comprehensive water resources planning are
seen in legal and jurisdictional conflicts,
slow response to chanl2'ing: conditions,
and politically imposed constraints on
a Iternat ives to be cons idered.
The causes
behind these symptoms, however, go much
deeper and are rooted in the conflicts
in the desired sorts of land and "rater use
among people in a free society.
Even the
development plans or management programs that
do most to promote the public welfare adversely effect some individuals, interest
groups, and communities.
As each group
takes political action in its own defense, it
generates forces that make planning decisions
more dependent on political power, legal
barriers, and the chance timing of decision
opportunities than on an objective assessment
of public welfare.
Over the years, !2'roups
with common interests combine in varying
alliances
on varying
issues at varying
times, and the outcomes of the resul t ing
political trading are probably the most
important single influence on decision
making.
Many water resources planners have
wondered whether careful evaluat ion of the
alternatives is really worthwhile after
seeing their best efforts rejected by politicians who have incomplete understanding of
the impl fcat ions.
The essence of the Hi Luation, however, is that the systems institutionalized for the orderly resolution of
disputes among conflictinf interests, [or
protectinl!. individual rights, ,mel for mnlntelining stable l,"nd and water use policy have
simultaneously created major obstacles
to action to meet pressin? social needs.

Technical Obstacles to Comprehensive
Planning
The technical obstacles to comprehensive
planning include limi ted information on the
relevant physical, economic, social, and
ecological systems and how their components
interact with one another, limited ability to
reason from the information that is available
in a manner that leads conclusively to a best
plan, and limi ted availability of the manpower and finances required to gather and
analyze information (McKean, 1958).
With
respect to system descr ipt ion, the physical
sciences are still far from able to describe
a 11 the in t era c t ion s bet wee n i m~ or tan t
variables controlling the temporal and
spatial distributions of the rate
of infiltration,
evapotranspiration, movement
of water through the soil, etc. (Flemin/!.,
1975).
Economists (James and Lee, 1971) are
an order of magn itude further and sociologists (Finsterbusch and Wolf, 1977) and
ecoloi~ists (Corwin et a1., 1975) are even
another order of magnitude further from being
able to describe how planning alternatives
differ in impac ts of the sorts with in their
respective areas of expertise.

Some see 8 remedy to this situation in
establishing cybernetic systems that will
make all parties better informed and thereby
more appreciative of one another's positions
(Beer, 1975).
While better information
flow systems can do a great deal of good and
a great deal of effort should be spent in
their development, the fact that different

With respect to evaluative techniques,
no algorithms are available to optimize
with respect to the complex object ive funct ion that would be needed to portray the
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people, all fully informed, would still
make different choices must also be faced.
In cases where one individual can choose
without affecting others, the public interest
is best served by permi tt ing each ind ividual
freedom to make his own choice (Pigou, 1938).
In other cases where a choice made by one
individual severely affects the lives
of others, the public interest requires
1 i mit a t ion son the f r e e d om 0 f i n d i v i d u a I
choice.
It is in setting and enforcing those
limitations that conflicts develop and are
institutionalized into obstacles restricting
further action.
In summary. the obstacles to
comprehensive water resources planning
and management in the United States originate
in the conflicts resulting because different
conclusions on how land and water should be
used are being reached by different groups
taking different actions to achieve different
objectives from different jurisdictional
viewpoints.

components illustrated in Figure 2 and
described in a little wore detail below.
Each component acts within each element at
each level of analysis alonp each d iwens ion
of Figure 1.
1.
The goals or objectives
being
lude economic development
(increas
real incomes), the preservation
or enhancement of environmental quality, the
improvement of social well-bei
and
r
ional development (increasing rea
Income
a
the local or river basin as opposed
to the national level).
2.
Jurisdiction.
The level of the
decision making ranges from private decision
making at the individual or family level,
corporate decision making, general or
special-district local government decision
making, decision making at the state level,
and decision making at the national level.
3.
The physical need and the
action
e ng contemplated for dealing
with it encompass water resources planning
flood control, drainage, irrigation, municipal water supply, navigation, hydroelectric
power, water quality control, recreation, and
the protection of fish and wildlife.
For
integrat
land with water planning, one
must add soil and land conservat ion, des irable urban )2:rowth patterns, ouality build-

Framework for Institutional Problem
Identification
In order to probe these institutional
obstacles more deeply, a framework is needed
for systematic inspection of water plann
institutions
so that
obstacles can
identified, classified, and analyzed.
The
descriptive framework used here has four

Temporal
Different horizons
Ovedal)ping durations
Model increments

Values

Jurisdiction

Actions

Short £lm vs. long ron
Changing Doul1~aries
Value change
Different horizons
Salience and satiation cycles Creation and termination
of agencies

Se<llleaCe
Duration
Processes
Technological advance

Polarities and affinities
Different orderings

Criteria of achievement and
instrumental actions
"Accidental" conflicts

TemlJOral

A~gregation

Aggregative and
distribu tive effects
Assignment of appropriate
functions
Local interest variations

Values
Aggregation
Integration
Externalities
Duplication and overlap
Creation and termination
of agencies
Area vs. function

Coordination
Duplication
Capacity and u tiliza tiO'l
tnlfesholds

Jurisdiction
Exclusivity
Specializa tion
Unintended cOllsequenCt'S

Actions

F

2.

Matrix of levels problems within and between planning dimensions.
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ings, transportation, neighborhood recreation, industrial growth, mineral development
and a number of other needs and actions
'related to land use.

vary much more in values than do communit ies
or states), and the intensity of the conflict
increases as groups with common values become
better organized.

4 .
I~l!!.E.Q!..!!l •
Goa 1 s, 1 eve 1 s, and
actions are constantly changing.
As these
changes occur faster than the institutionalized system can adjust, parties may
continue to advocate policies that are
no longer in their bes t interes t because of
delays in obtaining information on changing
conditions or because of the difficulties in
changing a position once adamantly advocated.
These temporal problems become particularly
important in the water planning arena because
periods from project conception to implementation of 10 to 20 years are ordinary.

One indication of the difficulty in
resolving conflicts in values is the fact
that such differences do not occur in expanding from single to mUltiple purpose
projects nor from single to multiple project
systems and that these planning expans ions
have been successful.
In contrast value
confl icts are inherent in expand ing from
single to multiple objectives and in integrating water with land planning, and
neither of these planning expansions have
been successfully implemented.
Apparent value conflicts mayor iginate
in different understandings of the facts or
in true value differences.
In the prevailing
situation of incomplete information, each
side tries to overwhelm its opposition with
alleged "facts" presented in a way to make
any who take a differing viewpoint seem quite
foolish.
Continued research can hopefully
separate facts from fantasy so that issues
can be discussed on a value basis, but
our current understanding of the environmental and social consequences of human
activity is still a long way from making this
possible.
To some extent, value conflicts
may be resolved by permitting individuals
or jurisdictions with differing values to f!0
their own way (for exampe by employing
different standards for water quality control
or flood plain management), but the administrative and legal problems in varying
management policies are very difficult to
overcome.
James et a1. (1976) discussed
these problems with respect to land use
controls in flood prone areas.

Problem Classification Within
the Framework
Within each co~ponent, one finds conin values conflicts in jurisdictional
viewpoints, con Icts in needs emphasized and
actions taken, and conflicts in time perspec,tive.
Among components, values, viewpoints,
perceived needs, and selected actions change
with time; pursuit of a particular viewpoint
or once-favored action may be found to
conflict with basic values; or actions may
prove not to be really wise.
Problems may
exist in two or more components simultaneously.
Finally, key action alternatives are
omitted from consideration because they do
not fall in the advocacy role of any single
value, jurisdictional viewpoint, nor problem
area.
Each of these problem categor ies will
be discussed below as illustrated by situat ions regularly faced in water reSOurces
planning and plan implementation.
~licts

2.
Conflicts in jurisdictional view£oints.
Those planning from individual,
corporate, local, state, or national viewpoints may overlook other viewpoints through
ignorance or purposefully to ach ieve advantage. The adverse consequences of failing
to consider other viewpoints depend on
how the actions of those of one viewpoint
affect the others, the conseq uences economists have long labeled as external effects.
Effects of the actions of one individual on
other individuals or of one community on
other communities are true external effects
and become more severe as population densities and economic development increase.
Effects of the actions of a higher level in,
an hierarchy (federal for example) on cOmponent lower level units (states for example)
are internal to both systems but may be
considered pseudo-external effects because
the higher level unit may be less concerned
over the harm caused because those affected
are a small portion of its total citizenry or
because the citizens of other component lower
units may have compensating opinions or be
affected in compensatinf! ways.
Effects of
the actions of those at a lower level of the
hierarchy (individual citizens for example)
on a high er leve 1 (the i r government) are a

Conflicts Within a Component
1.
Conflicts in values.
The study
of the sources and expressions of human
values has received considerable attention
a nd may ul t ima te ly provi de the rea 1 keys to
reducing the institutional obstacles to
planning for the common good.
For water
resources planning purposes, values are
expressed in terms of the twin objectives of
economic development and environmental
quality (Water Resources Council, 1973) while
every individual has some concern for both,
some people are more concerned wi th employment and incomes while others feel that they
can scarcely exaggerate the destruct iveness
of unfettered economic growth to basic
human environmental support. The first group
is going to favor structural water resources
development for an expanding economy, wh ile
the second group is going to favor nonstructural water resources management for environmental protection.
Each side is going to
create every institutional obstacle within
its power to prevent plans that it opposes
from being implemented.
The diversity
in values reduces as one goes from smaller to
larger jurisdictional viewpoints (individuals
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federal agency coordination resulted in
creation of the Water Resources· Council at
the national level, inter-allency river basin
commissions at the state and regional level,
and other appropriate coordinating units.
The need to coordinate water with land
planning, however, has not been resolved.
Those planning for flood control communicate
much better wi th those planning for irr igat ion that with those planning for parks or
mineral development.
The second pair of
administrative units may be so far apart in a
governmental hierarchy that new coordinating
mechanisms have to be established and, what
is often worse, the disciplines predominating
in the two un its may va ry so grea t ly in
profess ional va lues that a new common language has to be established for exchanging
viewpoints.

special pseudo-external effect problem in
wa ter resources plann ing.
Lower leve Is try
hard to get the higher level to pay for
projects that they would not be willing to
pay for themselves because the benef it they
receive is far more than their portion of a
cos t spread over the larger group.
Many in
such smaller units seem to believe that they
are actually getting a "free lunch."
In comparing these jurisdictional
viewpoints, it is important to remember that
while the higher level jurisdictions are able
to afford larger and more spectacular projects, the lower level jurisdictions are
in aggregate spending more money and having
a larger impact on water resources management.
For example, less than one third of
the irrigated acreage in the United States is
served by federal irrigation projects.
In
addition, the higher level jurisdiction is
more remote from the action and consequently
less able to implement its plans.

4.

i

The

Several approaches have been tried to
resolve conflicts in jurisdictional viewpoints.
The traditional one at the h
er
levels has been to form river basin commissions at which representatives of the
var ious levels can interact toward ach ieving
a consensus.
The number of elements that
must part ic ipate causes such group meet ings
to break down at lower levels.
For many
years management schemes were formulated by
assuming that individuals, corporations,
and communities would act rationally with
respect to the objective function the planners were using, but experience showed
this not to be the case, probably because
these other groups were not planning from the
same criteria.
Many federal water projects
have not produced anticipated benefits
because the individuals who stood to gain did
not respond as anticipated.
The recent
emphasis on nonstructural measures may in
part be viewed as an effort to force individuals to comply with government plans
for flood plain use, water conservation, etc.
Implementation requires laws forcing the
lower levels to conform to the higher level
viewpoint or providing economic or other
incent ives to encourage them to do so.
The
former method is less in keeping with the
democratic tradition, but the latter method
generally gives planners a less secure
feeling about the outcome.

p ann ng
operate from various time· perspec
tives. Professional water resources planners
characteristically think of project justification in terms of 50 or 100 years, whereas
the politicians making the choices often
emphas ize accomplishments to be aeh ieved by
the next election.
Professional water
resources
planners
characteristically
design from an assumption that the public
using project output (protected flood plain
land or irrigation water) will respond to
that output as seems wise from the public
planning perspective, when in reality those
in business in the pr ivate sector expect a
higher rate of return on their investment and
payback over a shorter planning horizon
(Grant and Ireson, 1970, p. 456-493).
The various discount rates used by different
planning jurisdictions (normally ranging from
high values in the private sector to low
values in government) are a manifestation of
this variation in time perspective that
causes a great deal of difficulty as the
various planning jurisdictions attempt to
implement conflicting plans. Local government
is often required by law to pay back borrowed money within a period much shorter than
50 years.
Hydroelectric power developments,
wh ich are frequently planned by the pr i vate
sector, are characteristically formulated
from a different time perspective than are
other types of wa ter projects.
Land use
planners also tend to plan for a shorter time
period than do water resources planners.

3.
~£~ili~£~_i~_~~Eh~~i~~~_~~~~.
Those who perceive a particular physical need
as extremely important and are consequently
do ing a 11 they can to meet that need (for
example, a community recently devastated by a
major flood and seek ing flood control) may
come in conflict with others who are trying
to meet some other need (such as irrigation
water).
If both groups are planning from
the same viewpoint (d ifferent agencies in
the government of the same state), the need
is to improve coordination among units within
the administrative structure, a phenomenon of
growing importance as the complexity of
government increases.
The need for inter-

Very little has in fact been done in
response to the problems caused by these
conflicts in time perspect ive.
Adjustments
are made to the private or market value of
land to estimate an equivalent public value
for planning purposes (James and Lee,
1971), and other similar adjustments are
also made by planners in the rub li c see tor.
These, however, do not get at the lJ'ore
fundamental problem of a difference in time
perspective caus
projects to be undertaken
in the public sector even though they would
be
ected as unprofitable by the private
sector (Hirschleifer et aI., 1960).
A more
general solution would require economic
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alterations in net food supply, and the need
for the public to protect itself against the
external effects of polluters who do not
consider others in their waste disposal
decisions.
Each need has lead to an institutionalized system for installing the
reservoirs, treatment plants, zoning legislation, etc., required to satisfy it.
These
systems have grown into large organizations
that are often slow to change with shifts
in
ublic need, particularly when such
shi
would reduce the role of the organization.
The removal of outdated institutional
structures is exceedingly difficult to
implement in the public sector.

incentives that actually bring private sector
planning more in line wi th general welfare
criteria.
Conflicts Among Dimensions
1. Time-value conflicts. Values change
with time.
The irrigation program of the
Bureau of Reclamation was in part established
to move people out of the congested, industrialized east to settle uninhabited
areas. Today, the first and fourth states in
population are in that then under-populated
area.
In the 1950s, structural water
res ources deve lopment was very popular, and
many were strongly push ing a low soc ial
discount rate so that more water development
p,rojects would be built for the benefit
of future generations.
A gene,ration later,
the shift in values from an economic to
an environmental emphasis has created a
s ituat ion where many would be happier wi th
fewer dams.
The use of present va lues for
long-term planning is in effect assuming that
people from now to the planning horizon will
cont inue to hold the same values that they
hold today.
Recent experience shows that
values are not stable, and the danger of
dis tort ing the des ires of those who come
after us increases as planners shift from
economic criteria to other and more volatile
values in multiple objective planning.

4.
Value-viewpoint conflicts.
Ind ividuals, corporations, localities, states,
and the federal government have different
value perspectives.
The federal government
is now officially committed to planning from
the twin objectives of economic development
and environmental quality.
The other viewpoint levels and elements at a given level
have not formally defined their planning
values and vary greatly among themselves in
preferred objectives.
In fact, one of the
basic strengths of the American sy~tem of
government is that it provides a structure
for different elements in soc
to pursue
different objectives and to reconcile conflicts among their courses of action.
The
federal government, the state, and the
community can each study a water resources
planning or management situation, come to
their own conclusion on what action is
best, and then arM trate the ir di fferences.
In practice, however, the system has been
greatly handicapped by the much greater
expertise and financial resources available
to the federal government, making it impossible for the other viewpoints to negotiate on an equal basis. The recent trend away
from federal structural measures and toward
state and local actions (structural as well
as nonstructural) to fill the vacuum is
working in the opposite direction.

2.
Time~~!~~EQ!~!_cQ~ill£!~.
The
goals of those operating fiom a particular
jurisdictional viewpoint change with time.
Individuals tend to pursue more basic human
needs in poverty s ituat ions and personal
f ul f illment needs when they become more
affluent (Maslow, 1954).
Special short-run
situations may cause deviation from long
r un goals.
Governments change goa Is as
elections replace decision-makers. While all
these
groups are
free to change
their
opinions, water projects require a financial
commitment and an operating schedule for
dividing project outputs (conservation versus
flood control storage within reservoirs for
example) that cannot easily be changed with
time. Major projects must be reauthorized at
the congressional level before ~hanges in the
allocation of stored water among beneficiaries can be made. One of the major planning
issues of coming years is likely to be how to
maintain the flexibility of project operation
required to maximize achievement of planning
objectives and yet to achieve the stability
r eq ui red to honor f inanci al commi tments and
contractual obligations to the or
inal
project beneficiaries.

5.
Need viewooint conflicts.
Those
operating from different
jurisdictional
viewpoints tend to meet needs through the
types of act ion wi th wh ich they are mos t
familiar or best able to implement.
For
example, individuals develop parcels of land
and decide on their use of water project
outputs. Corporations make similar decisions
at a larger scale; communities adopt land use
and utility service plans; states regulate
water rights and water quality standards; and
the federal government constructs large water
deve lopment projects.
Furthermore, our
constitutional form of government limits what
each level can do.
The federal government
cannot engage in land use zoning, and private
parties cannot build large projects.
Furthermore, those planning to meet a given kind
of need are predisposed toward the set of
alternatives commonly used for achiev
that
purpose and are unlikely to think of working
with those meet ing other needs in a mul t i
purpose solution.
Consequently, plans tend
to take on characteristics popular with those

3. Time-need conflicts. Water planning
in the United States has passed through
periods emphasizing inland navigation,
irrigation, hydroelectric power, flood
control, and now water quality control (James
and Rogers, 1976).
These changes in needs
have occurred in response to advances in
transportation technology, the harnessing of
electrical energy, climatic cycles bringing
concentrated per iods of floods or droughts,
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In such multi-component conflict situat ions, greater external pressure is
uired
to force a compromise resolution 0
the
issues, and the nature of the compromise
reached is less likely to depend on meri t.
Each component has elements that tend to
dominate, but those dominating ch
over
time.
The federal government usua
dominates the viewpoint component, at least in
cases where the key federal agenCies bel ieve
it their mission to do so.
Water quality
control has been moving to the front as the
dominant water planning purpose, but the
juxtaposition between water and land planning
is not yet clear.
One senses a
owing
attitude, however, that water p
has
had its chance and failed and that land
planning is the upcoming favored cureall to
national ills.
Economic development was
long the dominant planning goal and probably
still is even at the federill level where
environmental quality is nominally but not
operationally equal.

planning in the jurisdiction with primary
responsibility even where some other type of
plan may be more efficient. As examples, the
Corps of Engineers has bu ilt la
flood
control structures where flood pIa
zoning
may have produced grea ter net benef its, and
may individuals continue ventures that they
find profitable even though another less
familiar venture might be even more profitable.
6. Value-need conflicts. Those working
to satisfy particular needs tend to emphasize
values that they perceive as most likely to
develop support for their cause.
Economists
have complained that their skills are used to
sell rather than to select projects (Smith,
1974); and in recent years, economic arguments have been used by environmentalists to
strengthen opposition to projects they
oppose.
The basIc problem is that the
public and its politically-chosen decision
makers are generally unwilling to select how
the total water resources budget should be
divided among needs nor how the budget for
a particular need (municipal water supply
for example) should be divided among projects
based on the results of an impartial multiple
objective analysis of the alternatives.
The decision making is in reality based on
other criteria or values.
Formal value
statements (such as the princi les and
standards released by the Water
sources
Council) in th is sett ing become tools for
selling what has already been decided as
needed.
For example, water quality control
measures are not planned on the basis of
these principles and standards and are
justified to the public on the grounds of the
fundamental
importance of environmental
protection.
Water quantity supply measures
are now relatively much less salable in terms
of intrinsic merit and consequently are
justified, but less often successfully so, on
the basis of the principles and standards.
If a detailed analysis shows that continuing
to pollute a stream is better than to treat
the wastes, environmentalists are much more
1 ike ly to s tart look ing for flaws in the
methodology than to be convinced.

Conflicts in~ Between
Components
The existin? institutions for water and
related land resource planninf have evolved
in response to the needs for act ion that
people have seen and worked together to
implement.
Technological advance, resource
depletion or degradation, population shifts,
changes in world economic or political cond it ions, and a number of other f actors are,
however, continually generating new
ments for water resources management
not fall directly within the values, jurisdictional viewpoints, and needs emphasis of
the prior institutIonal framework.
Water
quality control and groundwater management
in humid areas where supplemental irr ation
is expandi
illustrate needs that water
planning ins itutions have recently had to
expand to accommodate.
Where water problems
crossed previous jurisdictional boundaries,
river basin commissions, interstate compacts, and regional commissions of local
governments have had to be established.
The
recent environmental movement was able to add
a new environmental quality perspective to an
institutionalized system that previously
placed little emphasis on these factors.

7.
Higher-order combinations.
The relational framework of values, viewpoints,
needs, and time components is used above to
classify institutional obstacles to water
resources planning within a given component
or between pairs of components. One can also
visualize obstacles created by her-order
conflict situations generated by s
taneous
differences in three or even all four components.
Qualitatively, these conflicts
represent combinations of factors outlined
above.
Quantitatively, however, the more
complexity that exists in a conflict situat ion, the more powerful the obstacles to
rational rel'olution become.
More areas of
disagreement provide those taking extreme
positions more lines of argument to prevent
compromise and provide more points requiring
compromi se.

These efforts have been able to achieve
the pOlitical clout to change the system but
only after a period of time.
One wonders
what planning inefficiencies occur during
the period required to effect the change and
what inefficiencies continue to occur because
worthy needs are unable to change the system.
Some of the
areas that are probably more
significan
nelude tributary land use
management to minimize downstream flood Clnd
water quality problems in urban areas, water
and power conservation programs, water
quality control strategies relying on methods
other than treatment, and provision for
variation in water quality or flood plain
land use standards according to the needs of
the local community.
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sarily aggravated by an inappropr iate planning strategy.
The ideal or ultimate plan
should be only a goal for use in judging
proposals or observed activity within the
basin.
The emphasis within the planning
process should be to identify a limited
number of priority actions to be promptly
implemented.

The above framework and discussion
suggests the principal institutional obstacles to effective and coordinated water and
land resource planning as 1) limitations in
available factual information that make it
possible for special interest groups to sway
public choice through biased presentation of
the alternatives, 2) viewpoint and time
perspective differences among planning
sectors (public v. private or national v.
local) that cause conflicting land and water
use policies, 3) the inability of the top
decision-making levels to deal effectively
simultaneously with more than one problem at
a time (other problems are being relegated to
the background now that water quality control
~s
the central focus), 4) insufficient
recognition of the magnitudes of the changes
in values, viewpoints, and needs that occur
over the long planning horizons (50 or 100
years) typically used for water and land
resources (one can consider the difficulty
a planner in 1880 would have in formulating
projects to meet the needs of today), 5) the
formal commitments during plan implementation
that make subsequent beneficial change very
difficult, 6) the concentration of planning
funds and expertise in groups of biased viewpoints or constrained perspective, 7) gaps
between planning and implementation agencies
that favor plan selection to be based on
familiarity or le~al authority rather than
merit, 8) use of planning capabiity to
prepare cases for selling plans already
selected rather than to gather facts that
can be used to compare the merits of possible
alternatives, and 9) problem areas that are
not properly handled because they either fall
in the gaps between responsibilit ies in the
institutionalized system or become a source
of conflict because more than one element
perceives responsibility.

On the whole, land and water planning
institutions have been responsive to problems
that they could solve within a single administrative structure (mUltipurpose projects
for example) but have not been effective in
solving problems requiring conflict resolution or cooperation between decision elements.
Conflicts severe enough to gain
public attent ion rise to and are eventually
resolved in the political arena (for example
the allocation of Colorado River water among
the basin states or the one-time failure of
federal flood control agencies to make suff icient use of flood plain management), but
many lesser issues are never resolved.
Often, no part of the institutional structure
really feels responsible for consequent delays or inaction.
The existing system is not good at resol vi ng confl ic ts among separated agenci es.
Technological advances (for example upgrading
from the rational method to watershed modeling for estimat
flood peaks) are only
slowly adopted by professionals or agencies
established in previous methodologies.
When
problem solving requiring ch
to existing
institutions, implementation
an order of
magnitude more difficult.
Carefully organized research to identify the basic causes
of resistance to technical innovation and
institutional change within the water and
related land resources planning arenas is
sorely needed.
The problems outl ined above
provide a good list of needed changes that
are not bringing needed responses and thus
a good starting point for needed research.

One observation of the total land and
water management process would be that the
nine institutional obstacles are more effect ive in prevent
plan implementation than
plan formulation.
A skeptic of the planning
l?rocess could make a good case for a cIa im
that most comprehensive planning never leads
to implementat ion, that the forces creat ing
the nine obstacles never appear as strong
d ur ing planning as they are when implementation seems imminent (people do not
respond to hypothetical alternatives in the
same way that they will later to real conditions), and that therefore one needs rather
to work on improving management pract ice by
beg inn
from (more limited) plans that are
being implemented.
"Comprehens ive plannin~"
would be better advised to drop its search
for an idealistic optimal management scheme
and concentrate on devising implementable
actions that could improve what is occurring.
Planning should concentrate on implementable,
incremental improvements.
The logical conclusion
to this
reasoning
is that the
"levels-of-analysis" obstacles to compre
hensive river basin planning are unneces-

Recommendations For Dealing With
Institutional Problems
One reason that the above institutional
obstacles are more effective in preventing
plan implementation than in preventing plan
formulation is that planners become so
attached to their recommendations that
they do not recognize legitimate opposition
and fail to give proper consideration to
other viewpoints. Special effort needs to be
made to understand the opposition to plan
implementation. PRDPDEMM provides a powerful
tool that can be used for this purpose by
bringing out specific issues of controversy
that need to be resolved in solving the
levels-of-analysis problem.
One of the pervasive difficulLies
with comprehensive river basin planninf.': as
currently practiced in the United States is
that it is interpreted as requiring a general
comprehens iveness that cannot be delivered.
Consequently, few practical results appear,
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the public becomes disillusioned by planners,
and the funds required for planning are
threaFened poli~ically.

new flexibility into the commitments required
at project implementation, 6) more equal
distribution of planning resources among the
various viewpoints, 7) more equal capability
for implementing the various possible measures, 8) greater commitment to search out
facts for evaluation by merit rather than
sell previously made decis ions, and 9) more
complete coverage of the spectrum of plann
needs.

Once problem elements are identified,
one needs to cons ider the alternatives for
dealing with each one.
Here again Figure 2
is helpful.
If the planner uses it to
distinguish differences in who is act
to
ach ieve what physical changes in pursu
of
what basic goals, he can then analyze the
situation to identify alternatives that dissatisfied actors might find equal or even
prefer.
The s i tua t ion may be resolved by
providing such information to the key parties.
Failing identification of equivalent
or preferred alternatives, the planner could
at least fall back to the alternative in
volving minimum net sacrifice from the
previous position.

As progress is made on doing a better
job of getting the facts together, levels of
analysis differences will be reduced toward
those based on differences in values.
The
next research need will then be in the area
of deve
ing a better system for resolving
value di
either through compromise
in decision making or through providing for
greater diversity among the various segments
of society without undue adverse external
effects on one another.
Another key component to better value-d i fference resolut ion
is deriving ways to accelerate the decisionmaking process toward more timely respon
ses to decision needs.

One of the root causes of difficulty in
water resources planning practice is that the
political decision making system often has
good reason for not waiting for a comprehensive and objective analysis before selecting a course of action.
In a situation of
partial information, those operating from
more powerful levels of analysis have been
able to fill in the unknowns with assertions
favoring their
udgment or have developed
decision making
titutions that 1) produce
decisions that they regard favorably or 2)
keep th ings work ing smoothly enough to avoid
unpleasant confrontat ions.
They then
ceive institutional ch
as a threa
to
this desirable state of a fairs and resist
change efforts.

Summary
Th is chapter began explor
the leve Is
of analysis problem in water resources planning by defining planning as a threefold
process combining selection, desi?n, and
implementation of a worthy alternative and
by outlining the planning process.
A de
scription of how this process has worked and
how it has responded to the need for change
with time showed how the changes required to
make tbe process work better that can be
made without caus
confrontations among
existing planning groups have largely succeeded but that changes whose implementation
would lead to intergroup conflict have seldom
come to pass.
Such stalemate situations are
reSUlting where different groups are taking
different actions to achieve different
objectives from different jurisdictional
viewpoints and address ing different time
frames.
Nine principal institutional obstacles to effect ive and coordinated water
and related land resources planning were
enumerated from these conflicts and analyzed.
The result was recommendations for research
and findings application to 1) develop the
factual information that will help planners
overcome these obstacles and 2) quickly
resolve the value conflicts remaining once
the facts are known.
This generalized
analysis together with the specific problems
identified in the Colorado River Basin
provide a basis for more detailed investigation into levels of analysis problems.

A second root cause lies in the limitat ions of human capability to absorb complex
information and use it in rational decision
making.
This also leads to biased selection
of information and the same sorts of differences in conclusion depending on the level
of analysis.
The logical response to this situation
is to develop more factual information relevant to water and related land resources
decision making and to present that information in a way that those at the various
leve Is of analys is can unders tand.
Spec if ic
research thrusts might address 1) more comprehensive development of factual information
with particular emphasis needed in the environmental and social areas, 2) incentives
to minimize rather than aggravate viewpoint
differences, 3) methods for institutions to
deal with many problems simultaneously, 4)
methods for coping with time changes in
viewpoints and needs, 5) ways to introduce
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CHAPTER III
ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR WATER RESOURCES PLANNING IN
THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN, UTAH, AND THE UINTAH BASIN

percent of the bas in, they account for 40
percent of the consumptive use. Th is established agricultural use, which has historically been in competition only with limited
municipal use within the basin is now
experiencing pressure from a new and developing water demand for energy resource extraction and processing.

tion
The first step in developing a working
understanding of real world experience with
'levels of analysis problems was to identify
such issues in the history of water planning
for the Colorado River Basin.
The water of
the Colorado River is the lifeblood of the
arid Southwestern United States where it supplies major needs in seven states (Colorado,
Wyoming, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada,
and California).l
The primary source areas
for runoff in this desert climate are the
high mountain areas near the crest of the
Rockies and in scattered other intermountain
ranges.
These areas constitute such a small
fraction of the total basin that the Colorado
produces less water per unit area than does
any other major river bas in in the country.
The runoff is collected from these mountain
ranges and carried 1440 miles from the headwaters to the Gulf of California along a
route where water, because of its scarcity
in the desert, is extremely valuable for
agriculture and municipalities.

As the pr inc i pal source of water in
seven arid states, it is not surprising that
issues of Colorado River water management
have generated much political heat, and that
many actors and institutions have been
involved at national, multi-state, state, and
substate levels.
This complex institutional
history, can be reviewed for implications for
solving problems in levels of analysis from
three different levels or perspectives:
the
Colorado River Basin as a whole, the State of
Utah, and the Uintah Basin in the north
eastern corner of Utah.
The discussion is organized under two
main headings:
Issues and Institutions.
Under the heading of "Issues," attention will
be given to water allocation, Indian and
federal water rights, water development
projects, energy development, l60-acre
limitation, water quality, and the 1976-77
drought.
Under the heading "Institutions, II
attention will be given to the institutional actors and institutional settings in
wh ich these issues have been debated and
r esol ved.

Despite this competition for water within the basin, the concentration of water in
the Colorado River has proved very attractive
to cities outside the basin.
The river
serves 2.5 million people who reside in the
basin and 12.5 million people through water
exports to the metropolitan centers of
Denver, Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, and San
Diego. It supports wildlife and recreation in
areas of unparalleled aesthetic value, and at
the same time supplies water for ci ties,
irrigated agriculture, energy production,
industry, and mining.

Issues

Table 1 generalizes current land usewa ter use relat ionsh ips with in the Colorado
River Basin.
The two principal water depletions are seen to be the large water
exports and irrigated agriculture Although
irrigated lands occupy only 1.8

Until just the last 10 or 15 years, the
"Law of the River"--an amalgamation of
statutes, compacts, treaties, court decisions, contracts, regulations, and administrative rulings--has dealt almost entirely
with allocation and development of the waters
of the Colorado River Basin.
The allocation
system for the Colorado River and its tributaries operates at four levels:
international, interregional, interstate, and
intrastate.

lSince many recent and generally
available reports contain detailed physical
descriptions of the Colorado River system
(Bureau of Reclamation, 1971,1974,1975;
Bishop et al., 1975; Bishop, Chambers, Mace,
and Mills, 1975; Water Resources Council,
1974; Lichtenstein
1977), only a brief
overview is present
here.

At the international level, a formal
division of water between the Uni ted States
and Mexico was accomplished by the ~lexican
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Table 1.
-

Summary of land and water use in the Colorado River Basin.

-:1:

Water Depletions 2

Land Use l

Rangeland
Fores t
Agriculture
Irrigated
Dry
Urban (M&l)
Other
Water Surface
(water export)
(fish & wildlife)

Source:

Acres
x 10 6

% of
Basin

AF
(1000's)

95.1
57.4

58.3
35.2

a
a

2.9
1.0
0.9
3.2
1.4

1.8
0.5
0.5
1.9
0.8

3,636
a
255

rm:r:o

1OT.lJ

(evaporat ion)
5,189 b

% of

Total

40
3
57

TOO

lWater Resources Council (!97l).
2Salinity Control Forum (June, 1975).

aOn-site use of precipitation.
bOf this, 4,538 maf are exported to Southern California, of which about 1 maf are
diverted by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California primarily for M&I use, and
the balance by the Imperial Irrigation District and the Coachella County Valley Water District predominantly for irrigation use.

and appor t ions the ba lance of the annua 1
consumptive use available to the Upper Basin
to Colorado, 51. 7 5 percent; to New Mexico,
11.25 percent
to Utah, 23 percent: and
to Wyoming,
percent.
The Arizona v.
California decision divided the total of 7.5
maf available in an average year to the Lower
Basin by giving California an annual entitlement of 4.4 maf; Arizona, 2.8 maf; and
Nevada, 0.3 maf. Utah and New Mexico can use
water originat
in their small portions
of the Lower Basin area.
This decision
affirmed the allocation among the three
states made by the Boulder Canyon Project
Act of 1928.

Water Treaty of 1944. Mexico was guaranteed
an annual amount of 1.5 maf, except in times
of extreme shortage.
At the interregional level, the 1922
Colorado River Compact (fTvidea the basin
states according to whether the drainage
entered the river above or below Lee
Arizona, into the Upper Basin (composed
the "upper divis ion" states of Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) and the Lower
Basin (composed of the "lower division"
states of Arizona, California, and Nevada).
Some of the area in Arizona is in the Upper
Basin while small parts of Utah and New
Mexico are in the Lower Basin. The Compact
assured the Lower Basin that depletions by
the Upper Basin states would not prevent at
least 75 maf of aggregate flow per
period from reaching the Lower Basin at
Ferry. The Lower Basin received a guaranteed
ten-year (not annual) minimum flow; the Upper
Basin became the guarantors. At the time of
the compact, the available record of measured
streamflow was very sparse and average annual
virgin flow was estimated to be in the
of 15 rna f.
One of the major problems as
been that this estimate has proved too high.
Average annual flows have been about 13

At the intrastate level, the benef ic ial
consumptive use of water has been allocated
through the creation and recognition of state
water rights. Although the water rights
systems of the Colorado River Basin states
differ in certain respects, all of them are
based on the "appropriation doctrine," which
was described by the National Water Commission in its
for
t
(l973) as fol
The basic tenets of that system are
that (1) a water ,right can be
acquired only by the acauiring
party diverting the water from a
water course and apply ing it to a
beneficial use and (2) in accordance with the date of acquisition, an earlier acquired water
right shall have priority over
other later acquired water rights.

maL

Allocation of Colorado River water at
the interstate level was achieved by the
Upper Colorado River - Bas in Compact of 1948
(for the Upper Basin states) and the Arizona
v. California Supreme Court case of 1963 (for
the Lower Basin states).
The 1948 Compact
allots to Arizona 50,000 acre feet per annum
20

Water in excess of that needed to
satisfy existing rights, is viewed
as unappropriated water available
for appropriation by diversion and
application of the water to a
beneficial use.
The process of
appropriation can continue until
all of the water in a stream is
subject to rights of use through
withdrawals from the stream.
(p.
271. )

been able to use for years because the
federal government has not been exercis ing
its right will be lost as the U.S. chooses to
utilize the full quantity of its right.
The
unresolved issue has created an atmosphere of
uncertainty and controversy in which the
Carter Administration expects to move expeditiously to identify areas where federal use
is of highest importance and to quantify
reserved rights consistent with the priorities set out.

Assuming 15 maf/year as the aver
flow, Utah's share of Colorado River water s
about 1.4 maf/yr (0.23 (15.0 - 7.5 - 1.5».
The Utah Divis ion of Water Resources esti
mates that current depletions from the
Colorado River Basin in Utah are about
100,000 acre feet. This leaves about 700,000
acre feet not currently being used; however,
the State Engineer has estimated that the
exercise of additional approved filings,
including those which have been approved for
the Central Utah Project, would deplete
Utah's ent itlement by another 600,000 acre
feet.
In addition, a substantial number of
filings are awaiting action by the State
Engineer.
Although no definitive tabulation of these unapproved filings has been
made, they are believed large enough that if
they were approved and exercised the total
water use would exceed Utah's compact entitlement.
For all intents and purposes,
therefore, Utah's share of Colorado River
water has already been appropriated.

Indian water righ~ reserve water for
Indian reservation land.
Like federal
reserved rights, Indian water rights cannot
be lost through nonuse.
Also like federal
reserved rights, most Indian water rights
have not been quantified.
There is a strong pressure from all
parties-at-interest to resolve the uncertainty in this situation. Administration policy
favors quantification through negotiation and
the use of federal (not state) cour ts to
litigate Indian claims when negotiations are
not successful.
The preference for solvJng
the issue of Indian water rights claims
through administrative means appears to be
widespread.
The Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs introduced (in 1978) a bill to
remove certain legal obstacles to tribes and
states interested in entering into compacts
or intergovernmental agreements.
A National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) task
force, composed of 'state legislators and
tribal repre'sentatives, proposed the establishment of a commission to explore and
test on a pilot basis forms of intergovernmental cooperation (coordination, mediation,
conciliation) at the state-tribal level.
In
addition, the National Association of Counties (NACO) is collaborating with the Civil
Service Commission and the National Tribal
Chairmen's Association to initiate an effort
which would experiment with such intergovernmental form of cooperation at the
tribal-county level.
These initiatives
reflect a dissatisfaction with judicial or
single, blanket legislative approaches to
solving the complex and highly diversified
jurisdictional problems involving the Indian
tribes.

Three major tributaries (the Green,
the Yampa, and the White Rivers) join the
Colorado River in the Uintah Basin. Although
Colorado has agreed that Utah is entitled to
500,000 af/yr from the Yampa, no quantitative
agreement has been reached concerning
Utah's entitlement from the White.
Utah's
share from the Green (flowing from v,lyoming)
is also an unsettled issue.

Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights
By a statute enacted in 1866, the United
States is recognized as the original owner of
the vast public domain in the West. Over the
course of time, the federal government has
set aside large tracts of land for national
parks and forests, wildlife refuges, and
other uses. When a tract of land is reserved
from the public domain for some such purpose,
the government also reserves sufficient water
from sources pert inent to the reserved land
to accomplish that purpose; the water thus
reserved is the federal
Unlike the appropriat ·"--:"':;"':;'r""-i-"':";~·
water users obtain from sta
the federal right remains valid even if the
water is not actually used (the "use it or
lose it" principle does not apply).

The issues of Indian and federal reserved water rights are of great importance
for the Uintah Basin.
Exercise of the
federal reserved water rights for the Flaming
Gorge National Recreation Area, the extensive
Forest Service land in the llint.1h Nal ionaJ
Forest, and BLM land holdings could, when
quantified, add up to a substantial claim.
The Indian water rights claim by the Ute
Tribe on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation is
also substantial.
The Utes claim 129,201
acres of irrigable land on the reservation,
for a minimum entitlement of 387,000 acre
feet based on 3 acre feet of water per
irrigable acrE'.

The heart of the federal reserved water
rights problem is that many water users,
whose right is junior to the 1866 federal
statute, fear that the water that they have

The tribe signed an agreement in 1965 to
defer some of its water ril!,hts until 2005 so
the Central Utah Project (CUP) could proceed.
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The political controversy a
ociated
with water project in the Colora 0 River
Basin became more heated the Carter Administration announced its "hit list" in the
sing of 1977. Dismayed by the
backlog
o
projects,2 the very substant
federal
outlays that would be required to implement
these projects, and the belief that many of
them were uneconomic or environmentally
unsound, Pres ident Carter ordered a review
of 342 projects. After an initial screening,
32 were selected for extensive study (with
public hearings).
Of these, nine were
recommended for continued funding, five for
modification, and 18 for deletion.
While
the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah
Project was one of the nine "reinstated
projects," three Colorado projects (Fruitland
Mesa, Savery-Pothook, and Narrows) were among
the 18 recommended for deletion.
The House
Appropriations Committee approved only six
deletions (including the three Colorado
projects), but put the other 12 back in the
bill which the President reluctantly signed
in October 1977.

But several tribal members objected and sued
the CUP in order to insure that Indian water
needs will be met before CUP water is exported to the Salt Lake City metropolitan area.
Water Development Projects
The Colorado is one of the most highly
regulated rivers in the world.
Its many dams
and reservoirs, water diversion and conveyance systems, and aqueducts for out-of-basin
exports are the product of a long history of
interaction between water planners, decision
makers in the political arena, and the
public.
From the passage of the Reclamation Act
of 1902 to the present time, major water
development projects in the basin have, for
the most part, been undertaken through
the Bureau of Reclamation. Local institutions
have worked through their representatives in
Congress and state water agencies in getting
the federal government involved. Federal
subs idies have been an important factor
in making projects financially feasible.
Irrigation development has had strong public
support in the basin states and has been
supported nationally as part of an equitable
apportionment of funds for regional deve
ment.
State agencies have played impor
poli t ica 1 roles in the process, as have
multi-state coalitions such as the Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact Commission,
working to resolve conflicts, build coali
tions, and get faCilitating legislation
through state legislatures.

The water projects issue flared up again
when the President transmitted his recommendations for new project starts to Congress
in June 1978.
While the President's recommendations for new construction starts
included 17 Corps of Enginee-rs projects and
nine Bureau of Reclamation
ojects, noticeably absent were Fruitl
Mesa, SaveryPothook, and Narrows (in Colorado) and the
Uintah and Upalco Units of the Central
Utah Project.
The House Public Works Committee
produced a bill that far exceeded the Administration's recommendations.
It provided
for 53 new construction starts (27 more than
those recommended by the President) at a cost
of $1.8 billion.
Included were the (above)
three Colorado projects and the U intah and
Upalco Units of the Central Utah Project.

The variability of annual flows has been
an important stimulus for construction in the
Upper Basin.
Since a growing population
and economy cannot be maintained with an
undependable water supply, legislat ion was
enacted to provide for the cons truct ion
of storage facilities to minimize the impact
of yearly flow variations (Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928, Colorado River
Project Act of 1956, and the Colorado River
Basin Pr
t Act of 1968).

Dismayed by the reappearance of the six
projects that had been deleted the previous
year, the absence of fund
for the Wa ter
Resources Council (which he wished to playa
key role in implementation of his water
policy), a provision that would mandate
the hirin~ of more than 2,300 new Corps and
Bureau employees, and the high price ta~, the
President vetoed the bill in October 1978.
Failing to override the veto, a substitute
bill cons istent wi th the Pres ident' s des ires
was hurriedly passed and s
into law.

Pr ior to passage of the Colorado River
Stor
Project Act of 1956, most water
deve opment
rojects served che Lower
Basin. De
ned to develop and beneficially use its appor t ioned share of Colorado
River water (California has consistently used
far more than its 4.4 maf entitlement) and
fearful that nonuse might result in the
loss of its entitlement, especially in view
of the increasing severity of the problem of
salinity, the Upper Bas in has since pushed
hard for completion of the numerous pr
au thor ized under the Storage Projec
Act
(includ
the Central Utah Project in Utah
which involves several units of special
significance to the Uintah Basin).
The
Bureau has invested over $380 million in the
State of Utah, much of it allocated to
construction of Flaming Gorge Dam and
the Vernal Unit of the Central Utah Project.

Since the Pres ident' s recommended new
construction starts sought to follow the
project evaluation criteria articulated

2Th irty Bureau and 233 Corps projects
with construction underway; 17 Bureau and 254
Corps projects authorized but not funded; and
numerous other projects in various sta~es of
plannin~.
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Columbia, Interior Secretary Andrus proposed
rules and regulations (in August 1977) for
their enforcement.

in h is June 1978
Water
Policy Message to
Congress, the successful veto perhaps signals
*reater use of objective analysis and less of
porkbarrel" water politics in funding
decisions. Since the Uintah and Upalco Units
of the Central Utah Project--authorized two
decades ago in the Colorado River Storage
ProJ"ect Act--have not been approved for
fun ing, it appears likely that these projects will have to meet the standards discussed in the next section.

Witnesses participating in the hearings
held throughout the West on the proposed
rules and regulations were generally opposed,
even though approximately 90 percent of the
acreage in the 17 Reclamation states meets
the 160-acre limitation.
The widespread
opposition led to a new Administration
policy presented by Secretary Andrus to
Congress in April 1978. This policy would
increase the individual acreage from 160 to
320 acres; require that an individual must
live within 50 miles and be involved in the
farming operation to be eligible; disallow
minor children as eligible for acreage
allotments; allow an individual with less
productive land within a project area to
receive additional land to achieve "equi
valency"; allow an individual to lease up to
one-half of his allotment or to acquire up to
480 acres through an ownership/lease combinat ion; set the maximum amount of acreage in
single operations el ible for reclamation
project water at 960 acres; allow partnerships if they meet the size, residency, and
farming involvement requirements; and allow
the sale of excess land to family, neighbors,
and long-term tenants and employees and
otherwise require the sale of land by
lottery.

Water Policy
In his June 1977 Environmental Message
to Congress, President Carter announced that
he was directing the Water Resources Council,
th~ Office of Management and Budget, and the
Council on Environmental Quality to undertake
a comprehensive review of water resources
policy, The review would cover criteria for
project planning, cost-sharing arrangements,
conservation strategies, and other matters
continuing a long series of previous efforts
,to establish a uniform national water policy.
Early investigations in the Carter review
revealed that 25 separate federal agencies
collectively spend more than $10 billion per
year on water resources projects and related
programs.
Furthermore, states are primarily
responsible for water policy within their
boundaries and yet are not integrally in
volved in setting priorities and sharing in
federal project planning and funding.

Energy Development
In order to improve planning practice
and ach ieve more efficient management of
federal water resources programs, the President announced in a message to Congress in
June 1978 that he would direct the Water
Resources Council to 1) add water conservat ion as a specific component of both the
economic and environmental objectives of the
Principles and Standards; and 2) require
explicit formulation and consideration of a
primarily nonstructural plan as an alternat ive to each structural water project planned.

The Colorado River Basin contains large
energy resources. There is more oi 1 in the
shale deposits of northwest Colorado, northeast Utah, and southwest Wyoming than in all
.the Middle East.
The Colorado plateau of
Colorado, Utah, and the Navajo Reservat ion
has 95 percent of dll the uranium in the
country.
The total amount of sub-bituminous
and lignite coal in the region is estimated
to be 1.3 trillion tons--enough to provide
the U.S. with fuel, at its present rate of
cons ump t ion, for more than three centur ies
(Bureau of Reclamation, 1975).

Additional announced criteria were
that projects 1) be actively supported by
state and local officials;
2) require a
state financial contribution above existing
cost sharing; and 3) provide for recovery of
federal and state costs (when vendible
outputs are involved).

The Uintah Basin itself contains vast
reserves of oil shale, tar sands, coal, oil
and gas, and some uranium.
The "oil boom"
began in the area in the mid-1960s and is
still going strong. Two large tracts of land
in the basin were selected by the Department
of the Interior as prototypes for oil shale
development.
The leases on these tractg are
held by the White River Shale Oil Project
(Sun, Sohio, and Phillips).
Much of the
basin's energy resources are on the Uintah
and Ouray Reservations.

160-Acre Limitation
The 1902 Reclama t ion Ac t limi ts the
del Ivery of federal reclamation water to
farms of !60 acres or less and requires
that the owner of the farming operation
actually live on the land.
Both the 160-acre
limitation and residency requirement have
been unpopular and generally not enforced.
U.S.

Estimated production from the oil
shale deposits is 300,000 bbl per day by the
early 1980s, increasing to 2.8 million bbl
per day by ~he mid 1990s (Bureau of Reclama
tion, 1975).
Bishop et a1. (1975) has
estimated that, .mder current technology, a
100,000-bbl/day operation would require about
17,000 acre feet of water per year.
Keith,

In compliance with a directive from the
District Court in the District of
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quality as that delivered at Imperial Dam.
The issue reached a head when Wellton-Mohawk
drainage water and reduced flows associated
with upstream development caused salinity
levels in the waters reach ing Mexico to
increase to 1500 ppm in 1962.
The Mexican
government reopened negotiations that
resulted in Minute 218 (1965) and an agreed
reduction of salinity levels in Mexico's
received waters (1240 ppm in 1971).

Andersen, and Gardner (1975) estimated the
consumptive use of water required for energy
development to total between 700,000 acre
feet and 2,300,000 acre feet.
Approximately 90 percent of water use in
the Colorado River Bas in now occurs in the
agr icul tural sector.
When energy companies
can afford to pay $400 or more for an acre
foot of water that benefits farmers by
amounts in the $7-16 range, significant
shifts in water use from agriculture to
energy can be expected, provided that
the institutional environment (state water
use priorities, prohibitions on intersectoral
transfers, level of federal subsidy to
agriculture, cost sharing arrangements for
new projects, etc.) does not impose prohibitive limitations.

Still dissatisfied, however, Mexico's
President Echeverria stated in 1972 that
Mexico would not accept drainage water
from the Wellton-Mohawk project.
He further
stated that the only valid interpretation of
the 1944
is that Mexican farmers must
receive water
the same quality as that at
Imperial Dam.
The following round of
negotiations led to Minute 242 (1973), which
called for the reduction of the salinity
of water delivered to Mexico to a level no
more than 115 ppm (+ 30) in excess of the
salinity at Imperial -Dam.
This goal was to
be ach ieved by the cons truct ion of a large
desalinization
ant to treat the WelltonMohawk dra
and led eventually to the
1974 Colorado
Basin Salinity Control
Act which implemented Minute 242 and authorized a number of other salinity control
projects (mostly in the Upper Basin).

A shift in water use from agricultural
to energy development will have significant
economic, environmental, and social impacts.
Wi th respect to environmental concerns,
use may improve or degrade the water
qua
ty depending on the extraction and
processing technologies selected for the
energy resource.
Transfers to energy
uses which have a high return flow would
increase water quality since the energy use
would not pollute the water and the leaching
of salts from irrigated cropland would be
reduced; however, transfers to consumptive
energy uses would provide less water for
dilution and thus reduce water quality.
Many other economic, environmental, and
social impacts could be cited which are just
as important.

Increases in salinity reduce agricultural productivity, damage equipment and
plumbing, and limit the use of water in
industry and municipali ties.
Bishop et a1.
(1975) estimated that salinity damages amount
to about $230,000 per mg/l at Imperial Dam,
and the Bureau of Reclamation (1974) shows
a possible reduction of $16 per acre in net
farm income for the Imperial Valley if
salini ty increases by 320 mg/l by the year
2000.

In the first half of the century,
siltation was regarded as the most serious
water quality problem in the basin.
While
soil conserva t ion pract ices and the sed iment
trapped in reservoirs have reduced siltation
problems, increased leach ing of soil salts,
reservoir evaporation, and diversion of fresh
water from the basin have caused the problem
of salinity to grow steadily more serious.
Natural systems contribute half to 70 percent
of the salt load. Of the man-caused sources,
most salt is contributed by irrigated agriculture. Again estimates vary, but a 1972 EPA
publication estimated that 33 percent of the
total salt load comes from agriculture, with
only 2 percent coming from municipal and
industrial sources.
The Bureau's Water
Quality Improvement Program contains efforts
to upgrade on-farm management as a means of
solving the problem, but implementation is
constra ined by factors from other perspectives working against farmer acceptance.

A new philosophy of salinity control
within the United States was adopted with the
passage of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500).
Section 402 of the Act makes the discharge of
pollutants into receiving waters illegal
unless the discharger has complied with the
effluent limitations specified in a permit.
The states are encouraged to assume responsib ili ty for the permi t program.
Four of the
Colorado River Basin states ptesently have an
approved
t program.
Utah is one of the
three s
that does not.
Section 301 of P.L. 92-s00--the effluent
limitation program--required that point
source effluents from agriculture and industry be limited to levels achievable
through appl icat ion of the best pract icable
tech
(BPT) by 1977 and the best available t
nology (BAT) by 1983.
The goals
are to rna k e W 11 t e r sa [ e for a qua tic I ire
and wildlife by 1983, and to achieve zero
pollution discharge (ZPD) by 1985.

fly the 19/~Os, salinity had become a
miljor issue in U.S.-Mexican relations.
Although the 1944 Mexican Water Treaty does
not specifically refer to the issue of
salinity, Mexico has repeatedly voiced the
belief that the United States had obligated
itself to deliver to Mexico water of the same

It was strongly argued by \-later (lnd
agricultural interests in the Colorado River
Basin that P.L. 92-500 is baSically muni24

state legislatures, and local,
multistate task forces bein
develop plans and programs for
the expected problem.

cipally and industrially oriented and should
not be indiscriminately applied to irrigated
agr iculture.
Early and vigorous efforts on
the par t of EPA to apply the permi t and
effluent limitation programs to agriculture
met
strong
resistance.
There were no
technically feasible salinity control measures that farmers could afford.

state, and
formed to
ling with

Desp ite the widespread drough t cond itions, the 1977 crop year was one of the best
in U.S. history.
A number of factors
were responsible for this anomalous outcome.
The soil conservation measures and added
reservoir storage implemented after droughts
of the 1930s and 1950s helped mitigate
potential damages.
Extensive groundwater
pumping saved many crops.
In many areas,
production was up despite drought-related
lower yields s imply because more acres were
planted.
Farmers in some areas were simply
lucky--infrequent rains came at the right
time.
Nevertheless, many farmers and livestock producers were hard hit with the
greates t losses occurr ing in lives tock and
dryland farming operations.

In 1973, EPA clarified application of
the permi t program to irrigated agriculture
by specifying that permits would only
be required when there is a point source
of disch
and when the return flow is from
more than
,000 cont iguous acres wh ich use
the same drainage system. The regulation was
temporarily struck down in 1975 through a
suit brought by the Natural Resources Defense
Counc iI, wh ich wanted cont inuat ion of the
permit requirements for small farmers, but
that rul
was later overturned.
In 1974, EPA issued a regulation re
quir
the states to adopt numeric standards
,for sa inity, consistent with the poli
of maintaining average annual salinity leve
in the lower main stem at or below 1972
levels (nondegradation) and to submit a plan
of implementation not later than October 18,
1975.
The Salinity Control Forum, formed by
the Colorado River Basin states in 1972 to
deal with EPA in implementing the Act,
developed numeric standards based on the
nondegradation policy and succeeded in
gaining EPA concurrence in setting these
standards at locations below Hoover, Parker,
and Imperial Dams (as opposed to state
boundaries as earlier advocated by EPA). The
approved implementation plan is based on the
Bureau of Reclamation's Water Quality Improvement Program, which incorporated the
salinity control projects authorized by
the 1974 Salinity Control Act and other
salinity control measures.

Institutions
Survey of Interstate Institutions
The issues characterized above have a
long and continuing history that has generated many contesting interests.
In the
process of becoming one of the most regulated
rivers in the world, the Colorado has also
become one of the most institutionally
complex.
This section describes the principal institutions and how they have interacted
to determine how the waters of the Colorado
are used.
Owing to the large amount of public
lands in the basin and the national policy of
irrigating desert areas, the federal government has exerted a strong influence on
Colorado River Basin development. The Bureau
of Reclamation has played a preeminent role
in water project development.
The Supreme
Court resolved interstate allocation issues
in the Lower Basin.
Federal courts have
been involved in the resolution of Indian
water rights issues and--despite the movement
to seek nonjudicial solutions in this
difficult and sensitive area will no doubt
continue to be involved in future decisions
concerning the nature and extent of Indian
water rights. The Environmental Protection
Agency has played a central role in the field
of pollution control and, along with the
Bureau of Reclamation, has been a key actor
in controversial efforts to reduce salinity
levels in the Colorado and its tributaries.

The winter months of 1976-77 saw
spreading and deepening conditions of drought
throughout the Colorado River Basin--indeed,
by the spring of 1977, moderate to severe
'drought covered large portions of the country.
Measurements of Colorado River flow at
Lee Ferry in April and May showed the
lowest flows in over 70 years of record.
I
As conditions worsened, private and
public concern rose sharply and led to
remarkable state and federal responses.
Over 60 drought-related bills were introduced
in Congress, inc Iud ing those mak ing up the
president's $844 million "drought package,"
and many existing federal programs were
mobil i zed to dea 1 with the problem.
The
result was one of the most expensive (an
estimated $4 billion total) and one of the
mos t rap idly mounted relief effort" in the
nation's history.
Action at the state level
was no less impressive, with emergency powers
being
granted
to governors,
scores of
drought-related bills being introduced in

While federal action~ have been a
dominant force in the development and use of
Colorado River water, institutions within the
basin have been effective in "shaping" the
federal involvement.
A sign if icant port ion
of the basin's institutional development has
occurred as a result of state initiatives and
multi-state agreements. The basin's numerous
water-related interests and the dynamics of
"distributive water politics" have created a
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Council, 1978). That meeting resulted in the
formation of the Western Regional Drouf!.ht
Act ion Task Force (WRDATF), staffed by the
Western States Water Council and the In
stitute for Policy Research.

large variety of multi-state organizations of
wh ich the 12 shown in Table 2 provide a
representative sample.
The role that regio~al and state
organizations have played In influencing
federal policy is aptly described by Mann
(1975).
Adopting Lowi's (1972) concept of
" dis t rib uti v e pol i tic s ," Man n has show n
how different organizations with divergent
missions have banded together in loose
coalitions for the purpose of realizing
common object ives.
Coali t ions have appeared
when organizations within the basin have
perce ived a common threat or a common benefit, and when collective action has been
perceived as an effective strategy for
avo id ing the threat, obtaining the benef it,
and ensuring that associated costs and
benef its are worked out in an "equi table"
manner among competing basin interests.
Example coali tions and agreements have been
forged to influence Congressional water
project authorizations and appropriations,
t.o minimize federal dictation in interstate
allocation decisions, to ensure that federal
concessions to Mexico do not compromise basin
i nteres ts unduly, to ward of f "unreasonable"
EPA pollution standards and enforcement
actions (especially in regard to salinity),
and to prevent a federal preemption of the
preroga t ives and r igh ts of states to manage
water within their boundaries.

The WRDATF was organized to serve 8S an
information clearinghouse on drought relief
programs, represent the states' interests
before Congress and the Administration, and
organize special studies.
The prinicpal
achievements of WRDATF were:

1.
Weekly publicat ion
Drought Conditions: 1977.

of
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2.
Coordination of state efforts with
four federal agency (the Federal Disaster
Assista.nce Administration, the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Department of Agriculture,
and the Corps of Engineers) programs.
3.
Review from the state viewpoint of
the proposed
$844 mi 11 i on
Wh i te House
"drought package" and exchange of information
on problems and actions of the individual
states.
4.
Assignment of a representative to
the Office of the White House Drought Coordinator to monitor and report on Administration and Congressional drouf!.ht
initiatives and to prepare, publish, and
distribute a "directory of federal drought
assistance."

Example Performance of the Western
States Water Council during the
Drought Emergency

5.
Formation of working groups to
deal with issues and problems in the areas of
crops and irrigation; livestock and rangeland; fish, wildlife, and recreation;
energy, business, and industry: and Task
Force Management.

By the winter of 1976-1977 several
western states had already experienced
drought conditions for a year or more and
initiated drought mit
tion programs.
As
conditions worsened, the states began to turn
to collective action and federal assistance.
Growing concern was evident at a January
20 meeting of the Western Governors' Task
Force on Regional Policy Management in
which possible multi-state actions were
discussed, and at a January 28 meeting of the
Western States Water Council. It was decided
at the latter meeting that the Council should
publish a weekly bulletin,
Conditions, 1977.

6.
As s ignment of a member of the
Utah Department of Agriculture to USDA on a
temporary duty ass ignment to coord inate
federal and state agriculture programs.
7.
Initiation and organization of
efforts leading to the passage and signing
of a bill which gave the Secretary of the
Interior authority to reallocate funds
from h is "water bank" program to other
programs (e.g., state grants) (Western
Governors' Policy Office, 1978, p. 26-27).

These two meetings led to a third
meetinf!. on February 20, attended by the
governors of 14 western states and Interior
Secretary, Cecil Andrus.
Three notable
agreements were reached at the meeting; 1)
the Secretary of the Interior would seek
appointment of a federal drought coordinator
in the Executive Office (Jack Watson was
appOinted February 22), 2) each
overnor
would appoint a state drought coor inator
and, 3) the governors would meet one week
later at the National Governors Conference to
consider further steps (Western States Water

The significant role achieved by the
states in shaping the federal droufht mitigation program was made possible by establishing a temporary, special purpose multi-state
organization (WRDATF) which was able to
mobilize the existing resources of es
tablished organizations
(Western States
Water Counci 1 and Western Governors' Policy
Office).
As preCipitation levels increased
in the winter of 1977-78, the common need for
the Task Force diminished; and the organization was dissolved in the spring (Western
Governors' Policy Office, 1978).
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1. An appeal ror maximum flexibility in
the manner and methods by which states' are
permitted to contribute their share of water
project costs.

Example Performance of the Western States
water CouncIL In InfluencIng Carter
Administration Water Policy
When the President announced a sixmonth study of water policy on May 23,
1977, the Western States Water Council (WSWC)
obtained and disseminated inrormation that
became available prior to formal publication
of the options on July 15 in the Federal
Register.
A draft briefing paper informed
the western governors of the issues emerging,
but the Council decided that it could not
make a formal statement at the July 28-29 or
August 1-2 hearings because of the short time
period between publication of the options and
the hearings (Western States Water Council,
1978) .

2. An objection to the preclusion or
state court adjudication of federal reserve
and Indian water rights.
3. A request that the Secretary or the
Interior direct federal officials to observe
state water rights laws in the operation of
federal reclamation projects, and to recogn ize the primacy of the state role in water
resources allocations.
4. A call for application of conserva
t ion measures to meet s ite-specif ic needs.

The Western Governors' Conference
convened in September in Anchorage, Alaska,
with Secretary of the Interior Andrus and
other federal officials in attendance.
A
special committee of the Council had used the
additional time to prepare a briefing document to assist the governors in their dicussions with the federal officials.
Many
western governors perceived a threat of
encroachment on state water perogatives,
and saw a need for formalizing a policy to
assert state interests.

5. A call for consistency in rederal
funding level for state planning efforts.
6. A reassertion of state primacy in
the protect ion of groundwater supply and
instream flows (Western States Water Council,
1978).
These positions provide excellent
examples of state-federal differences in
western water policy.

Articulation of these concerns led to
a meet ing in Reno of the western governors
with Vice President Mondale and Secretary of
the Interior and a following meeting with the
Pres ident in Denver.
Both meet ings sought
administration assurance that there would not
be encroachment on state and local perogatives, but the western governors remained
skeptical.

State Water Organizations
At prese~t, water planning in Utah
is performed In three distinct executive
agencies:
Office of the State Engineer,
which is responsible for the administration
of the state's water rights law; Division of
Water Resources, which administers water
conservation and development projects and
represents Utah in negotiations involving the
state's interstate waters; and Water Quality
Section of the Bureau of Environmental
Health, which administers the State's Water
Quality Act and represents Utah's water
quality interests in the Colorado River Basin
Salinity Forum (Crawford and Weatherford,
1975) .

The 13 executive orders of July 1978
documented the water policy decisions made by
the President to that point and lead to
creation of 19 task forces responsible for
making recommendations on particular water
policy issues.
The Western States Water
Council has been monitor ing the progress of
these task forces and has repeatedly taken
the pos it ion that the implementat ion recommendations be brought back to a high level
policy pos ition for review (Barnett, 1979).

The Division of Water Reosurces was
assigned the task of formulating a state-wide
water resources plan.
The agency is act ive
in planning small-scale water projects,
assessing alternative uses for Utah's remaining unappropriated water, and looking into
options on how the state can meet its future
water needs.

Because of the difficulty of obtaining
informed gubernatorial response to so many
wa ter policy proposals, the National Governors' Association (with Utah Governor Scott
Matheson chairing the water subcommittee)
adopted 13 principles for water policy to
provide the states a common reference against
which future Administration policy initiat ives could be measured.
The WSWC worked
closely with the National Governors' Association while these principles were developed.

The Water Quality Section of the Bureau
of Environmental Health is responsible for
state water quality planning.
Several
levels are involved.
Under Section 106 of
the Federal Water Pollut ion Control Act
Amendments, Utah is required to submit to EPA
each year a state program plan which outlines
the state's prinCipal water quality problems,
reviews accomplishments during the previous
year, and shows how the state will allocate
resources during the ensuing year among the
water quality program areas, including
planning, the permit system, monitoring

Up to that point, the Council had
refrained from expressing an official posit ion to avoid diversive regional responses.
Once a Western States' position was established, the Council becarr.e convinced that a
statement was in order. One was approved in
October 1978. Highlights include:
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Table 2.

Water-related regional organizations in the Colorado River Basin.
Issue
Identification a

Name of Organization

Type of Organization

Upper Colorado River
Commiss ion

Compact Commission

Apportionment of Colorado River water uses; determine upper
basin states' delivery obligations at Lee's Ferry; resolve
controversies; secure upper basin agricultural and industrial development and promote related water storage
projects; encourage

La Plata River
Compact Commission

Compact Commission

Administer La Plata River Compact; moniter and maintain
stream gaging stations

Pacific Southwest
Interagency
Committee

Joint Federal-State
Regional
Organization

Provide means of coordination of interests, policies,
programs and activities of states and federal agencies
in water and related land resources investigations,
planning, construction, operation, and maintenance;
provide means of conflict resolution

1-7

Four Corners
Regional Commission

Joint Federal-State
Regional
Organization

Distribute and administer federal funds for infrastructure development under the Public Works and
Economic Development Act of 1965

1,3,5,7

Mission

1-7

Budget

Source of Funding

$160,000
(FY76)

From states in same
proportion as upper
basin consumptive use
allocation

None

Activities carried
out by state engineers of member
states (Colo. & N.M.)

None

Staff support and
other costs provided
by members

$733,295
(FY76)
(Admin.

Federal

Exp. )

I\)

co

Old West Regional
Commission

Joint Federal-State
Regional
Organization

Distribute and administer federal funds for infrastructure development under the Public Works and
Economic Development Act of 1965

Colorado River Basin
Salinity Control
Forum

State Executive
Branch
Organization

Promote interstate cooperation on salinity and other
interstate water problems

Western States
Water Council

State Executive
Branch Organization

Committee of
Fourteen

1,3,5,7

$825,328

(FY77)

Federal

(Admin.
Exp.)
3

None

Promote cooperation among western states in planning
for programs leading to integrated development by state,
federal, and other agencies of western water resources

1-7

$174,000
(FY7 8)

State Executive
Branch Organization

Advise the State Department on Colorado River salinity
problems in negotiations with Mexico

1,3

None

North American
Interstate Weather
Modification
Council

State Executive
Branch Organization

Coordinate international, interstate, and intrastate
weather modification activities to attain legislative
uniformity and effective information exchange while
maintaining state and local control

Interstate
Conference on
Water Problems

State Executive
Branch Organization

Provide a forum for expression of states' viewpoints on
water problems of common concern

1-7

Staff support and
other costs provided
by members
Mostly from state
assessments
Staff support and
other costs provided
by members

$10,700
(FY76)

Membership dues

$18,712
(FY75)

State assessments and
federal grants

.J

Table 2.
Western Snow
Conference

Professional
Association

Coordination of water supply forecasts and techniques
of snow surveying watershed management, conservation and
use

Association of
Western State
Engineers

Professional
Association

Forum to discuss· state water rights administration;
preserve states' rights in use and control of state
waters

2
3
4
5
6
7

f\)
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Continued.

Water development
Carter Administration water policy
Water quality
1976-77 drought
Indian and federal water rights
160-acre limitation
Energy development

$6,000

(FY75)
1,3,5,7

$1,000
(FY75)

Membership dues and
fees for services
State dues,
registrations,
carryovers

agencies, agency planning specialists, and other decision makers.
3.
It has made use of a
planning concept (Alternative
Futures) wh ich provides for the
continuing consideration of possible future events, singly and in
various combinations, which can
significantly alter future requirements for governmental services
and the order of their priority.
4.
I t has evolved a means
(Economic and Demographic Impact
Model) by which known statistical
data, in combination with anticipated but uncertain events, can
be projected to obtain a more
dependable picture of what the
relationship of public needs and
available resources will be five or
ten
s in the future.
It has evolved a planning
process which at every step is
or iented toward establish in!" an
effective relationship between
planning: and budgeting (Office of
the State Planning Coordinator,

and enforcement, f aci Ii ties cons truct ion,
training and certification of operators,
development of stream standards, public
participation, and administration.
At another level, Utah has been working
on basin plans for its rivers.
These plans
provide classifications of each segment of
the streams according to waste assimilation
capacitiies in relation to the water quality
standards established by the state.
They
analyze future population growth and economic
development and outline systematic management
and regulation approaches for maximizing
public benef i t with minimum public expendit ures.
The bas in plans provide a framework
for two other levels of planning, namely
area-wide and facilities planning.
Areawide (or so-called "208")
lans will be
developed for all areas of
state having
serious pollution problems.
The Uintah Basin
is one such area.
Among other things, these
plans call for the control of nonpoint
sources of pollution, the protection of
flroundwater, and the r
ulation of the
location and construction
any facilities
which may result in pollution.
In effect,
Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments calls for the integrat ion of land use and water management planning.
Facilities planning involves engineering and economic feasibility studies for
the construction of wastewater treatment
facilities, with the objective of integrating
such facilities into basinwide waste management systems.

1972) .
Uintah Basin Water Organizations
Planning within the Uintah Basin combines regional efforts instigated by state
government with the activities of the
various counties and communities.
There are three counties in the Uintah
Basin:
Daggett, Duchesne, and Uintah.
Each is governed by a Board of County Commissioners elected at large. by voters in the
county. A measure of continui
is provided
for the board by the biennial e
ion of two
of the commissioners to a four-year ovet1
term.
The th ird commiss ioner is
e
for a two-year term.

A closely related institutional issue
is the perceived need for the integration
of water and land use planning.
In it
final report, Water Policies for the Future
the National Water Commission (1973) conc luded:
"Water planning is not adequately
integrated with planning for the land uses
that water developments are expected to
serve." The Commission recommended that if
Congress enacted land use planning legislat ion, i t should provide for coordination of
water planning and land use planning at
all levels of government.
As noted above,
Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 also calls for
an integrated planning approach.

There are four third class cities
(Vernal, Roosevelt, Duchesne, and Myton) and
three towns (Manila, Tabioni, and Altamont)
in the Uintah Basin area.
The four third
class cities operate under the mayor-council
form of government. In each odd-numbered year
a municipal election is held in which either
the mayor and two councilmen or three
councilmen are elected to office.

An effort, known as the "Utah Process"
was initiated several
s ago in th€ Office
of the State Plann n
Coordinator, to
coordinate all levels
planning the state.
In a 1972 report, that office summarized its
accomplishments:

The Ute Indians, who occupy 15 percent
of the land in the area, have a tribal
council form of government. The Indian lands
are held in thrust by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs which occupies off ice space in Fort
Duchesne (Horne, 1973).

t.
1 t proposes and to some
degree hilS systema<tized, applied,
ilnd tested, a structure to implement and maintain a coordinated planning procedure.
2.
It has designed this
structure to bring into the planning process the administrators
of
the
various
governmental

The three counties of the llinlah Kasin
compose one of seven intercollnty planning
districts in the state through the Uintah
Basin Association of Governments (UBAG)
created in 1970 to assist municipalities and
counties in planning and promoting basin-wide
development.
UBAG also sponsors and administers federal grants and programs for
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5.
People are beneficially using water
which by right should go for federally
reserved pruposes or use by Indians.
Severe
differences in opion can be anticipated
should these rights be quantified (a process
likely to begin soon) or exercised.

counties and municipalities in the basin and
aids local officials in the preparation and
revision of plans and guidelines for resource
development.
The Governor in 1974 established the
Planning and Development Advisory Council and
a supporting Technical Committee under the
direction of the Executive Director of the
Uintah Basin Association of Governments
(UBAG). The Council was created primarily to
provide information and planning assistance
for local jurisidictions, in anticipation of
growth induced by energy development.

6.
Indian water rights appear to be
in at least partial conflict with water
export to metropolitan Salt Lake City.
The
values to be used in resolving the issue have
not been defined.
7.
The institutions for water development in the Colorado River Bas in have been
strongly oriented toward irrigation, and much
uncertainty exists as to how they will
respond to growing pressure to use more of
the water for municpal and energy-related
uses.

The Planning and Development Advisory
Council has 13 members and consists of
elected officials from cities and counties of
the basin.
The Technical Committee was
formed as a means of providing specific data,
documents, and studies to the Advisory
Council.
The committee provides expertise
in socio-economic, environment, transportation, education, finance, water, and community service.

8.
Historical water allocation and
use decis ions are not in harmony wi th a
nat ional water policy trend toward dec is ion
making by objective criteria.
Continued
clashes can be expected between those promoting a common evaluative framework for all
water planning and those who believe that
they can better promote their interest
through the political process.

Observed Levels Problems
The above description of Colorado
River Basin water issues brings out a number
of problems in levels of analysis.
In
the order of the issues and institutions
presented, some of them are:

9.
The push by the executive branch
of the federal government toward water
conservation (defined as reduction in use as
part of a nonstructural water management
effort) runs strongly counter to the water
use values of the people in the Colorado
R i ve r Bas i n a n din ma n y res p e c t s t o t h e
physical facts of return-flow hydrology in an
arid basin.
The national emphasis can thus
be expected to generate s
ificant conflicts
in the West.

1.
The Colorado River water allocat ion
has been set politically without reference
to desirability in terms of the basic nationa 1 water planning objectives of economic
development and environmetal quality.
Furthermore the negotiation process that
produced this allocation was so protracted
and strenuous that the parties are not
interested in reopening the issues by studying the equity of the results.

10.
The recently proposed compromise
revision to the 160-acre limitation is of a
sort that never makes all sides happy and is
probably going to be a subject for continuing
discussion.
If farmers react to acreage
limitations by making greater use of privately financed groundwater development, import ant implicat ions would r esul t for both
water resources managment and energy conserva t ion.
11.
Since the western irrigation projects were justified in part as promoting
family farming, any major shift of water use
from agr iculture to the large corporat ions
engaged in developing fossil fuel resources
raises important issues related to water
pricing and the equity of federal subsidy.

2.
The allocation set by water interests has major implications for the development of one of the largest sources of fossil
fuels' in the world. Specifically, the existing allocation may constrain
development in ways highly detrimen
to the
national interest in an era
energy
shortage.
3.
Overes t ima t ion of average annual
runoff from the basin at the time the waters
bf the river were legally allocated has
probably worked to increase development
dependent on the water and intensify conflicts among user groups.
The situation
provides an excellent example of the need for
better coordination among dimensions in
decision making (Figure 1).

12. The probable shift of water use from
agriculture to energy is being considered
in the context of fragmentary information on
consequent economic,
environmental,
and
soc ial impacts.
When people exper ience
unanticipated impacts as these shifts are
made, their policy
are likely to
change drastically.
One can expect a rather
unstable water plann
environment.

4.
The institutionalization of Indian
and Federal Reserved Water Rights has
created situations in which certain water
uses are favored over others for reasons
having little to do with current benefits
from use and over which state and local
interests have little voice.
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16.
Institutionally expressed statefederal water policy differences stress
desires on the part of each side to increase
their management responsibility and do not
explicity address the problems of resolving
important differences in policy preferences.
The existing interstate and state-federal
framework is focusing on procedural but not
well on substantive issues.

13. Adopted salinity standards represent
another case in wh ich management goals were
established through the political process
without reference to the objective analysis
advocated by national water policy.
The
situation reinforces a state perception
of a nat lonal government that does not use
its own rules when planning salinity control
measures in national favor but then forces
states to comply with very stringent planning
requirements before funding their projects.

17.
Organizations institutionalized
for planning at the national level are
oriented toward achieving national objectives
and have competent technical staff for
promoting them. At lower levels of analysis,
organizations tend to be swayed more by
national priorities and programs than
by local needs or desires. Local people can,
however, express their desires and are
likely to be able to be more effective in
do ing so when dea li ng wi th Congress than by
interacting through administrative channels.

14.
The difference in goals and values
between the national government and irrigators is seen in farmer resistance to
federally promoted on-farm salinity control
practices.
The differences will have to be
reconciled for decision making at the individual level to promote national goals.
15.
Drought-period decision making
is much less thorough than that done more
leisurely at other times. When water management policy is not determined before drought
conditions develop, the quickly determined
water policy
prove less than adequate and
ye t cont inue
or a long time af terwards.
When policy is determined beforehand, drought
conditions create strains among water users
that put it to a severe test.
Fortunately,
the 1977 drought in the Colorado Basin did
not reach a severity that created such a
test, largely because of the extensive
carryover storage available in large reservoirs from previous years.

Conclusion
The above description of issues and
institutions in the Uintah Basin of the
Colorado River drainage area were used to
list 17 issues related to differences in
levels of analysis.
The list is suggestive
rather than exhaustive, but i t provides a
reasonable idea as to the issues existing
among planning levels in an arid climate.
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CHAPTER IV
PROPDEMM: AN APPLICATION OF A POLICY SIMULATION
COMPUTER MODEL TO A MULTILEVEL,
MULTI GOAL PLANNING SYSTEM
For realistic representation of real
world conditions, water resources planning
models needs to recognize the value, jurisdiction, action, and temporal components of
decision making as shown on Figure 2 in the
framework of multiple levels decidinp: at
multiple levels as shown on Figure 1.
The
practical problem prevent
this sort of
representation is that a suff cient conceptual basis is yet to be established.
This
point is made in recognition that the theory
of multilevel, multigoal hiera~chical systems
has been advanced by Mesarovic, Macko, and
Takahara (1970) and applied by Haimes (1976)
to planning for the Maumee River Basin.
The
point shown in Figure 1 is that real world
decision systems are not entirely hierarchial
and further work is needed to plan in th is
context.
Economic analysis has developed
rules for dealing with situations where
conditions depart from the assumptions of
perfect competition.
Planning theory needs
rules for dealing with varying degrees of
departure from hierarchial decision systems.

.
In a third approach to a better understanding of levels of analysis problems, a
simulation was attempted of the local region,
state, and national viewpoints on water
management in the Uintah Basin. The hope was
that the more explicit representation forced
by having to quantify relationships for ~
model would provide additional insights that
would contribute to conceptual representation
of levels of analysis problems.
Computer Simulation of Partially
Hierarchial Systems
Recent advances in our understanding of
the relationsh ips among physical, economic,
environmental, and social factors in land and
water planning have been made possible, in
part, by use of sophisticated computer
technology for data processing and analysis.
The increased capacity to process information
has increased our ability to analyze larger
and more complex systems in greater detail.
This, in turn, has increased the potential
benefits from computer modeling (Riley, 1976,
p. 18-19). A wide range of managment alternatives can be evaluated as systematic
information storage and retrieval permit
focus
attention on component parts without
losing sight of the larger
tern.
Clarity
in system definition is
ncreased, and
information deficiencies and needs are
identified.

General Structure of PROPDEMM
Th is chapter uses the PROPDEMM s imu lation to identify levels of analysis problems.
The PROPDEMM (Programmed Policy Decision
Making Model) simulation was developed by
Mulder in 1974 under a grant from the Utah
State University Environment and Man Program
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation
(Hoggan et al., 1974). The simulation is an
application to water resources planning of
concepts adapted from PRINCE, a simulation of
international relations developed by Coplin
and O'Leary at Syracuse University.
In
previous applications, Hoggan et a1. (1974)
utilized the simulation to determine the
effect of group interact ions on alternat ive
plans for the Willamette River Basin, and
Keith et al. (1977) used it to determine and
evaluate social, political, and environmental
trade offs in a multiobjective planning for
the Virgin River Basin.
During the course
of th is project, PROPDEMM was mod if ied
to eliminate erroneous formulae and increase
the rogram efficiency. The altered version
is
to as PROPDEMM II.

A computer model is a set of equations
representing some real system.
The model
defines functional relationships within a
system, defines constraining parameters at
system boundaries, and .transforms raw information into a useful format for the
~nterpretation
of large system activities.
The variety and complexity of models
\lave increased with advances in computer
technology.
Basically, however, there are
two approaches to model development:
mathematical programming (optimization) and
s imulat ion.
Mathematical programming seeks
to identify management decisions that do the
best job of achieving some defined goals.
Simulation models attempt to represent system
behavior in response to defined sequences of
external s timulat ion.
Both types can contribute valuable information on impacts on
planning objectives of a range of feasible
a Iternat ives.

PROPDEMM was developed to tis imulate
decision processes which involve political
and social-ecological interactions" from
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A second feature of PROPDEMM is its
characterization of interest groups and their
interactions (Mulder, 1974: Hoggan et a1.,
1974; Keith et a1., 1977).
For this study,
five interes t groups were used.
Each is
characterized by 1) environmental value
preferences, 2) environmental value salience,
3) power to affect a course of action, 4)
potential for punishment or reward as deter
mined by the decision maker, 5) degree of
dogmatism 6) cos t consciousness, 7) potential to
feet and, in turn, be affected by
the other interest groups, and 8) openness to
change.
F
4 illustrates the relationship of in
est group attributes to the
general policy decision model.
The follow ing da ta inputs are req u ired
and generally must be estimated subjectively
for the modeling.
1. Group dogmatism vector. One dogmatism value for each group is entered by an
ordinal integer value between 1 and 7.
A high dogmatism is indicated by a ranking of

information on the cons iderations shown in
Figure 3.
According to Mulder (1974),
general policy decision making involves four
factors:
interest groups, group values,
policy objectives, and courses of action.
The PROPDEMM simulation is built on the
following assumptions about the relationships
between these four factors:
1) interes t
groups represent the general populace in
articulating policy demands, 2) the interest
groups possess value preferences for some
present, or future, state, 3) the decis ion
maker is responsible for converting these
values into policy objectives, and 4) the
policy object ives will be used to formulate
plans, or courses of action, which will
ach ieve the object ives, and hence the more
a bs tract va lues of the re levant interes t
groups.
For example, an interest group may
desire to maintain, or even increase,
its level of attainment of some value. When
this desire is communicated to the decision
maker, he will devise a course of action by
which the value attainment will be preserved
or increased in the future.

7.

I INTEREST GROUPS :

I
I

I DECISION MAKER I
I OBJECTIVES I
I

VALUES

I

I

I

IMPACT ON VALUES

~I

COURSES OF ACTION (POLICY)

I

.,..,..

I

MODIFIED SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
VARIABLES
Figure 3.

General policy decision model.
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I
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I
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I
I
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I
I

I
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I

I
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POTENTIAL

OPENNESS TO CHANGE

I

OTHER INTEREST
GROUPS

Figure 4.

INTEREST GROUP

Relationship of interest groups to the general decision model.
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match between existing environmental conditions and group environmental values.
The
dec is ion maker is able to view these indices
and propose courses of action to improve the

2.
Punishment-reward potential vector.
One punishment-reward potential value for
each group is entered by an ordinal integer
value between -3 and .3. A -3 indicates a
high potential for punishment by the decision
maker.

fit.

Following formulation of applicable
courses of act ion, an output is pr ovided in
the form of a preliminary Nonsystemic
Political Feasibility Index (NSPFI).
This
output gives the decision maker his first
information on how each interest group
stands with regard to the formulated courses
of action.
The output is preliminary
because it treats each interest group as if
it were affected only by the envi ronmental
conditions and the courses of action.
From
this output, the decision maker is able to
determine those aspects of a course of action
that are liked or disliked by the interes t
group.
This knowledge may permit the
decision maker to modify some undesirable
features or develop alternatives more likely
to be acceptable.

3.
Cost consciousness/cost level
vectors. -1'h-e--'-cost- consciOusness-vector--fs
entered by an ordinal integer value between 1
and 7. A ranking of 7 represents a high level
of cost consciousness among a group.
The
cost level vectors are also inputted by
ord inal integers between 1 and 7.
There is
~ne cost level for each course of action.
4.
Q~£~E_~ii~£!_ve£!£~.
For each
group, a set of affect vectors is entered to
~epresent the affect of that one group on all
pther
groups.
The
affect
vectors are
supplied as ordinal integers between -3 and
3.
A -3 represents a high negative affect;
no affect is represented by 0; and, a high
positive affect is represented by 3.
5.
Group values vector.
Ten environmental values are entered for each group.
The group values are entered USing -3 to 3 on
an ordinal scale representing the degree
of preference.

The final output of the PROPDEMM simulation is the Sytemic Political Feasibility
Index (SPFI).
This index utilizes the NSPFI
i n d e x and inc 0 r po rat e s t h e imp a.c t t hat
other interest groups may have on a given
group's support for particular courses of
action. The model thus provides for the fact
that the selection of a political strategy by
an interest group requires an estimate of
support and opposition from other groups.
The SPFI, when compared to the NSPFI, gives
the decision maker information on the importance of group interactions and on possible coalitions among interest groups.
Refinements can be made in order to des ign
alternatives capable of generating greater
support.

6.
Group salience vectors.
Ten sal ience vectors are entered for each group.
The salience vectors represent a degree of
commi tment to each of the ten environmental
values.
An ordinal scale of 1 to 7 is
used.
7.
Q~£~E_Eow~~_ve£!£~~.
Fifteen
values for each group represent the power
that that group has to impact each course of
action.
A 1 to 7 ordinal scale is used to
rank the group power.
8.
Environmental impact value vectors.
A -3 to 3 ordinal scale is used to enter the
impact of a given environmental factor on
the environmental values.
A scale of 1 to
5 is used to rank each environmental factor
with respect to impact intensity on the
e nvi ronmental va lues.
A 1 represents the
most intense.

Uintah Application
The model was applied to three levels
of decision making--the Uintah Basin, the
State of Utah, and the Colorado River Basin-chosen according to a combination of hydrologic and political jurisdiction criteria.
The three levels correspond to the planning
perspectives emphasized in recent national
legislation.
For example, basin-wide planning and state planning are encouraged in
Title II of the Water Resources Planning Act
of 1965 (PL 89-90).
The Pr inciples and
Standards require multiobjective project
evaluation.
Subbasin planning and area-wide
planning are encouraged in the 1965 Act, and
in Sections
201, 208, 209, and 303 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(PL 92-500) (Mulder et al., 1978).

9. Outcome value vectors. There are
five posSIb~utcomes for each course of
action.
These outcomes, with associated
probabilities, are entered using an ordinal
scale ranging between -3 and 3.
The-3
represents a high negative outcome or
impact.
10.
Indicated salience level.
The
indicated-sarrence-leveT-Is-that-level of
salience which is regarded as significant to
the decision process.
This level is entered
using an ordinal ranking of 0 to 7.

It is of interest to note, however. how
the degree to which the units fail to overlap
geographically produces problems in the
part-whole relation in the level structure.
The Uintah Basin is a hydrologic subdivison
of the Colorado River Basin, and covers
portions of southwest Wyoming, northwest
Colorado, and northeast Utah.
The Uintah

From input information on the above
factors, PROPDEMM simulates outputs to aid
the decision maker.
The first output
is the Environmental Value Modification
vector indices.
These indices indicate the
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rather than to resolve particular water
resources planning issues in the Uintah
Basin, the groups and the information describing them used in the model will not be
spelled out in this report. Greater specificity in that regard would be expected to add
controversy away from the desired thrust of
this study.

Basin Asso~iation of Governments is a political subdivision of the State of Utah and thus
covers only a portion of the hydrologic
region. At the state level, Utah is a member
of the Colorado River Basin Compact, but
hydrologically it is divided approximately in
half between the Colorado Basin and the
Great Basin where most of the people live.
Finally, at the basin level, the member
states of the Compact cover the entire
drainage area of the river, except a small
portion in Mexican territory, but the states
also cover a great deal of additional territory--not one is exclusively within the
Colorado River Basin.

The first use of the simulation model
was to select courses of action for the
planning systems.
To accomplish this task,
the relevant interest groups, group data, and
environmental data (Appendix B) were entered
into the PROPDEMM II model (Appendix A) to
generate an environmental state for the 1990
planning horizon.
The generated environmental state represents the most desired
environmental factors, the least desired
environmental factors, and the most probable
environmental factors.

Other levels of analysis in the governmental dimension of Figure 1 could have been
chosen.
The lowest political subdivisions-counties, cities, and special purpose waterrelated districts were not included. Neither
was the federal government.
Also excluded
were levels along the physical-natural
dimension, such as the smaller hydrologic
areas (six in the Uintah Basin) and the upper
and lower basins and levels in the economic
social and cultural dimensions.
Since
PROPDEMM was applied to only three of the
many possible levels of analysis and in only
one of the five dimensions, the results could
not be expected to provide planning answers,
but they hopefully would ident ify planning
problems.

Following the generation of the environmental states, the Environmental Value
Modification Vector Indices were computed.
These indices (Table 3) measure the match
between the environmental states and the
values of the interest groups.
From these
indices it is possible to derive suitable
courses of act ion (Table 4) des igned to
improve the ma tch between group va lues and
environmental factors, increase the potential
to achieve more desired environmental conditions, and mitigate, or minimize, occurrence
of the less desired environmental conditions.

In opting for three general purpose
governmental units, this application glossed
divisions that might be better for a special
purpose perspective. If water quality is the
priority interest, the river concourse would
be the prominent object of attention.
If
electricity generation were the primary
consideration, water quantity would be the
important water consideration, and transmission lines would determine the units.
Different results would be obtained by
focusing on the other major historic water
development goals, such as irrigation and
flood control.
All of these possibilities
could not be incorporated in one PROPDEMM
simulation.

By achieving these objectives, the
course of action becomes a tool to increase
interest group value satisfaction, or goal
attainment.
In order to permit multilevel
impact assessment, PROPDEMM I I has been
structured so that each planning level can
not only identify its own course of action
preferences but also its peferences for
courses of action at the other two levels.
For each planning level, five alternat ive courses of act ion were devised.
These
courses of action are a composite of present,
or past, water resource project plans. Each
course of action is assigned five possible
outcomes with probabilities of occurrence
approximating a normal distribution.
In
Table 5, the values seen by the State of
Utah planning system for the possible courses
of action at all three simulated levels of
decision making are tabulated.

Having identified the decision making
levels, the next step was to determine the
values being pursued by prominent interests
within each jurisdiction and a set of alternative courses of action for water development at the respective decision levels. This
information was derived from a general values
survey of residents of the Uintah Basin area,
a content analys is of the major da ily newspapers in the Colorado River Bas in, interviews with government officials at the three
levels, and a review of the reports of
government agencies concerned with Colorado
River water. Since the collected information
could not be objectively transformed into
model inputs, the modeling effort must be
cons idered as heuristic (although probably a
fair representation of the interest of actors
in the planning system). Because the purpose
of this PROPDEMM application was to develop
insights into levels of analysis problems

The most probable outcome of each COllfse
of action is rated at a 40 percent probability of occurrence. The next two outcomes
tabulated, rated at 20 percent probability of
occurrence, represent somewhat more optimis
tic and pessimistic impacts respectively.
The final two outcomes, rated at 10 percent
probability of occurrence, represent the
maximum positive and negative impacts.
Each
outcome set thus spans a potential impact
range.
For explor
the problems of mult iple
decision levels, cross impacts of courses of
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Table 3.

Environmental value modification vector indices.

THE SMALLER THE INDEX VALUE, THE CLOSER THE FIT BETWEEN
EXISTING CONDITIONS AND A SET OF GROUP VALUES
FORMULAE ARE: XEMV ~ ABS(EIVV-GRPVAL)!GRPSAL
PXEMV = XEMV!PROBABILITY OF CONDITION
State of Utah
Environmental State 1 Most Probable
Envi ronmental
Cond
1443500 People
8 .5 MAF Annual
15166 AF M-I WTR
Social Service 3
$856M PUB Invest
5702 MW Energy
500 MG/L IDS
6.0-8.0% UNEMP
29M Tourist Days
137 Quad BTU's

Selected
Group 4
Group 6
Vector
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 5
Prob XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV ( PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV)
44
33
38
40
43
40
33
40
38
40

4.0
5.6
4.9
6.4
6.0
3.4
8.2
5.9
5.7
4.8

9.1)
17.0)
12.8)
15.9)
14.0)
8.4)
( 24.7)
( 14.6)
( 14.9)
( 12.0)
(
(
(
(
(
(

10.2)
9.0)
10.0)
7.4)
7.2)
9.3)
11.4)
9.7)
9.1)
10.5)

4.5
3.0
3.8
3.0
3.1
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.5
4.2

4.1
2.9
3.6
4.4
3.8
4.3
5.6
4.1
3.6
3.9

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

9.4)
8.7)
9.4)
11.0)
8.8)
10.6)
17.0)
10.2)
9.4)
9.8)

Environmental State
Envi ronmental
Cond
1443500 People
10. 2 MAF Annual
13166 AF M-I WTR
Social Service 5
$856M PUB Invest
5702 MW Energy
400 MG/L TDS
3.0-4.5% UNEMP
32M Tourist Days
137 Quad BTU's

1353000 People
6.8 MAF Annual
17166 AF M-I WTR
Social Service 1
~770M PUB Invest
6272 MW Energy
600 MG/L TDS
10.0+ % UNEMP
26M Tourist Days
~51 Quad BTU's

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

15.7)
19.2)
17.3)
15.1)
16.3)
21.9)
23.0)
15.8)
15.4)
23.3)

10.2)

4.5
4.5
3.7
3.3
3.9
5.0
2.8
3.1
3.6
4.8

13.n

9.7)
8.2)
9.1)
12.4)
8.5)
7.7)
9.4)
12.1)

11.3)
9.5)
12 .5)
9.4)
8.2)
8.4)
19.0)
11. 7)
9.7)
8.5)

5.0
3.2
4.8
3.7
3.5
3.4
6.3
4.7
3.7
3.4

3.2
1.8
3.1
2.3
2.0
1.8
4.2
3.1
2.2
1.8

(
(

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

7.3)
5.5)
8.2)
5.7)
4.])
4.6)
12.7)
7.8)
5.9)
4.5)

Most Desired

Selected
Group 4
Group 6
Vector
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 5
Prob XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEM\l (PXEMV)
44
9
18
9
43
40
12
12
27
40

4.0
7.7
4.9
6.0
6.0
3.4
9.8
5.0
5.7
4.8

(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

9.1)
85.7)
27.4)
66.9 )
14.0)
8.4)
81.5)
41.8)
21.1)
12.0)

4.5
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.1
3.7
4.7
3.0
3.2
4.2

10.2)
36.5)
18.1)
36.5)
7.2)
9.3)
39.0)
( 24.6)
( 12.0)
( 10.5)

(
(
(
(
(
(
(

4.1
3.5
3.3
4.1
3.8
4.3
7.5
3.4
4.9
3.9

(
(
(

(
(
(
(
(

9.4)
39.1)
18.6)
45.7)
8.8)
10.6)
62.2)
28.4)
18.2)
9.8)

Environmental State
Environmental
Cond

2

6.9
6.3
6.6
6.0
7.0
8.7
7.6
6.3
5.9
9.3

3

6.9
7.5
5.1
6.4
7.0
8.7
7.7
5.8
5.2
9.3

(
(
(
(
(
(

(
(
(
(

15.7)
82.9)
28.2)
71.5)
16.3)
21.9)
64.2)
48.6)
19.2)
23.3)

4.5
5.5
3.3
3.3
3.9
5.0
2.2
3.9
4.7
4.8

(
(
(
(
(

(
(
(
(
(

10.2)
61.5)
18.1)
36.2)
9.1)
12.4)
18.1)
32.7)
17.5)
12.1)

5.0 ( 11.3)
2.2 ( 23.9)
4.3 ( 23.7)
4.1 ( 45.7)
3.5 ( 8.2)
3.4 ( 8.4)
7.2 ( 60.3)
3.8 ( 31.8)
3.8 ( 14.0)
3.4 ( 8.5)

3.2
1.5
2.8
2.6
2.0
1.8
5.0
2.3
2.3
1.8

7.3)
17.0)
15.7)
28.9)
4.7)
4.6)
41.4)
18.9)
8.4)
4.5)

Leas t Desired

Selected
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5
Group 6
Vector
Prob XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEM\l (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV) XEMV (PXEMV)
20
12
20
12
20
20
15
5
20
23

4.5
4.9
5.6
5.8
5.9
3.8
6.8
6 .. 2
6.0
3.9

( 22.4)
( 41.0)
( 27.8)

48.5)
29.2)
18.9)
( 45.3)
023.7)
( 30.1)
( 17.0)
(

(
(

4.4
8.8
5.3
3.0
3.1
4.8
3.1
5.1
3.3
5.9

22.2)
73.1)
26.5)
24.6)
15.6)
24.2)
( 20.8)
001.3)
( 16.4)
( 25.7)

4.0
8.7
4.1
5.2
3.9
5.0
4.0
5.3
4.1
4.8

( 19.9) 6.8
( 72.4) 9.5
( 20.7) 9.6
( 43.7) 5.6
( 19.6) 6.2
( 25.1) 9.6
( 26.9) 6.9
005.2) 6.5
( 20.6) 6.4
( 21.0) 11.2

34.1)
79.4)
47.9)
46.8)
30.9 )
48.0)
( 45.9)
029.4)
( 32.2)
( 48.9)
(
(
(
(
(
(

4.1
3.3
5.0
4.7
3.4
6.8
3.2
2.7
3.3
6.9

(
(
(
(
(

20.4)
27.3)
24.9)
38.8)
17 .1)
( 34.0)
( 21. 3)
( 53.6)
( 16.3)
( 24.8)

4.9
8.8
5.3
4.0
3.9
4.2
5.0
5.8
4.1
4.2

24.4)
72.9)
26.3)
( 32.9)
( 19.7)
( 21.1)
( 33.6)
(115.7)
( 20.6)
( 18.2)
(
(
(

3.2
6.5
3.4
2.6
2.4
2.8
3.2
4.2
2.6
3.2
...

groups
level.

action for other planning systems are entered
into the simulation.
These cross impacts
are represented, for the Utah level, in level
1 and level 3 of the course of action outcome
value vectors.
Levell outcome value vectors
are the course of act ion outcome impacts on
the State of Utah planning system of the five
courses of action designed for the Uintah
Basin planning system.
This recognizes that
planning activities in the Uintah Basin will
have some effect on the values and interest

at

the

statewide

(.
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

15.8)
54.4)
17.2)
21.7)
12.2)
13.8)
21.3)
84.7)
13.0)
13.8)

~~-----

decision

making

Level 3 outcome value vectors represent
the impacts on the State of Utah planning
system of courses of action designed for
the Colorado River Basin planning system.
The outcome value vector impacts of courses
of action designed for the State of Utah as
they affect the Uintah Basin and the Colorado
River Basin planning systems are entered into
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Table 4.

Courses of action.

Uint ah Basin l:
Uintah Basin 2:
Uirtt ah Basirt 3:
Uintah Basin 4:
Uintah Basin 5 :
State of Utah l:
State of Utah 2 :
State of Utah 3 :
State of Utah 4:
State of Utah 5:
Colorado River
Basin 1:
Colorado River
Basin 2:
Colorado River
Basin 3:
Colorado River
Basin 4:
Colorado River·
Basin 5:

Completion of Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project as planned in final EIS
Completion of irrigation phase of Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project as planned in
final EIS
Completion of municipal-industrial phase only of Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project
as planned in final EIS
Completion of Trout Creek alternative for Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project as
planned in final EIS
Completion of Brush Creek Tunnel alternative for Jensen Unit of Central Utah Project
as planned in final EIS
Completion of all phases of Central Utah Project. Completion of all phases of Virgin
River Project
Completion of Central Utah Project with no export to the Sevier River Basin
Completion of Jensen, Uintah, and Upalco units of Central Utah Project with water
allocated to energy development. Completion of small scale Virgin River Project for
limited energy production
Completion of Jensen, Uintah, and Upalco units of Central Utah Project with water
allocation to agriculture only. Completion of lVirgin River Water Project for
agricultural use only
Completion of Bonneville Unit of Central Utah Project only. Completion of all phases
of Virgin River Project
Completion of Central Utah Project.

Completion of Central Arizona Project

Implement USBR Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program. Completion of Central
Utah Project. Completion of Central Arizona Project. Develop groundwater supplies in
Upper Basin
Completion of Central Arizona Project.

Completion of Dolores Project

Completion of Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, Dolores Project.
USBR Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program

Implementation of

Completion of Uintah, Upalco units of Central Utah Project for energy development. Develop
groundwater in Upper Basin. Implement USBR Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program

The first two types of cost represent at ions present a problem when fitted to the
data requirements of the PROPDEMM simulation.
In earlie!: applications of PROPDEMM, a seven
point scale was adequate.
The cost levels
of the courses of action, although numerically different, were of the same o!:der of
magnitude. For example, all course-of-action
cost levels were in one case between $100
million and $125 million.
The seven point
scale is set to cover the extremes.

th e two other PROPDEMM i tera t ions wh ich
simulate the policy interact ions of Uintah
Basin groups, values, and environmental data,
and Colorado River Basin groups, values, and
environmental data, respectively.
By providing course of action cross
impact analysis, PROPDEMM allows a policy
maker the option of assessing the desir
ability of the programs of others in terms
of their effects on his planning system.
Th is enhances the potential for coordinated
policy formulation to mitigate, or minImIze
adverse impacts and to support favorable
ones.

I n the present PROPDEMM s imulat ion,
the costs of the available courses of action
are quite different among the three levels.
This presents problems of scale comparison
and sensitivity.
For the Uintah Basin, the
costs of the available courses of action
range between $10 million and $33 million.
For the State of Utah, the estimated cou!:seof-action costs range between $100 million
and $620 million. For the Colorado River
Basin courses of action, the estimated costs
begin at $300 million and go to well over
$1.3 billion.
If the scales which represent
these cost levels were applied only to
their respective planning systems, no problem

In addition to the data concerning
the desirability and likelihood of outcomes
of alternative courses of action, PROPDEMM
also uses course-of-action cost estimates.
The cost level factor can represent the total
cost of the p!:oject, the amortized annual
cos t of the project, or the cost of the
project per unit of benefit.
The last
representation is to be generally preferred,
but it was not available for most of the
alternatives for this simulation.
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Table 5.

Course of action outcome value vectors for State of Utah

plannin~

system.

OUTCOME VALUE VECTORS

ECON

UB 1

Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2
3
4
5

r

Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2
3
4
5

1
1

o

o

2
1
1
1

o
1

o
ECON

UB 3

,

2
1

ECON

UB 2

Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2
3
4
5

1
1

Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2
3.
4
5

Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2
3
4
5

o
o
-1

o
-1

EMER
1
2

o

o

2
1

2

o

2

o

IND

REC

o
MUNI

o
o
o
o
o
MUNI
1
1

o

o

1

o

o
MUNI

o
2

o
AGW

o
o
o
o
o
AGW

1

1

2
2

o

o

o

2
1

1

1

o

o

-2

o

o
o

-1

o

MUNI
-1

o
-2

o

o
o
o
o
o

1
2

o

EMER

o

AGW

2
1

-1

1
2

1
2

2
2

o

2

o

LEVEL I
IND
REC

1

o
EMER

AG W

o

1

ECON

UB 5

2
-1
EMER

MUNI
1
1

o
ECON

UB 4

ENER

1

o
1

o

IND

REC

1
2

1
2

o

o

3

2

ENV
-2
-1
-2

o
-2

ENW
-1

o
-1

o
-2

ENW
-1

o
-2

o

o

o

-2

IND

REC

ENV

o

2

-2
-1
-2

1

2

o

o

o

2

1

1

o

2
-1

-1

REC

ENV

AGW

IND
-1

o
o

-1
1
-1
1

o

-1

-1

o

o

-2

-1

-3

-2

ECON

ENER

MUNI

AGW

-1

-1

o
o
o
o
o

-1

LAND
3
3

o
3

o
LAND
1
1

o
2

o
LAND
1
1

o
2

-1
LAND
1
1

FISH

PVT

-1
2
-1

o
o
o
o
o

FISH

PVT

2

2

o

-1
2
-1

o
o
o
o
o

FISH

PVT

1
1
-1
1
-1

o
o
o
o
o

FISH

PVT

1

o

-2

1

3
-2

o
o
o
o
o

FISH

PVT

o
LAND
-1

o
-2

1
2

o
o

-1

o

o

-2

-1

LAND

FISH

o

1
-1
2
-2

p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p=.10
p=.IQ
p=.40
p=.20
p=.l0
p=.10
p=.l0
p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p=.10
p=.10
p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p=.10
p=.10
p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p=.10
p=.10

LEVEL 2
UT 1
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2
3
4
5

Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2
3
4
5

UT 2

2
3
4
5

Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

2
3
4
5

UT 5
2
3
4
5

3
1
3
1

2

1

o

1

1

3

3

3

3

1
2

2
1
3
1

2
2
1
3
1
1
2
-1
2

-1

ECON
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome.
Outcome
Outcome

-1

3

1
1
-1
2

3

ECON

UT 4

ENV

3

1

EooN
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

REC

2

2

ECON

UT 3

3
3

IND

1
1

o
1

o

o
EMER
1

1
MUNI

o
AGW

3

1
2

o

3
1

2

3

2

o
EMER
2

2
1
2
1
EMER

o
1
-1

2
-2
EMER

o
1
-1

o
-2

1
MuNI

o
o
o
o
o
MUNI

o
o
o
o
o

MUNI
2
2
1
2
1

IND

ENW

o

1
-1
1

1

-2

IND

REC

ENW

o

-1

o

1

-2

o
-2

AGW

AGW
1
2
-1

2
-2
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o
1

o
-1

-1
-1
-2
-1

FISH

1
1

REC

1

-1
-1

o

1
1

o

-2

-2

1

1

o

o

-2

IND

REC

-3
LAND

2
3
1
2
1

2
2

o
2
-1
LAND
-1

o

o

-1

o

o

-2

-1

2
-1

-2

-1

o

PVT

LAND

IND

o

FISH

2

-1

-1

-1

-1

1
-1
1
-1

1
-1

1

ENV

o

o

-1

o

PVT

2
-1
2
-1

2
-1

-3
ENV

1
1
-1

1

o
o

2
3
1
3
1

-3
LAND
i

-1

1

AGW

o

-2

1
1
-1
2
-1

3

2
1

-2

2
-2
2

REC

3
3

o

-1

o

2

1
-1

-1

-2
-1
-2

-1

1
1
-1

o
o
-1

p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p=.lO
p=.lO

PVT
1

1
1
1

2
-1

o

FISH

PVT

1
1

o

-1

-1

-1

-1

o

p=.40
p=.20
p=.10
p=.lO
p=.l0

PVT

-1
-1

FISH

p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p= .10
p=.lO

1

o

p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p= .10
p= .10
p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p= .10
p=.l0
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Continued.
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OUTCOME VALUE VECTORS

Outcome 3
Outcome 4
Outcome 5
CRB 2
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
2

would
among
three
single

3

1
3

1
2
3

4
5
1
2
3

4
5

CRB 5
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

1
ECON
2

3

CRB 4
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

3

4
5

CRB 3
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome
Outcome

ECON
1

1
2
3
4
5

1

ECON
0
0
0
0
0
ECON
0
0
0
0
0
ECON
1

2
0
2
0

occur.
But, cross
planning systems r
cost factor scales
scale of reference.

ENER
0

MUNI
1

AG W
1

3

3

3

0
EMER
1
2
0
3
0
EMER
0
0
-1
0
-1

EMER
0
0
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0
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2
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1
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3

3
2
3
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0
0
0
0
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1
3

0
2

0

0
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0
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1
1
0
1
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0
0
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0
0
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2
2
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2
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0
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2
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1
2
0
2

PVT
-1
1
-1
P\rr
1
1
-1
1

IND

0
REC

2

1

-1

1

1

2

1
0
1
-1

-1
-1

1

1

1

-1

-1

1

-2

-1

1
1
1

-1
1
-1

-1

1

2
0

0

0
0

1
1
1
1
1

ENV

-1
FISH
0

1

0

0

0
0
0
FISH

0
-1
LAND
0
-1

0
0
-1

LAND

1
1
1
1
1

FISH

p"".20
p= .10
p= .10
p"".40
p=.20
p= .10
p=.l0
p=.l0
p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p= .10
p=.10
p=.40
p=.20
p=.20
p= .10
p=.10
p=.40
p"'.20
p=.20
p=.l0
p= .10

action designed for their own system.
The Utah interes t groups have more power to
affect Uintah Basin activities than Colorado
River Basin activities because of the political-institutional structure of the planning
systems.
The county-state relationships are
legally defined in the statutes of the
State of Utah which establish a hierarchical
relationship with the state serving as a
locus of power.
The Colorado River Bas inState of Utah relationship, on the other
hand, is less well defined.
The planning
system for the Colorado River Basin of seven
member states plus management agencies of the
federal government is really a loose confederation of political sovereignties.
It
h as no hierarch ical arrangement that would
permit a central authority to impose its will
on the states.
The participating federal
agencies can veto any plan proposed by the
member states, but each state can veto
projects within its own boundaries.

impact analys is
uires that all
attached to a

In th is appl icat ion of PROPDEMM, the
cost factor problem was resolved by making
all cost level factors equal using the State
of Utah planning system as the center of
analysis. The simulation will be analyzed as
if a policy maker for the State of Utah were
going to use the results to formulate a state
water resources plan and negotiate for
coordination with plans of the other two
levels.
In centering the analysis on the
State of Utah, potential scale problems are
minimized.
No planning
tern is more than
one step removed from
he system under
examination.
The final input variable affected by
the levels problem is the group power vector.
This vector represents the potential of a
group to influence a course of action. Table
6 shows the power of the Utah interest
groups to affect not only courses of act ion
designed for the State of Utah plannin!?,
s y stem, but a 1 s o t h 0 s e for the U in t a h
Basin and Colorado River Basin planning
systems.
have

0

-1
REC
1
2

LAND
-2
2

-1
PVT
0
0
0
0
0
P\rr
0
0
0
0
0
PVT
1

2
IND
0
0
0
0
-1
IND
0
0
0
0

-1

-1

1
1

3

3
2

AG W
0
0
-1
0

0

0
0
MUNI

1

IND

1
-1

0

2
-1
REC
0

ENV
-1
0
-2
ENW
0
0
-1
0
-2
ENW
0

3

0
AGW
1
1
-1

AGW
0
0

0

LEVEL 3
IND
REC
-1
1

Results of the PROPDEMM Simulation
The first phase of the simulation
analysis provides an assessmenL of Lhe
political feasibility of the courses of
action considered.
This assessment is
presented for the State of Utah in the
Systemic Political Feasibility Indices, shown
in Table 7.
Level 1 represents the desir-

As might be expected, interest groups
the most power to affect courses of
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Table 6.

Group power vectors.

GROUP POWER VECTORS

:IND-ENERGY DEV
COMMERCE-TOURISM
AGRICULTURE
RECREATION

UB
3
3

3
2

~NVIRONMENTAL

5

DECISION MAKER

S

UB 2
2
2
4
3
4
5

UB 3
4
2
2
2
4
S

UB 4
3
2

UB 5

5

4

2
3

3

4

7
5

6
5

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

UT 1
3
3
4
3

6
5

UT 2
4

UT 3

UT 4

UT S

6

3

6

3

3

4

3
3

3

6

2

6
5

6
5

4
S

4
4
3

4

5

5

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

CRBl
3
2

4
3

7
S

CRB2

3
2
5
4

.7
4

CRB3
1
1
1
1

CRB4
1

1
1
1

3

4

1

1

CRBS

4
2
1

1
5
3

ability of the five courses of action designed for the Uintah Basin ·from the viewpoint of the State of Utah, level 2 represents the desirability of the five courses of
act ion designed for the State of Utah, and
level 3 represents the desirability of the
five courses of action designed for the
Golorado River Basin in the State of Utah.

recreation interest groups, while UB 5
appeals most to the industry-energy development and environmental interest groups.
A
policy maker for the State of Utah, acting to
minimize levels of analysis conflicts, would
encour age the adop t ion of one of these two
courses of action to enhance his own policies
contained in UT 4.

According to the total Systemic Political Feasibility Indices for the State of
Utah, the most desirable, or politically
feasible, course of action is CA 14 (UT 4),
followed by CA 15 (UT 5) and CA #3 (UT 3).
The SPFI of UT 4 is the sum of the courseof-act ion va lues for the five State of Utah
interest groups.

Level 3 of the SPFI table represents the
.f ive courses of action designed for the
Colorado River Basin planning system' and
their contribution to the goal attainment of
the Utah interest groups. Courses of action
CA 12 and CA 11 (CRB 2 and CRB 1) make the
greatest contribution by appealing to the
va lues of commerce-tour ism, agr icul ture,
and recreation interest groups. The environmental group prefers CA #4 (CRB 4) while the
Industry-Energy Development group prefers CA
15 (CRB 5) by a large margin.
Again, the
Utah policy maker would encourage the
adoption of CRB 2, or CRB 1, to complement
h is own pOlicies designed for the State of
Utah plann
system.

The value structure of the interest
groups reflects a high preference for econ omi c growth, agr icult ura 1 water supply,
recreational opportunity, and private property control.
UT 4, which calls for the
completion of the Jensen, Uintah, and Upalco
units of the Central Utah Project for agricultural water supply with limited emphasis
on energy water supply and also the complet ion of the Virgin River water project for
agricultural water supply, provides a moderate to high contribution to the attainment of
these values.
It is the most preferred
alternative for four of the five interest
groups and the course of action the policy
makers for the Utah plann
system would try
to implement.

At this point, the State of Utah policy
maker knows which courses of act ion, at
all levels, will make the maximum contribut ion to the goal attainment of the Utah
interest groups.
He can formulate a policy
of coordinated plans which will be optimal
from his planning perspective.
Unfortunately, the optimal policies for the State of
Utah might be nonoptimal for the interest
groups of other planning systems.
For th is
reason, it becomes necessary to examine the
SPFI outcomes from the perspective of the
other planning systems as they appear in the
remaining two PROPDEMM iterations.
The
computer printout is in Appendix B.

For the desired multilevel, multigoal
plann
scenario, PROPDEMM was modified to
recogn
the inter-level impacts of different policy alternatives.
The next step,
therefore, was to review the effect of
c our ses of act ion des igned a t other leve Is
on the State of Utah planning system.
This
can also be accomplished from the Systemic
political Feasibility Indices (SPFI) in Table
7.

Analysis of the course-of-action preferences from the three PROPDEMM i terat ions
indicates the policy conflict shown in Table
8.

Level 1 of the SPFI table represents the
U intah Bas in courses of act ion.
Of these
five courses of action, CA 14 (UB 4) and CA
15 (UB 5) make the grea tes t contr i bu t ion to
the goal attainment of the Utah planning
system interest groups.
UB 4 appeals most to
.the commerce-tourism, agriculture, and

The Uintah Basin plannin~ system sees
its course of action UB 4 as optimaL
Both
Utah and the Colorado River Basin planning
systems also see UB 4 as the Uintah Basin
course of action which makes the greatest
contribution to their own goal attainment .
Thus, no policy conflict potential exists in
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Table 7.

Systemic political feas ibi li ty indicies.

SYSTEMIC POLITICAL FEASIBILITY INDICES
THE LARGER THE INDEX VALUES, THE MORE FAVORABLE THE COURSE OF ACTION
FORMULAE AREA SIP = 00 * NSIP
SPFI = STP * PWR * SSN

Group
Ind-Energy Dev

SSN.

CA in
SIP
PWR
(SPFI)

4.2

0.52

3
6.6)
3.40
3
(
48.5 )
2.55
3
( 34.1)
4.19
2
(
32.6 )
0.23
5
(
6.4)
( 128.3)
(

Commerce-Tourism

4.8

Agriculture

4.4

Recreation

3.9

Envi ronmenta1

5.6

Total SPFI

Group
Ind-Energy Dev

SSN

CA it!
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)

4.2

0.72

Commerce-Tourism

4.8

Agriculture

4.4

Recreation

3.9

Environmental

5.6

Total SPFI

Group
Ind-Energy Dev
Commerce-Tourism

-0.13

CA in
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
1.03

4
17.4)
2.64
3
(
37.7)
2.03
3
(
26.9)
2.26
3
(
26.4)
-0.00
6
(
-0.1)
(
108.3)
(

SSN
4.2

0.72

0.37

(

(

4.8
4.4

Recreation

3.9

Environmental

5.6

3
9.0)
2.93
2
(
27.8)
2.18
4
(
38.3)
2.20
3
(
25.7)
-0.16
7
(
-6.2)
(
94.6)

2

-1.1)
3.81
2
(
36.2)
2.35
4
(
41.4)
3.15
3
(
36.8)
0.75
4
(
16.9)
(
130.2 )
(

CA #1
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)

Agr icu 1t ure

Total SPFI

3
9.1)
2.53
3
(
36.0)
2.21
4
( 38.9)
2.75
3
(
32.1)
-0.31
6
( -10.3)
( 105.8)

CA in
SIP
PWR
(sPFIl

CA #2
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
3
4.7)

3.02

2

28.7)
1. 75
5
(
38.4)
1.67
4
(
26.1)
0.03
7
(
1. 3)
(
99.2)
(

the adoption of this course of action.
The State of Utah planning system sees course
of action UT 4 as its optimal policy, the
Uintah Basin and Colorado River Basin
planning systems concur, and thus again
there is no policy conflict.

Level 1
CA it3
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
1.13
(

3.75

4
19.1)
2

35.6)
1.86
2
(
16.4)
2.35
2
(
18.3)
0.60
4
(
13.4)
(
102.8)
(

Level 2
CA it3
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
1. 97

6
49.8)
3
2.47
(
35.2)
1.43
3
(
18.9)
3.25
2
(
25.3)
-0.10
6
(
-3.4)
(
125.8)
(

Level 3
CA #3
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
-0.28

1

-1. 2)
1
2.42
(
11.5)
1
1.43
(
6.3)
2.33
1
(
9.1)
1. 58
3
26.7l
52.4)

CA #4
SIP
PWR
(SPFI)
-0.11
3
( -1.3)
4.17
2
(
39.6)
2.38
4
(
41.9)
3
3.03
(
35.4)
0.69
7
(
27.3)
( 142.9)

CA #5
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
0.47

5
9.9)
2.36
2
(
22.4)
1.35
3
(
17.9)
2.00
4
(
31.2 )
1.80
6
(
60.8)
(
142.3)
(

CA it4
SIP
PWR
(SPFI)
-0.25
3
(
-3.2)
2.92
4
(
55.5)
2.38
6
( 62.9)
2.75
4
(
42.9)
0.82
5
(
23.1)
( 181.2)

CA it5
SIP
PWR
(SPFI)
0.45

6
11.4)
2.49
4
(
47.3)
1. 75
4
(
30.8)
2.47
3
(
28.9)
0.38
4
(
8.4)
(
126.8)
(

CA it4
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
1
-0.54
-2.3)
2.48
1
(
11.8)
1
1.42
(
6.2)
2.48
1
(
9.6)
2.19
4
(
49.3)
(
74.7l

CA #5
PWR
SIP
(SPFI)
1.14

4
19.2)
2.60
2
(
24.7)
2.022 1
(
8.9)
1.61
1
(
6.3)
0.38
5
10.7)
69.7)
(

action for the Colorado River Basin is CRB 5
with CRB 4 as a second preference.
This is
not a good policy for the State of Utah
planning system but could satisfy the Uintah
Basin second preference, CRB 5. If, however,
CRB 5 is adopted, there will be greater
disagreement between the State of Utah and
the Uintah Basin than if CRB I were adopted.
The PROPDEMM s imulat ion can then be used by
the policy maker to identify the source of

At the level of the Colorado River
Basin, the PROPDEMM simulation does indicate
a policy conflict.
The optimal course of
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Table 8.

Conflicting COA optimals.
Preferred Course of Action For

Planning Perspective
Uintah

Utah

UB 4

UT 4
UT 4

UINTAH BASIN
STATE OF UTAH

UB 4
UB 4

COLORADO RIVER BASIN

this conflict, and by so doing, take
achieve a satisfying solution. That
application to levels of analysis
solving is beyond the scope of th is

UT 4

Colorado Basin
First
Second
Performance
Performance
CRB 1
CRB 2
CRB 5

CRB 5
CRB 1
CRB 4

division operations diminishes the importance
of increasing salience.
This problem does
not invalidate the course-of-act ion des ign
for two reasons.
First, although the marginal impact of the group salience index
diminishes as group salience increases, the
intent of this input factor is not reversed.
Figures Sa and 5b illustrate, the problem.
Figure 5a represents the ideal relation
between GRPSAL and its impact designing
courses of action, while Figure 5b represents
the represent at ion in the PROPDEMM s imulation.
The direction is correct, but the
relationship is biased so as to undervalue
salient interes ts.
Th is will usually result
in courses of action being altered towards a
closer fit between environmental conditions
and group values but will not achieve the
match desired by the interest groups.
The
selected courses of action are meeting some
interest group expectat ions but are not as
effectively designed as they could be.

steps to
specific
problem
report.

Evaluation of PROPDEMM
Since it has
been shown that the
PROPDEMM simulation indicates policy preference conflicts among levels of analysis,
the rema ining question is whether, in light
of the PROPDEMM formula analysis performed by
Kimball (1978), the indicated conflicts are
valid.
The PROPDEMM simulation may be
divided into 1) formulae which help the
decision maker create courses of action, 2)
formulae which determine the political
feasibility of courses of action for given
interest group factors and 3) indices
which provide additional information for
iterative purposes but are not tied to the
other parts of the program.

A second desirable feature is that each
couts e of act ion in the PROPDEMM s imulat ion
is assoicated with five possible outcomes
with specified probabilities of occurrence.

The analysis of the first set of formulae indicated some conceptual problems in
that use of the group salience factor in

IMPORTANCE
OF

GPPSAL

GPPSAL

GPPSAL

7

(A)

Figure 5.

( B)

GRPSAL relationships.
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This minimizes the impact of any single
course-of-act ion outcome vector and broadens
the potential outcome impact.

input vector. Also, to complete the modeling
of the political process, an information
segment of the model must be developed to
allow input of vectors representing positive
and negative information connected wi th the
perceived impacts of courses of action and
the salience of the positive and negative
information vectors.
The development of
these additional input factors will enhance
the model and simulate a more realistic
version of the actual political decision
making process.

The analysis of the formulae which
comprise the main part of the PROPDEMM
simulation indicated two problems which might
affect the validity of the PROPDEMM political
feasibility assessment. The first problem is
a sensitivity problem identified in the
Selected Salience Number (SSN) computations.
In Table 7, the Uintah Basin courses of
action were ranked in terms of their contribution to the State of Utah planning system
goals.
The SPFl indices would place course
of action UB 4 above UB 5 as a preferred
course of action.
The net difference in the
two indices is 0.6.
Given the precision
of the SSN index, a factor used in computation of the SPFI index, one cannot really
distinguish between the two courses of action
in desirability.

Summary
The PROPDEMM simulation was instrumental
in identifying and clarifying three levels
problems:

1.
1~~~!iiZi~&_~~£i~iQ~_l~~el~·
The PROPDEMM simulation requires speciFication of the decision making domain- or
domains--in a multilevel setting.
Sometimes
the real boundaries are difficult to discover
and compare among levels
In the present
case, the political and hydrologic boundaries
for each level cover different territory_
In general, when multilevel decision systems
do not exhibit subset relations from the
highest to the lowest levels, it is more
difficult to represent the levels and their
interrelationships in a model.

The second problem encountered in
the main part of PROPDEMM is peculiar to the
levels of analysis applications.
This
problem centers around the use of a seven
point scale of measurement and was most
evident in the cost factor computations.
In the present application, this problem
was minimized through use of the State
of Utah planning system as the level of
analysis.
However, the problem was not
removed.
In the two sets of iterations which
were completed for each planning perspective,
the change from seven point cost factor
rankings to cost level equalization accounted
for five changes in SPFI ranking at the State
of Utah level, eleven changes in SPFI ranking
at the Uintah Basin level, and eleven changes
in ranking at the Colorado River Basin level.
This illustrates both the importance of the
cos t factor in the PROPDEMM simulation and
the validity problems which arise when this
factor is removed through equalization.

2.

Identifying a set of alternatives
Part of the
problem of identifying comparable alternat ives is a carryover from the problem of
identifying the decision making levels, from
whose perspectives the alternatives are
defined. One would expect ill-defined levels
to create a corresponding problem of ill-defined alternatives.
The PROPDEMM simulation
assumes some exclusivity in the courses of
action.
Even though some courses of action
overlap with other courses of action designed
for different levels, the final physical
action associated with a course of action
takes place at a local site(s).
This makes
i t difficult to distinguish between courses
of action which are local and regional.
The
difficulty of locating a course of action at
one level or the other is increased by the
fact that water resource projects and programs tend to be multipurpose and multisponsored.
£Q~~~~Ql~_~crQ~s_levels.

The seven pOint scales are controversial
in another aspect, as well. In PROPDEMM, the
numbers are treated as if they possessed
interval or ratio properties, although they
are clearly ordinal.
Recent developments in
psycho
lcal measurement suggest that in
many cases such manipulations of ordinal
numbers do not lead to inconsistent results
(Long and Wilken, 1974).
Although no tests
were conduc ted on PROPDEMM to determine
whether the necessary assumptions on the
uniqueness of orderings are warranted, the
analys ill of progr.1m formulae that was done
would lead one to suspect problems in the
reliability of "close" rankings.

3.
Integrating evalua~ions of alterna
ives.
In wa ter resources development. bas in
prans typically cons ist of combinations of
local projects.
Benef its that accrue to
people outside the project locality, and
especially costs borne by nonlocal interests,
are less likely to enter into project evaluations from a local perspective than from the
basin perspective.
This is one reason
for di fferent rank ings of planning a lternat ives.
t

Finally, i t should be observed that
the full theoretical model has not been
operationalized.
The vector representing
pun ishment -r eward potential, for example, is
being used but must be modified in order to
overcome the conceptual problem of a single
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CHAPTER V
PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS IN CONCEPTUALIZING A PLANNING THEORY
would have to be included to be complete).
He would also have to enlarge to include the
economic, social, and cultural d imens ions.
and this expansion would get the planners
into some areas where few people tvant them.
Finally available planning tools are not
capable of optimizing a system large enough
to internalize the relevant world.

Introduction
At the beginning of this report, the
relational problems in water resources
planning defined to be of particular interest
were those in the area of levels of analysis
broad ly defined as the problems needing to
be solved to optimize the planning process ..
I t was subsequently noted that progress in
solving levels of analysis problems requires
a conceptual basis for putting it all together; but that before one can begin to
build that basis, he needs to understand the
;problems that the planning theory needs to
deal wi th. These problems were searched out
in Chapters II, III, and IV.
Chapter II
found a number of levels of analysis issues
through qualitative review of planning as
practiced in the Colorado River Basin.
Chapter III found issues in nationwide
planning practice, and Chapter IV found some
in a simulation of planning as practiced in
the Uintah Basin.
The identified problems
are listed at the end of each chapter, and
the purpose here is to sort them into an
integrated set for the subsequent theoretical
development.

Classification of Identified
Levels Problems
The 17 levels problems identified in
Chapter III from the analysis of planning
issues in the Colorado River Basin and
the three levels problems identified from the
PROPDEMM application to the Uintah Basin
described in Chapter IV are classified by the
scheme shown in Figure 2 and described
in Table 9. All 20 problems were classified within a single combination or a combination pair rather than as "higher order
combinations" or "gaps between components"
even though many of the problems certainly
display higher-order or gap aspects.
Each
problem is referenced in the table back to
its chapter of or igin and problem number
there.

Problems of a Unitary Planning Agency
The 20 levels problems included at
least one in nine of the ten classifications
with five classified as conflicts in jurisdiction and four as value-need conflicts.
Four other classifications had two problems,
and three had one problem.
Altogether
nine problems had jurisdictional aspects,
nine had value aspects, nine had need aspects, and four had time aspects.

One of the classical justifications used
for governmental planning is that individuals, when left on their own or only limited
by market forces, do not adequately consider
external effects on others in their decision
making.
A favorite approach to the problem
is to internalize the externalities within a
After doing so, one
common management.
would, of course, still have the problems of
aggregating common values for the constituency of the plann ing uni t, work ing from
incomplete information, coping with a variety
of uncertainties, and preserving flexibility
to deal with circumstances that come along.

Summary
The identification of levels problems
showed them to be widely distributed among a
diversity of classifications and not concentrated in a few. Since the identification
did not attempt to be exhaustive and no
effort was made to weight the problems
identified by severity, one cannot at this
point state a preference for any part icular
emphasis in the needed conceptual advance.

The dimensions used in Figure 1, however, demonstrate the flaw in this approach.
One would have, to make this method effect ive, not only to internalize by enlarging
the physical and governmental units to
include all those affected (the whole world
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Table 9.

Classification of levels of analysis problems identified from Colorado River
Basin Review or by PROPDEMM.

1.

Conflicts in Values
a. Conflict between water users and government on l60-acre limitation (3-10).
b. Conflict between water users and government on salinity control practices (3-14),

2.

Conflicts in Jurisdiction
a. Competition between Indians and Wasatch Front for water (3-6).
b. Federal planners have much more extensive staff support than do those at other
levels (3-17).
c. Jurisdictions in decision systems do not exhibit subset relations (4-1).
d. Courses of action among jurisdictions are difficult to distinguish when the bound
aries among jurisdictions are poorly defined (4-2).
e. Jurisdictions conflict in position as they experience different impacts from one
another (4-3).

3.

Conflicts in Emphasized Need
a. Planning to supply the need for water is not coordinated with planning to supply
the need for energy (3-2).
b. Competition in municipal and energy uses taking water from agriculture (3-7).

4.

Conflicts in Time Perspective
None

S.

Time-Value Conflicts
a. Individual water allocation and use decisions out of harmony with water planning
value framework (3-8).

6.

Time-Jurisdiction Conflicts
a. Individuals have begun to use water which will later have to be taken from them
to sat isfy Indian and Federal Reserved Water Rights (3-S).

7.

Time-Need Conflicts
a. Political allocation of COlorado"River water before firm flow information was
available (3-3).
b. Emergency water allocation during drought emergencies that sets precedences for
future (3-lS).

8.

Value-Jurisdiction Conflicts
a.

b.

Indian and Federal Reserve water rights are defined through state-federal jurisdictional compromise outside water planning value framework (3-4).
Federal emphasis on water conservation defined as a reduction in use is not
accepted by Utah jurisdictions (3-9).

9.

Need-Jurisidiction Conflicts
a. Institutionally expressed state-federal water policy differences emphasize jurisdictional rights to protect need differences (3-16).

10.

Value-Need Conflicts
a. Political allocation of Colorado River water outside official water planning
value framework (3-1).
b. Shift in water use from agriculture to energy conflicts with values used previously
in water development (3-11).
c. Shift in water use from agriculture to energy conflicts with current water planning
value framework (3-12).
d. Political establishment of salin
standards outside official water planning
value framework (3-13).
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CHAPTER VI
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES AND LEVELS

The Concept of a Planning Perspective

Introduction
Conceptualization of comprehensive
planning has introduced the concepts of
multiple objectives and public participation
into water resources management.
Plans must
row be considered from multiple perspectives.
As planners have moved away from eva luat ing
alternatives solely in terms of their contribution to economic development as seen from
the perspective of the nation as a whole,
they have found that the decision making
principles and tools which were developed
over the years for single perspect ive planning to be inconclusive in multiple perspective situations.
Because available tools
are not leading to timely decision making
within the framework of officially adopted
planning principles,
the institutionalized
water resources planning and management
process is continually falling further
beh ind.

The most serious difficulties in formulating and implementing water resources
management plans genera lly or ig ina te in
conflicts among the choices of interested
parties.
The conflicting choices frequently.
arise from differences in perspective.
In
art, the term "perspective" is used when
talking of the distances, positions, and
proportions of the objects represented,
relative to the position assumed by the
artist.
If the artist changes position,
he acquires a different perspective.
Analogously, as Baier (1965, p.91) observes,
when we speak of perspectives on issues
requiring decisions, "we have in mind the
demands, goals, or aims of persons holding
certain special positions or jobs or functions in a society," and each position can be
expected to lead to somewhat different
resolutions to common issues, based on
different reasons or justifications.

The line of invest
tion used here
to address this situat on is to seek a
conceptual framework that can be used to
ach ieve acceptance of a common plan fulfilling a variety of needs as seen from a
variety of jurisdictional and value viewpoints.
Consensus acceptance of a common
conclusion requires that the perspectives
formed as analyses are made at many levels
and from many viewpoints be reconciled to
some acceptable degree of common satisfact ion.
The development and management of
water resources involves decisions by individuals and private firms, by local, state,
and national levels of the political system,
and by actors infllJential in the economic,
social, cultural, governmental, and technical
dimensions of society. The decisions made by
actors in each element at each level are
based on analyses (informed, uninformed, or
misinformed; superficial or profound) using
concepts that provide a degree of generality
suitable to the objectives of the analyst.
The different objectives of different decision makers imply that analyses will proceed
at different levels of generality and use
different concepts.
Progress in reconciling
divergent conclusions that result from these
differences must be based on a sound understanding of how levels of analysis are
related.
The strategy here is to develop a
working concept in this chapter of how levels
of analysis are related and then deal with
specific problems in applying that concept in
Chapters VII and VIII.

A decision maker adopts a perspective,
either explicitly or implicitly, as he
forms a position on an issue.
The perspective provides "characteristic modes of
explanation"--answers to: what is the nature
of the problem, what are the important
factors, what will happen if X is done--and
the justifying reapons for action--answers
to:
what are my (our) responsibilities and
obligations, what are my (our) goals, how
efficient and effective are the various
possible courses of action in fulfilling
these goals and responsibilities?
(Moline,
1968; Weiler, 1976.)
Consequences of taking
a perspective thus include:
1) limiting
one's set of aims and interests; 2) relying
primarily on evaluative criteria related to
achievement of those aims; 3) regarding other
interests as less relevant; 4) biaSing one's
interpretation of the "facts"; and 5) agreeing with others (in matters related to the
first four tendencies) who share (or to the
degree that they share) the same perspective
(Moline, 1968, p. 195). A perspective, then,
can be thought of as a perceptual filter for
selecting some considerations as relevant and
rejecting others. A perspective once adopted
in the process of deciding an issue will set
a precedent that will be more likely to be
followed than reversed in the future.
An expliCit, general principle of
relevance is found in Moline's succinct
statement:
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A consideration C is relevant from
a point of view P to the extent
that ignoring C avoidably prevents,
interferes with, or fails to take
advantage of an opportunity to
facilitate the accomplishment of
the aims which are characteristic
P. (1968, p. 197.)

set of characteristic aims or values, 2) a
scope of control or jurisdiction in which
these values are pursued, 3) possible actions
with consequences relevant to the achievement
of the values, and 4) the time frame in which
the issue at hand must be decided. The four
dimensions are illustrated graphically in
Figure 6.

The principle, however, may be difficult
to apply.
Uncertainty as to the aims characteristic of P causes the set of relevant
considerations to be ill-defined.
Moreover,
determination of what "prevents, interferes
with, or fails to take advantage of an
opportunity" cannot generally be done a
pr iori, but requires experience.
The judgement of which obstacles are avoidable depends
on the agent's capabilities and his beliefs
in his capabilities--not to mention all of
the further conditions that need to be
accounted for in causal judgments.
Such
beliefs must have some grounding in the
actual experience of the agent. These points
suggest four dimensions to perspective: 1) a

The values d imens ion.
Everyone can
probably agree with the idea of va lue as
a general standard for plan formulation,
selection, and justification.
Albert (1956)
observes that values 1) are normative elements in the definition of a situation, 2)
may be implicit or explicit, 3) are relatively persistent through time, and 4) are
interrelated in culturally or individually
distinctive patterns.
Economic efficiency
has provided the first explicit and long-time
standard of federal project evaluation (James
and Rogers, 1976), although analysis of
actual historical choice patterns show that
it has not been the sole criterion (Haveman,
1965).
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system.

The scoee of control dimension.
Planning activItIes are lImIted by geographically
identifiable boundaries and by functional
assignments.
A metropolitan water af!;ency
plans for water supply in the area under
metropolitan control, but does not plan for
health care, nor for wa ter servi ces ou ts ide
of the lIletropolitan area.
The configuration
of political and functional boundaries has a
significant effect on planning coordination
and on the alternatives considered.
Integrated water and related land resources
planning, for example, is hindered by the
fragmented authority in land use controls.

A logical determination of what to
include in a planning system must be based
upon an understanding of how or why in fact
certain distinctions are important.
A guide
is found in Mo line I s pr inci pIe of relevance
defining the important distinctions as those
believed to be necessary to the effective
pursuit of goals.
The word "belief" in this
definition is not used to say that one
perceives only what one wants.
The high
degree of agreement in ident if icat ion of
phys ica 1 objects sugges ts that many th ings
are perceived independently of the purposes
of those perceiving them.

The action dimension.
The authority
and capability of the planning agent is
also specified in the action dimension.
rhe problem here is that conception of
alternatives is far more flexible than
ability to implement them.
Even large
organizations have difficulty in implementing
alternatives with which they have not had
previous experience.

Campbell (1958) has suggested that
the criteria used to identify physical
objects can be of assistance in sharpening
identification of systems with less tangible
boundaries.
These tests for determining
whether an object is a member of some system
include:
1) a common fate, defined as
covariation of some attribute over time; 2)
similarity, where members have, and nonmembers do not have, some relevant property
or set of properties; 3) proximity; 4)
resistance to intrusion; 5) uniformity
of diffusion. Application of these tests may
improve the clarity of system definition, but
they cannot guarantee that different individuals' definitions agree.
Since the
number of elements that might be considered
in defining a complex system is likely to
exceed the information processing capabilities of the analyst, the criteria for
inclusion become relative as one defines as
large a system as he can handle by adding
elements in order of decreas ing importance.
The real problem, as Van Gigch (1974, p. 17)
observes, resides in compromising between
those who attempt to take into account too
little and distort reality and those who
attempt to take into account too much and are
incapable of reaching a solution.
Different
results will be obtained by different analysts using the same basic methods, due to
differences in analytical capability and
interest in the analysis.

The temporal dimension.
Timing issues
penetrate each of the other dimensions.
Planners generally think in terms of sequences of events extending to some time
horizon.
The events, then, constitute the
basic temporal units for analysis, and the
time horizon serves as the boundary beyond
which identification of possible events is
either unnecessary or else so uncertain that
the effort is not worthwhile.
Before the
horizon is reached, the values pursued by a
decision maker, and the boundaries of his
scope of control, may change, requiring
periodic updating of plans.
In addition,
implementation of a plan requires the accommodation of temporal relations among activit ies and of the delayed consequences of
act ions taken.
The desirability of water resource
development and management schemes cannot be
defined until the planning system boundaries
and elements have been identified. But needs
a nd a lternat ives for meet ing them can be
viewed from many perspectives, each leading
t.o a different identification of "the plann ing system" and its components (Wimsatt,
1974).

The planning purposes of the analyst
provide an additional pragmatic grounds for
defining the system to consider. Accumulated
planning experience has evolved to a pOint
giving the planner a fairly good idea of what
to look for when the analysis begins.
Pract ice has ach ieved general agreement on
the planning purposes and what should be
included in comprehensive analyses. In
Chapter II these purposes were defined as 1)
the selection of water development or management schemes that are worthy investments for
limited capital resources considering the
consequent economic,
environmental,
and
social effects, 2) development of a detailed
design that will indeed perform satisfactorily in its intended function, and 3) speci
fication of such details of project implementation as working institutional arrangements for project management, raising the
necessary finances, securing needed political
approval, and getting user groups to make
proper use of project output.

One may encounter differences in points
of common reference, differences in division
into subunits, and differences in level
structures. For example, the boundaries of
un its def ined by poli t ica 1 cons iderat ion.
(nations, states, counties, etc.) do not
correspond to the watershed units identified
by hydrologic considerations, and economic
trade regions provide yet a. different set of
units.
As one influential philosopher has
argued, one cannot speak about objects
absolutely, but only from a perspective
(QUine, 1969). Only by adopting uncritically
a background ontology can one interpret
what another is referring to by the use of
certain expressions, and there is not just
one "correct" background ontology to adopt.
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Organizations are different from persons in
being composed of many autonomous decis ion
units.
If cooperat ion in pursuing organizational goals through selected tasks is to be
attained, individual members will have to
take the probable actions of other members of
the organization into account.
In other
words, individuals assume the perspectives,
or at least some of them, of others in the
organization.
Indeed, acquiring the ability
to take the perspective of another is an
essential part of the socialization process.

The purposes of management scheme
selection, .design, and implementation can be
accommodated in a planning system defined
according to the four dimensions of planning
perspective.
In comprehensive river basin
planning, planning activities that affect
the use of water resources in the basin are
obvious choices for inclusion.
Once the
river basin planner defines his system, his
decisions begin to be made from the viewpoint
of that system as a whole.
The river basin
planner, therefore, develops his own per spect ive but must also recognize and relate his
perspective to other decision makers, without
introducing more complexity than he can
handle.

People
and governments
are often
ted in try ing to induce a
particular change in another's perspective by
rational means.
One attempts to persuade
another that his perspective is deficient in
some respect, and that there are good reasons
to make some alteration.
Individuals'
perspectives and organizational perspectives
may be criticized for being too narrow, and
less often, for being too broad (Moline,
1969, p. 193).

In practice, the river basin planning
perspective is typically conceived as derivative of the common interests of jurisdictions in the basin.
Although the analyst
is likely to give too little attention to
the perspect ives adopted by others, the
acceptability and implementation of the
resulting plans will suffer when he does.

Criticisms of scope of perspective
require the assumption of at least one
dimension as fixed, usually some part of the
values dimension.
In one sense, this requirement amounts" to no more than the recognition that the critic, too, must have a
perspective.
More importantly, it would not
be rational to change a perspective in
response to criticism unless the reason
warranting the change is already included in
the perspective. Thus, rational improvements
in the planning perspectives involved in the
planning system require that individuals be
able to adopt several perspectives, and that
there is ample opportunity for dialogue
(Habermas, 1975; Friedmann, 1973).

Perspective Adoption a l1 d Adjustment
. It was suggested earlier that a perspective is ~haracteristically formed during the
process of human decision making. This claim
assumes people to be purposive creatures,
who in pursuit of various purposes dif
ferentiate between perceptions of features
associated with successful achievement
and of features that thwart pract ical pursuits.
For the pragmatist, the obstacles
have epistemological primacy.
Consensus is
more eas ily ach ieved as planning factors to
avoid than as goals to pursue. This inherent
human purposiveness, then, is at the core of
adopting a planning perspective, but clearly
a learning process is required to develop a
repertoire of act ions that wi 11 further the
chosen purpose to recognize the limits of
one's control.
The learn ing process can be
described in terms of a feedback process
involving a perceived deficiency, an action
intended to remove the deficiency, and an
evaluation of success.

Water resources management decisions
are made at both individual and collective
levels.
Individuals decide on such things as
land use, water conservation, and flood
proof ing.
Governments decide on structural
measures such as dam or channel construction,
and on nonstructural measures such as zoning
ordinances or water utility price regulation.

I t is important to remember that an
essent ial part of this learning process is
social.
There are many possible purposes or
values, in many combinations, that can be
pursued; there are many possible actions by
which values can be pursued; there are many
individual decision centers and thus many
potential combinations of choices to be made.
The social environment of an individual
decision center prevents some possibilities,
and more importantly, the socializing institution" provide instruction that an indjviduul would otherwise have to learn by
trial and error, if at all.

The schematic of Figure 6 indicates
decisions be,fng made in governmental, technical, economlC, social, and cultural dimensions.
Decisions in the governmental dimens ion directly relate to water resources
management while the decisions made in the
other dimensions are unlikely to be purposefully related to water resources cons iderations. Governments decide on water projects,
but the processes forming cultural nOrlns nre
generally not strongly dependent on wnter
policy and can more appropriately be considered as part of the water planning context
than as part of the expl icit water plann ing
system.

Organizations can be viewed analogously
as acquiring a perspective by continuous
articulation of organizational goals and
developing a set of operating procedures
found to be effective in achieving them.

For th is reason, the four decision
mak fng leve Is commonly taken as with in the
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and interrelationships in a river basin that
must be considered. Care must be taken here,
however, to recognize the role of conceptual
frameworks and pract ical purposes in characterizing complexity (LaPorte, 1975, p. 7;
Wimsatt, 1974, p. 69-74; Wittgenstein, 1953,
Sections 46-48).

system within which water resources planning
operates are private individuals, local
governments, state governments, and the
national government. Ea~h of these levels is
related to the others (as well as to decision
making levels in the other dimensions that
influence but are not defined as within the
water planning system) in various ways.
If
the general forms of these relationships
tould be identified, the planning effort
could be substantially improved.

The third sense of level involves the
relation between parts and wholes; its most
familiar occurrence is found in various forms
of anti-reductionism:
"the whole is more
than the sum of its parts."
The import of
these statements is often unclear because of
the multiple senses of "whole," "part," and
"sum" (Nagel, 1952).
Generally the terms
"whole" and "part" are used correlatively,
so what is needed is an account of the kinds
of whole there are to better understand how
wholes may be composed of parts (Nagel, 1952;
GrOSSman, 1973).
For exampl'e, it is fairly
unproblemmat ic to say that a river bas in is
composed of all those subbas ins, the dra inages of wh ich merge at some point.
Adopt ing
this hydrological perspective, it is seen
that the area of the basin is the sum of the
areas of the subbasins.
But this sort of
additive composition relationship does not
hold for other properties of interest:
it is
not clear how to interpret "sum" in the
statement "water quality of a river basin is
the sum of water quality of the subbasins of
which it is composed."

The general problem presented by multiple decision making levels is that project
proposals are generated and evaluated from
the different perspectives of each decision
maker.
The ana lyses of each dec i s ion maker
a re based on the concepts and degree of
detail that he deems appropriate to the
,purposes at hand.
The result is that different proposals are chosen as preferable
from different viewpoints for different
reasons.
The problem of constructing a
unified water resources management plan in a
setting of multiple decision levels therefore
emerges from the difficulties of reconciling
the conclusions of analyses carried out at
different levels of analysis.
Progress in resolving these difficulties
requires a better understanding of what a
level is.
One philosopher who has given a
good deal of attention to the meaning of
"level" has identified nine senses of the
term relevant to science or philosophy
(Bunge, 1963, Ch. V).
Four of them are of
i nteres t to the present study.
One of the
most common uses of the term identifies
levels with degrees or amounts on a static
scale.
In the context of a river-basin
study, the concern wi th water surface level
is an obvious example.
More generally, th is
sense of "level" is found in the phrase "a
high (low) leve 1 of X, II where "X': is any
abstract quality that a thing could have more
or less of. This use is not usually a source
of difficulty, except when threshold effects
are associated with different levels.
Water
level in a river can be measured on a continuous scale that reaches the flood stage at
some point.
For some purposes it is neces~ ary on ly to know that the flood stage has
been reached; for other purposes it may be
important to know what the flood stage is.
In this case, both interests can be satisfactorily accommodated.
But when different
?erspect ives focus on di fferent ranges of a
.continuous scale, as occurred in the cost
compar isons between the Uintah and Colorado
Bas ins in PROPDEMM, a single satisfactory
resolution is less likely.

In many cases, the statement that the
whole is greater than the sum of the parts is
invoked as a claim for the existence of
emergent properties at the level of the
whole.
That is, we think of levels when the
whole .exhibits properties not exhibited by
the parts and especially when there is no
apparent explanation for the property in
terms of the parts. In the first case, we
have at least descriptive levels (Wimsatt,
1974), and in the second case, the stronger
claim of irreducibility.
Generally, macroeconomics is said to be reducible too, or
derived from, micro-economics; nevertheless,
it is more convenient to use macro-level
terms to describe macro-level phenomena
(Brodbeck, 1968). It is much less clear that
all social aggregate terms are reducible to
descriptions of the individuals composing the
aggregates (Lukes, 1973, p. 110-122; Gellner,
1968).
A fourth sense of "level" of interest
to this study is hierarchy--an asymmetric
ordering of strata.
The formally pyramidal
structure of authority in military organizations is generally thought to be the best
example.
Weber's ideal-typical rational
bureaucratic form of organization (which
he thought would become the dominant modern
form because of its efficiency) has hierarchical arrangement as one of its central
characteristics (Weber 1946, p. 197).
The
definition of a hierarchial system has been
carefully set out in Mesarovic, Macko, and
Takahara (1970), and hierarchical aspects of
water planning and management systems have
been modeled by Haimes (1973), among others.

A second sense of "level" is degree of
complexity.
One system is at a higher level
than another if the former has more constituent parts and interrelations than the
latter (LaPorte, 1975, p. 12-13; Metlay,
1975, p. 26).
The planning and management
structure for water in a river basin is at a
higher level, in this sense, than planning
and management for water in an irrigation
canal because there are more elements
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In selecting the level of analysis to
use in a water resources planning study,
an investigator should focus on the level
wh ich bes t accounts for the phenomena to be
explained (Winsatt, 1974) because they are of
interest to those who will use the results of
the planning.
A reductive approach to
explanation requires use of the lowest or
"bottom" level because a reduct ive explanation is not complete unless the reduction is
carried that far.
Such is the position of
the methodological individualists in the
social sciences, who claim that persons are
the fundamental social units and thus that no
explanat ion of social phenomena is complete
unless all relevant predicates describing
social aggregates have been reduced to
predicates describing individual behavior
(Brodbeck, 1968; Watkins, 1968).

In our culture, the term "hierarchy" has a
somewhat negative connotation, perhaps
because it appears to be antithetical to the
ideal of democratic
uality.
Actually, it
would be unusual to
ind an example of a
social institution that did not exhibit some
elements of hierarchy and equally unusuar-tO
find ah institution that was perfectly
hierarch ical.
The concern with identifying levels and
their interactions is rooted in the potential
benefit from doing so.
There are at least
two reasons (not independent of each other)
for this benefit.
First, natural systems
appear to be organized into .levels, and
levels concepts can thus be used to improve
understanding of how they operate.
Second,
Simon (1969) has suggested that organization
into levels is a natural way of coping with
complexi ty.. Th is cop ing refers both to the
advantages in performance that complex
s ys terns can ach ieve and to the problems of
control that accompany increased complexity.
The advantage of complexity is in that
specialization becomes poss ible when relatively simpler entities are joined together,
and specialization increases ability to
pursue opportunities and resist hazards. The
control problems arise from the need to
coordinate specialized activities by channeli ng the inf orma t ion each un i t needs if it is
to make timely contributions to collective
goals.

Opposed to the methodological individualists are the emergentists or holists, who
claim the existence of irreducible social
facts.
Proponents of this approach argue
that predicates describing social groups or
institutions
appear in complete explanations of soc
phenomena (Durkheim, 1964;
Gellner, 1968; Agassi, 1975).
Advocates of this approach thus suggest
that reduction to the lowest possible level
is not necessarily desirable.
It requires
extra work and makes explanation of irreducible social facts imposs ible.
According
to this position, the levels of analysis
employed in any particular inquiry, should
depend on the explanatory needs of the
investigator.
Simon (1969) suggests that
planners seldom achieve explanatory benefits
worth the efforts of employing more than
three levels:
the focal level to be explained, the level above, of which it is part
(the context or environment), and the level
below containing the parts into which focal
units are to be analyzed.

The observation that complex systems are
composed of relatively less complex subsystems suggests that understanding of
complex systems could be improved by analyzing them in terms of their component parts.
This is the basic idea in reductive explanat ions; one of the more successful modes of
explanation is science. A reductive explanation consists of showing how the macro-phenomenon to be explained is the result of, or
composed of, micro-phenomena. One might, for
example, expla in the dec is ion of an agency
to undertake a given project as the result of
actions by certain individuals in the agency.
The distinct ion between micro and macro is
relative; the micro level contains smaller
units that stand in some composition relation
to the macro units (Everson and Paine, 1973).
Thus, individuals are micro relative to
counties, and counties are micro relative to
states (though the macro-micro relations are
not of the same type).

Sometimes the selection is dictated
by methodological concerns, as when data
are available only in highly aggregated form
(Dogan and Rokkan, 1969).
In many cases,
investigators adopt different level foci for
different purposes (Singer, 1961).
This can
create problems in utilization of the results
because relevance to policy actions in a
given functional area varies from one policy
maker to another--compare the needs of a
county board responsible for flood plain
Zoning with those of the director of the
National Flood Insurance Program.
Planning
studies should therefore be carefully de
signed so that the level of analysis employed
by the planner corresponds to that of the
user.
At the same time, of course, the user
must recognize the possibility that data br
methodological problems may make it impossible to achieve results at the level desired.

One practical effect of complexity is to
i nh ib i t act ion.
The use of leve Is in conceptualizing problems can therefore be seen
as a way of reducing complexity to facilitate
action. Large problems, that seem overwhelming when taken as a whole, may be solved
satisfactorily once defined into a set of
smaller problems.
Similarly, if the knowledge required to perform certain tasks can
be organized into levels of concepts (going
from g e n era 1 t 0 s p e c i f i c), the pro c e s s 0 f
transmitting this knowledge can be improved.

An excellent example of employing
different focal levels to explain the same
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phenomenon is found in Allison's study (1971)
of the Cuban missile crisis.
He applied
three analytic approaches to political
science and provided three different,
but plausible, explanations of what took
place in October 1962.
The three models are
summarized in Table 10.
Model I is the
hatiohai actor model frequently used in
international relations.
An equivalent in
water planning would be to treat an entire
basin as a single decision unit and determine
the best basin-wide allocation of water in
terms of national principles and standards.
Government act ion is interpreted wi th in the
framework of the value-maximizing behavior
adopted for decision analyses.
Model II
focuses on the set of organizations involved
in the formulation and execution of government policy_ According to the model, complex
organizations can only act through an established routine which must order the actions
of a large number of individuals.
Th is
implies that effective organizational response to any new situation must be in terms
of established routines.
In other words, the
price of being able to perform complex tasks
is the limitation of flexibility.
Finally,
Model I I I is the bureaucratic politics
paradigm which interprets government actions
as the result of a sequential bargaining
game.

planning system. Model I provides a per spect ive for choos ing among the development
alternatives for a bas in-wide plan; but
implementat ion of a plan determined in th is
manner must be tempered by recognition that
implementation will be constrained by the
established repertoires of existing organizat ions as in Model I I and by the rather
unpredictable outcome of bargaining as in
Model III.
In short, comprehensive planning
requires all three levels of analysis and
must be sensitive, therefore, to the problems
of consistency that arise in shifting focus
from one level to another_
The foregoing remarks suggest that in
many cases a mUltiple level focus is appropriate for comprehensive planning.
Ideally, one would hope that as the analysis
shifts focus from one level to the next,
the understanding gained will be complementary and cumulative.
This is seldom the
case.
Propositions and recommendations at
one level may be of little consequence from
the perspect ive of another level, or worse,
they may actually confl ict.
In the latter
case, the investigator rna
simply have to
choose the level that wi
dominate.
In
these cases, one would expect decisions to
favor the level paying for the study (Brewer,
1973), creating imbalances when resources for
analysis are unevenly distributed among
decision levels.

The bureaucratic politics model
sees no unitary actor but rather
many actors as players, who focus
not on a single strategic issue but
on many diverse intra-national
problems as well, in terms of no
consistent set of strategic
objectives but rather in terms of
various conceptions of national,
organizational, and personal goals,
making government decisions not by
rational choice but by the pulling
and hauling that is politics
(Allison, 1969, p. 407).

During a study with a mUltiple level
focus, the investigator typically has information about units at one level, and is
interested in what, if anything, can be
inferred from this information about units at
another leveL
The process requires that
collected data be either aggregated or
disaggregated.
Either operation requires
assumption of a rule governing the procedure.
In the social sciences, recognition of
the existence of inherent problems in
aggregating or disaggregating data dates back
at least to Robinson (1950) (and somewhat
earlier in economics).
Alker (1969) gen-

All three of these models can be prof itably employed to analyze processes in a
Table

10.

Outline

of

three

levels

of

analysis.

(Adapted

from Allison,

1970,

p.

256).

MODEL I

MODEL II

MODEL III

Government action
as rational
choice

Government action largely determined
by institutional standard operating
procedures and goals

Government action as the result of
bargaining among concerned individuals in positions of power

Basic unit
of analysis

National actor

Organizational actors

Players in positions

Organizing
concepts

The usual canons
of rational
choice

Factual problems & fractionated power
Parochial priorities & perceptions
Standard operating procedures
Uncertainty avoidance
Central coordination accounts
Decisions of government leaders

Players in positions
Parochial priorities & perceptions
Goals & interests
Stakes & stands
Deadlines & faces of issues
Power
Action-channels
Rules of the game
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tions.
The aggregation procedure can take
the form of "natural" i ntermed iate forms
(Ando, Fisher, and Simon, 1963) obt:ained
from the application of a ipecified algor ithm.
Alternatively, it may search out
the most likely relation between specified
macro and micro variables.
For decision
mak ing, the mos t useful aggregat ion problem
is interpreted as the most efficient simp 1 icat ion, in terms of bes t allocat ion of
resources available for the analysis, given
the kind of decision to be made and the
available implementation means (Nataf, 1968;
Theil, 1972).

eralized Robinson's conclusion and identified
seven fallacies of ecological inference,
summa r i zed
in
Fig u r e 7.
I t i s us u all y
possible to resolve the objects of analysis
into three levels:
individuals, groups of
individuals, or an overall level, like the
social system.
In analyses where different:
levelS are recognized, it is not logically
true that:
1) what is true overall is true
within a particular group (universal fall a c y); 2 ) what i s true 0 v era 11 i s t rue
between groups (individualistic fallacy); 3)
what is true of a particular group is true
overall (selective fallacy); 4) what is true
in a particular group is true in another
group (contextual fallacy); 5) what is true
in a particular group is true between groups
(cross-sectional fallacy); 6) what is true
between groups is true wi th in a group (h istorical fallacy); 7) what is true between
groups is true overall (ecological fallacy).

All sorts of studies from scientific
inquiry to fact gathering for political
decision making can and usually need to be
analyzed at various levels.
For each decision, Boulding (1956) tells us that "Somewhere, however, between the specific that has
no meaning and the general that has no
content there must be, for each purpose, and
at each level of abstraction, an optimum
degree of generality."
The problem is
determining the degree of generality at
which an analysis will provide the best
results in terms of the goals of each
portion of the planning.

The possibility of ecological fallacy in
planning is quite high not only because it is
of interest to express the relationships
between phenomena of different levels, but
also because the only available data are
often collected at a level different from the
planning focus.
As Hannan (1971, p. 475)
points' out, "problems of aggregation and
disaggregation arise largely as a consequence
of missing data."
Since ecological inferences are not necessarily true (nor necessarily false) but often unavoidable, it
becomes necessary to offer an auxiliary
premise to warrant the inference.
This
suggests that positions on ecological inference may be located along a continuum,
defined by degree of willingness to assume
similarity of properties across levels.
On
this continuum, the homology approach at one
end supports unrestricted use of propositions
across levels, and the inconsistency approach
at the other end rejects such use of propositions (Hannan, 1970; 1971).

One of the most common problems in
public works planning is that any proposal,
be it a dam and reservoir or a curb and
gutter, is Simultaneously considered from
perspectives using various levels of analysis
ranging from the top levels of government to
people in the immediate vicinity.
Different
designs are likely to be preferred from the
different viewpoints, and each level uses
different concepts in reaching its decision
and consequently in discuss ing the reasons
for its decision with others. A planner may
not have freedom of choice on a level of
analysis and may have to work toward reaching
a conclusion acceptable at all levels without
creating conceptual confusion.
When the
total study requires analysis at more than
one level, great care must be taken not to
apply concepts discovered at one level
indiscriminately to other levels.

Each planning effort, by choice or by
default, locates somewhere along this continuum according to the approach taken how to
express the micro-macro composition rela-
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national having jurisdiction in the matter.
The primary levels concepts useful in this
analysis are the relationships among parts
and wholes and the concept of hierarchy.
The reductionist approach would reduce the
whole system to its smallest component units,
but the theory of the existence of irreducible social facts and the practical
limitations in data availability and data
processing make inquiry at a higher level,
chosen to sat isfy the explanatory needs of
the investigator, more satisfacory.
Where
multiple perspectives are involved, explanatory needs vary with perspective, and inquiry
is necessary at a level to meet each need.
This means two or three levels in practice.
In concentrating on two or three selected
levels, however, one should recognize the
ever-present possibility of biasing the
results because of ecological fallacy in that
r elat ionsh ips found among groups at the
levels chosen do not represent relationships
among groups at other levels or the overall
situation.

Recapitulation
The discussion in this chapter has
described how the concept of perspective can
be used in defining a total planning system
and how the appropr iate level for analyzing
that system varies with perspective and
needs to be explicitly chosen in harmony
with the purposes of the planning effort.
Perspect ives are inherent in human decis ion
making where they take on values, scope of
control, capability of action, and temporal
d imens ions that collectively def ine the
relevant planning system.
Different actors
wi th voices in the decision mak ing process
developed different perspectives based on
experience and capability with respect to
these d imens ions, and the total relevant
system would encompass all aspects relevant
from any, perspective.
A more practical
definition of the relevant system, however,
recognizes that the planning process cannot
afford to devote extensive effort in areas of
the tot a 1 s y stem t hat are 0 f i n t ere s t to
relatively few actors and that socialization
processes among the actors work to reduce
the scope of accepted concerns.

The discussion in this chapter has shown
that the problems of levels of analysis are
among the most fundamental in conceptualizing
a comprehensive river basin plan.
A conceptual framework based on the idea of a
planning perspective, was defined and will be
used in the next chapter to cons ider how
relational problems may be overcome when
planning from a single perspect ive, and in
the following chapter the concept will be
expanded to multiple objective planning.

The selected planning system can then
be analyzed from the perspectives of the
various parties who have active interest
in the sorts of decisions at hand, in this
case water management and use decisions.
In practice this means concerned individuals
and the levels of government from local to
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CHAPTER VII
RELATIONAL PROBLEMS IN SINGLE PERSPECTIVE ANALYSES
the purposes of the people concerned.
This functional orientation is evident in the
discussion by James and Lee (1971, p. 9-10)
of four planning horizons in engineering
economy studies:2

Introduction
Relational problems seem less serious
when a single planning perspective is involved.
Although deeis ion mak
on total
planning systems nearly always involves
multiple levels, an analyst can take a
single perspective by specification of
selected interrelationships.
The results of
these select ions may lead to implaus ible
or erroneous conclusions, but the levels
phenomenon does not usually obstruct plan
formulation.
To put the situation differently, when planning studies use multiple
levels analysis, decisions must be made on
wh ich levels to use and how to relate
them.
An indecisive analyst is thus in a
pos ition simi lar to that of two analysts who
disagree on what the best focus for study is.
But the individual analyst is likely to have
an easier time resolving (ignoring?) his
difficulties.

The economic life ends when the
incremental benefits from continued
use no longer exceed the i ncremental cost of continued operation.
The £~Y~i£~l_lif~ ends when a
facility can no ronger physically
perform its intended function. The
period of analysis is the length of
time over which project consequences occurring are included in a
ticular study. The construction
is reached when the con
s
facilities are no longer
expected to satisfy future demands.
If projects are compared on the basis of
expected net benef it, the fate of a project
may depend on how far into the future the
analyst is willing to go in estimating
the flow of benefits and is particularly
likely to do so if a low discount rate is
used (Herfindahl and Kneese, 1974, p. 189222; National Water Commission, 1973; Krutilla and Fisher, 1975; Howe, 1971).

The relational problems to be explored
in th is chapter may be generally characterized as emerging from the planner's need to
structure the dimensions of his perspective
to make good use of available information in
finding answers to questions that arise in
the planning study.
A reasonable way to
order the discussion of these problems is to
arrange the four dimensions of planning
perspective in the matrix form used in
Chapter II (Figure 2) and discuss each cell.

In principle, there seems to be no
limit to the number of time subdivisions
that can be made, so that one can characterize processes of very short duration and
very long duration on the same scale.
The
fact that th is can be done in pr inciple,
however, does not overcome. the pract ica 1
difficulty of assigning value to the smallest
units and to the largest units on the same
scale.
People concerned with activities or
events that occur within the smaller temporal

Problems Within the Temporal Dimension
The Temporal Dimension
,
Planners generally think in terms of
scenar ios cons is t ing of sequences of events
extending to some future time horizon.
The
events, then, constitute the basic temporal
\.Inits in analysis, and the temporal horizon
IS erves
as the boundary beyond wh ich the
ident ificat ion of later poss ible events is
either unnecessary Or else so uncertain that
the ef fort is not worthwh ile.
Internally,
the p lann ing per iod may be though t of as a
temporal whole composed of events--the
temporal parts.

lA good discussion of the problems
here is found in Beardsley (1975); also
Davidson in Rescher et al., eds., (1969).
2A related statement is found in the
Water Resources Council's statement of
Principles and Standards (1973:24784).
The
per iod of analys is will be the lesser of 1)
the per iod of time over wh ich the plan can
reasonably be expected to serve a useful
purpose considering probably technological
trends affecting various alternatives; on 2)
the per lod of time when further discount ing
of beneficial and adverse effects will have
no appreciable effects on design.

The philosophical issues in the ind i v idua t ion
of events are too
complex
for full discussion here,l and it will be
sufficient for our purposes to follow a
generally pragmatic line and show how what
counts as an event is heavi ly dependent on
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intervals have difficulty grasping the
pract ical impor t of events tha t are not
s ignifcant except over longer intervals.
Conversely, when one is concerned with longer
intervals, events of shorter duration tend to
fade to insignificance.
This difference
perhaps in part accounts for the differences
in planning perspect ive between those thinking of short-term economic gain and those
thinking of long-term ecologic loss.
It is a
basic fact, as Hayek has argued, "that it is
impossible for any man to survey more than a
limited field, to be aware of the urr..ency of
more than a limi ted number of needs I (1944,
p. 59).

be measured by this single dimension, and
the one ranked highest (assuming there
are no ties) is the one which ought to be
chosen. Economic efficiency has provided the
first explicit and long time ostensible
standard of federal
t evaluation (James
and Rogers, 1976).
use economic efficiency as traditionally applied can conflict
with other values, like equality (Okun, 1975)
or environmental quality (Commoner, 1971),
important cons iderat ions are left out when
efficiency is the sole evaluative criterion.
It is useful to distinguish among the
ways values can conflict (Rescher, 1969b).
Probably the most common case of conflicting
values (labeled "accidental" in Figure 2) is
where mutually exclus Ive cour ses of act ion
contribute to the fulfillment of two or more
values to differing
These conflicts
are called accidental
se they ar ise in
the context of compet
states of affairs
rather than in the con ent of the values
themselves; a different, as yet unidentified,
alternative might satisfactorily achieve the
values at issue without conflict.

I t is also useful to distinguish among
four patterns of distribution within the
interval (Resch
and Urquhart, 1971, p.
159-161):
1)
activi tes occur over
the interval a
but cannot be said to
occur in any subinterval.
2) Homogeneous
activities can be said to take place over any
or all subintervals in the same sense that
they can be said to take place in the interval as a whole.
Constructing an irrigation
canal is a holostic activi
for one dealing
in annual time units while
ting fields
is a homogeneous activity.
3) Majoritative
activities go on dur
most, but not necessarily all, parts 0
the time interval.
Reading this report is likely to be a
majoritative activity for a day or two.
4)
Finally, occasional activities go on at some
times in the interval but not necessarily
most of the time.
Gaging water quality or
stream flow are examples. The classification
for a given activity, however, depends on the
length of the time interval.
Keeping these
different temporal patterns in mind can be
helpful in constructing efficient management
systems.

In contrast, other values necessarily
conflict.
Some values in fact seem to occur
in polar pairs.
Familiar examples include
liberty and authority, individualism and
collectivism, partic
tion and expertise.
In every case where one is relevant the other
membe~ of the pair is also. An improvement in
one requires diminution in the other.
Finally, there are conflicts among
criteria of value achievement.
For example,
people may agree on the need for clean water
but disagree over how clean is "clean."
Apparent conflicts of this sort are often
actually based on one of the other types of
conflicts mentioned.
However, two agents
sometimes more or less independently adopt
standards for the same va lue and later find
they need to come to some sort of agreement
on cr iter i a of ach ievement.
The adop t ion of
the Pr inciples and Standards for federal
water planning is an example.
The need for
common standards becomes greater as the
number of agents involved increases.

The Values Dimension
For at least the past century, one
of the dominant philosophies of value in
the United States has been utilitarianism.
Th is dominance is apparent in the use of
benef it-cos t analys is as a me thod of social
policy evaluation.
One of the fundamental
claims of utilitarianism (and to the nonutilitarian, one of its fundamental def iciencies) is that ultimately there is only
one values (or, at least one highest value),
although there is some disagreement among
Among
utilitarians on what to call it. 3
the candidates are "pleasure," "utility,"
"happiness," and "the general welfare."
Other value terms -say, "liberty •." "justice,"
"beauty," are to be valued bec~ql?,e (and only
because) of their contributiont9the general
welfare.
The one ultimate value is the only
criterion of choice needed. Alternative
courses of action can, t
oretically,

The objection that economic efficiency
does not capture important considerations in
water resources managment has led to the
explicit recognition of environmental quality
as an added value. Lesser attention has been
given to regional development and social
well-being (Water Resources Council, 1973).
All these values cannot be reduced to <J
single value without 0 straightforwDrd
reduction method.
Because the concept of
decision implies convergence on a single
alternative, the admission of multiple values
requires aggregation across values.
Systematic attention to aggrel'ating
values for multiobjective decision making is
fairly recent, but a growing number of techniques and applications are being reported.
Useful recent surveys of this work include
MacCrimmon (1973) pnd, with emphasis on

30 n th is and other current issues in
utilitarianism, see the excellent review by
Brock (1973).
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sional space, the decision maker is asked to
identify the ideal point in that space, and
alternatives that are ranked according to
their distance from the ideal.

water resources applications, Cohon and Marks
(1975).
MacCrimmon groups 19 aggregating
techniques into four major categories with
three subdivisions in each.4
His four
major categor ies indicate the variety of
approaches possible for aggregating multiple
values, and therefore, the difficulty of
ident ifying the "best" for given cases.

The Scope/Jurisdiction Dimension
Generally, a policy is cons idered less
relevant if it does not affect the welfare of
individuals in the decision making unit.
Political units in fact behave somewhat like
egoists. If efficiency is the primary value,
one would want to adjust the boundar ies of
the decision unit to the boundaries of policy
effects.

The first category is the weighting
method.
It requires that a scale be cons truc ted for each va lue of interes t, so that
each alternative may be quantified with
respect to each value. A numerical weight is
assigned to each value score, reflecting the
relative importance of the value, and products of values and weights are summed to
give each alternative a single score.
The
alternative with the highest total score is
then chosen. 5

If the boundaries of the political
body are not roughly congruent with
the boundar ies over wh ich the
external benefits or costs prevail,
decisions will be biased and
inefficient.
If the affected area
is too small, important benefits or
costs will be ignored.
If the area
is too large, excessive centralization and the associated
inefficiencies will result.
(Schultze, 1968, p. 127128.)

MacCrimmon's second major category is
the sequential elimination method.
It also
begins with a set of attributes expressing
the values in terms of which alternatives
are to be .characterized.
The attributes are
scaled in such a way that they form a set of
constraints.
Any alternative that does not
comply with the set of constraints is then
eliminated.
Generally, the set of constraints can be specified so that at least
one acceptable alternative is found.

Unlike individual egoists, political units
cannot operate on the basis of simple welfare
maximization; the distribution of costs and
benefits is crucial.

The third category of multiobjective
techniques is mathematical programming.
The
attributes of interest are the variables, and
the alternatives are impliCitly identified
by the set of constraints imposed upon the
values of the variables.
These constraints
may be both technological and--as in the case
of goal programming--preference.
An algorithm generates a set of perferred points
from the set of feasible solutions (I.e .• the
set of solutions satisfying the constraints)
and systematically evaluates them in terms of
a specif ied object ive funct ion in order to
converge on an optimum.

One of the long-standing controversies
in political theory is the determination
of the best size of the policy for the
performance of its responsibilities.
These
responsibilities fall under the general
goal of promoting the general welfare.
Of course such an abstract value as the
general welfare does not prOVide much guid
ance in decid
what the boundar ies of the
political unit ought to be and i f taken to
encompass all welfare effects would lead to a
political boundary that would include the
whole world.
Appropriate smaller units ilre
difficult to identify without defining the
particular activities that are appropriate
for governments to undertake.

The final group of techniques is the
$patial proximity method. Some applications
of this method are simply instances of the
previous methods where emphasis is placed on
geometric representations.
Each value is
represented by a dimension in multidimen-

The Action Dimension
4Cohon and Marks use three major
tategor ies to di vide 12 approaches.
But
their interests are slightly different from
those here, i.e .• they wish to evaluate
techniques with mathematical representations
in terms of computational efficiency and
comprehensibility of the display of alternat ives.

The primary source of conflict in
the actions dimension is associated I<>'ith
difficulties in ascertaining the technical
feasibility of action alternatives and
consequent different perceptions of probable
effectiveness.
When performance cannot
be predicted to the general satisfact ion of
the various decision makers, each is likely
to prefer the action with which he is most
familiar.
Often this choice is grounded in
part on faith that the fami]iilr cnD be
made to work more than on evidence from pust
performance.
Dam builders and the enforcers
~f zoning laws both believe they can succeed
working in the framework they know best.
The
way out of this sort of conflict is found in

5The PROPDEMM technique described in
Chapter IV falls roughly into this category, with the complication that multiple
values are distributed over several decision
makers.
Thus, the weighting procedure not
only weights values (via "Group Salience"),
but groups as well (via "Group Power").
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where all the objects, simi lar to
the first, are followed by objects
similar to the second. Or in other
words, where, if the first object
had not been, the second never had
existed.
(Hume, 1902:VII, 72,
emphasis omitted.)

developing
causal relationships for
prediction, and that topic is examined in the
balance of th
chapter.
The impl icat ion is
that problems associated with ~mperfect
causal relationships predominate In single
perspect ive analyses and problems associated
vi i th c lashes in the other three d imens ions
predominate in multiple perspective analyses.

The standard modern version of causation
is that one event C is the cause of another
event E if E occurred after C, and C and E
are instances of (the antecedent and con
sequent of) a general law.
In other words,
given the natural law and the initial condition C, event E follows deductively (Nagel,
1961, p. 73-75; Hempel, 1966, p. 49 58).
This explanation is generally thought to be
adequate for at least some range of phenomena.
Disagreement centers on how broad
this range is, and what sort of analysis may
be provided for c2usal relations beyond
it.

Causal relationships become a problem
when deterministic efforts to represent them
do not portray what the decision makers
presented with the plan have found to happen
in similar situations in their experience.
The problem becomes particularly severe
should subsequent experience after action is
taken on the planning information conform
more closely to the expectations of the
doubtful decision maker than of the planner.
The faulty planning: project ions can
result from inadequacies in a deterministic
model used by the planners or in the fact
that random events in real world systems mean
that projections can only be made on a
stochastic basis.
Departure in a given
s ituat ion may then s imply be because a rare
random event (a major flood for example)
happened to occur within a planning horizon
in which it would not normally be expected.
Such events become particularly difficult to
deal with in planning for multiple level
deci s ion mak ing because the var ious actors
usually have quite different risk aversions
and perceptions of possible outcomes.

Causal relationships are sough.t and
used in two ways in planning.
One IS the
determination that something is the cause of
some effect, and the other is the determination of the causal contribution of something
to subsequent states of affairs, that is the
consequences of some event.
Few claims that
one thing caused another thing are ever made
unconditionally, but rather on the assumpt ion that a number of other "background"
conditions--the ever present
paribus
cause--also pertained.
The ques
on that
then arises is why the one thing should be
singled out as the cause when the truth of
the ass e r t ion evi den t 1 y d e pen d son the
presence of other conditions.
Various
attempts have been made to reformulate
the notion of causation to address this
question.
One recent
tion, by Mackie
(1975), is that
causal attributions with an INUS con
tion, which he
defines as "an insufficient but necessary
part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result." Having
thus explicitly included relevant baCkground
conditions; one must return to the question
of how anyone part of the sufficient conditions can be favored as
cause, and
answering the question poses
additional
problem of delimiting the boundary of
the sufficient condition.
It does not, after
all, seem reasonable to include the entire
state of the universe just prior to the
result in the sufficient condition.

Further probing of the problem requires
exploration of causal relationship~ in
greater depth.
Causal judgments have
several uses in planning:
(1) We make causal judgments
to
the occurrence of
par
cu ar events; (2) we seek
causal knowledge because of its
u sefulnes s; (3) knowconnec t ions 0 f ten
gives us power to control events;
(4) causal attributions involving
agents are important in the attribution of moral responsibility,
legal liabilI!:.y, and so on; (5)
caus81 concepts are often used in
special technical senses in physical theory (Kim, 1973, p. 572).

Inc;] s e s w her ewe h 11 veil w~, 1 1 - cst ;1 blished scientif Ic theory-' such that the Cilllse
and effect in question can be construed as
instances of a causal law- the s i tuat ion is
not so difficult.
The central concern is
that the cause and effect in question are of
t~e appropriate kind, as indicated in the
cover ing law.
I n other words, the laws on
which we are able to rely provide gUidance in
singling out the cause. Secondly, one should
look for other relevant conditions known to
be required if the causal relation is to hold
but likely to be present in the context in
which the law is being applied.
In other

The first practical problem is how to
determine that a causal relation exists
between two objects. 6
Current approaches
often take Hume's famous statement as a point
of departure:
We may define a cause to be an
object followed by another, and

6Useful recent collect ions of art icles
on causation, with introductory surveys are
Brand (1976) and Sosa (1975).
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expected to follow regularly from a water
diversion, but the third consequence is
contingent upon the institutional setting in
which water allocations are made.
Thus, the
criteria for identifying causes in practical
affairs must include the institutions which
make certain actions possible and partially
determine the conditions under which an
agent may be held to be the cause of certain
effects (Hart and Honore, 1959).

words, background condi tions become salient
to the degree th at they are known to be
variable.
The problem planners encounter in
trying to predict the consequences of their
actions is nO,table lack of scientific laws
for projecting impacts other than those in
the technical dimensions of Figure l.
Consequently, a very large number of auxiliary conditions seem to be required in order
to make explanations and predictions fit the
covering law model.
Alternatively, it has
been observed that the !Q&i£~! form is
satisfied easily enough, but at the expense
of plausibility (Mandelbaum, 1960).
I t has
been suggested by some (Mandelbaum, 1960;
Winch, 1958; Louch, 1966) that events inpractical affairs are identified according
to different standards--Le., the interests
of actors in part icular s ituat ions--than are
events in scientific contexts, so that
traditional causal interpretations are inappropriate, or at least cannot be 'applied
until the events in question have been
analyzed into components. The implication is
that causal explanations proposed for actual
situations are heavily dependent on the
interests of actors doing the explaining;
moreover, the act ions of actors depend on
their interests. 7
The supporting assumpt ions for causal explanat ions in pract ical
affairs, then, are often closely tied to
salient values and object ives.
Since these
may be different for different groups, and
can change over time, the same generality and
stability of causal laws in hard sciences
does not appear to be attainable in policy
sciences (Reynolds, 1976).

The second problem of causation that
arises in planning activities is the notion
of the consequence of an action. Our ordinary conception of performing an action is
that of mak ing someth Ing happen or br ing ing
something about.
We think of actions generating consequences in the future.
Some of
the consequences are beneficial, some are
harmful, and others are neither benef ic ial
nor harmful.
Judgments as to whether a
consequence is beneficial or harmful and the
degree of benefit or harm vary with perspective and level of analysis.
In addition, we
are often interested in determining whether
certain consequences are intentional or
unintent ional.
If the utilitarian's teleological
evaluation of proposed actions is adopted-that is, if the alternative is chosen that is
expected to have the h
est net benefits-then there must be some way of estimating
the relevant consequences of the alternatives
before they occur.
If we want to improve
future predictions by monitoring the consequences of past actions, we need a way of
ident Hying the consequences of the act ions
as they 'happen. 9
Our inHial inclination,
then, is to claim that ideally we should
compare the total consequences of each
alternative. But Bergstrom (1966) has argued
persuas ively that the consequences of an
action, or any plausible interpretation of
"consequences," are indeterminate.
Pr ior
(1968, p. 54) goes further and claims that
"the notion of the total consequences of an
action seems thus to suffer from an incurable
incoherence which renders it useless for
ethical theory or for any other sort of
theory."

Another way to put this problems is that
when planners bring human actions into a
discussion of causes and effects, they must
take into account the possiblility that
actions have some of the consequences they do
because of their intrinsically social nature. 8
If someone diverts an amount of
water in the Colorado Basin, two likely
consequences that fit our ordinary causal
model are a decrease in downstream flow and
an increase in downstream salinity.
Another
consequence might be a law suit filed by
downstream water users wishing to collect for
damages.
The first two consequences may be

The reason for Prior's objections
is the difficulty of separating what happens
after the performance of an action into
the consequences of that act ion and consequences of other happenings.
Since the
occurrence of an effect requires the presence
of other conditions, one may think of the
consequences of these conditions as what
would have happened if the action in question
had not been performed, but everythin/2'- else
had been the same (Lewis, 1973).
But
th is is almost certain to place too much

7Although he does not have the final
word in all cases, the agent's view of
h is act ions is the favored interpretat ion.
Presumably the agent views what he is doing
according to the practical purposes to which
he is attending.
8Actions that are "internal" to a
pract ice--that is, actions that cannot be
performed except within a definite institut ional setting--are paradigm cases of this
social dependence.
The rules governing
the practice are then said to be constitutive
of the action see Searle (1969, p. 33-42).

9Equivalently, we must be prepared
to identify actions in terms of their consequences.
What is meant by performing
that act ion is the bringing about of
consequences (Lyons, 1965).
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must have deceived himself about what his
intentions really were.

weight on the action in question, for consequences will be attributed to it that occur
only because it and certain other conditions
are present--for- example, the chemical
effluent that is not harmful alone, but
interacts with another harmless effluent to
form a toxic chemical.

At the other end of act ion ident if ication are those actions that are identified
fairly independently of consequences~ or not
conceptually tied to particular goals.
The descriptions of such actions are, in
other words, fairly neutral with respect
to different practical purposes.

the consequences of act ions are further
rendered indeterminate by subsequent dec is ions.
Present actions have consequences
extending into the future, forming the
conditions in which future decisions are
taken.
But since each future decision also
generates consequences, each decision point
represents, as it were, a dilution of the
consequences of previous decisions.
In other
words, we cannot determine the total conseq uences of present act ions because some of
them depend on future decisions.

One way to view a plan is as a specified
set of actions leading to a goal.
Therefore,
the identification of actions accordinl'- to
their contr ibution to goals is an essent ial
part of planning.
On the other hand, i f
actions cannot be identified independently of
particular goals, it will be more difficult
to coordinate the activities of different
agents, particularly different agents pur
suing different goals and having different
training.

Th is inde termi nacy of the conseq uences
of an action creates problems in forecasting
for mak ing planning choices.
The commonly
expressed desire of decision makers for
certain prediction is not attainable because
the planner can never be sure.
But we are
reasonably sure of what we are doing in some
cases, and this indicates that we employ
other standards of predict ion.
These other
standards may be summarized as explicit or
implicit rules indicating possible consequences that may be ignored and possible
consequences that, for various reasons,
should be included in our deliberations.
This corresponds to D'Arcy's (1963) concept
of focal act descr ip t ions:
f ea Lures of act s
that, if they apply in a given instance,
cannot be omitted from the description of
that act without deception.
The application
of these rules and norms make planning
possible, but creates problems at the same
time.

A tension is thus created between the
advantages of more certa in goal ach ievement
from specializat ion and the increased d ifficulty of coordinating individuals with
different specialized training.
A further
tens ion is created between the increased
effectiveness of specialization, under a
certain range of circumstances, and the
possibility of reduced effectiveness when
special procedures are applied in circumstances outside of this range (Alexander,
1964).
Finally, the need to restrict the
range of consequences in order to ident ify
act ions at all implies that virtually every
action will have unintended consequences.
Unintended consequences become a serious
planning problem under conditions of rapid
social change, for such circumstances are
likely to change the conditions necessary for
an action to have even its expected effects.
Since society is unlikely to excuse (negat ive) unintended consequences a second time,
it is often necessary either to take a
meliorative actions or refrain from actions,
even though their consequences are not
certain.

By narrowing the range of considered
consequences, it becomes possible to identify and compare actions in terms of a·
manageable set of characteristics required
for successful performance.
In fact, we may
observe that different actions are identified
with varying degrees of certainty as to their
consequences.
One common way to identify
actions, but maintain a choice dependent on
consequences, is to conceive of the action as
bringing about some (especially desired)
state of affairs; in other words, identification by goal.
An action of this sort is
called by whatever phrase is the appropriate
replacement for "X" in "bringing about X."
Not ice, however, that it is necessary to
distinguish between the action and the goal,
so that we shall be able to describe the
action "bringing about X" as "bringing about
X by Y-ing" (Austin, 1956-57; Anscombe, 1976;
Meiland, 1970, p. 36-42). The distinction is
necessary for the same reason, basically,
that "total consequences" proved to be
unworkable.
There are cases where we fail
to bring about what we intended to, but
nevertheless we can say what it was that we
were doing.
When intent ion and performance
do not match one does not then decide that he

The discussion in this chapter describes
key problems in the temporal, values,
scope-jurisdictional, and action dimensions
of perspective for planning by a single
analyst. The temporal problems center on how
to divide planning time into subunits and fit
processes into those units.
The value
problems are that the values perceived from
different perspectives can conflict and so
can the criteria used to determine whether
desired values have been achieved.
The
principal scope-jurisdictional problem is
that institutionalized boundaries of responsibility vary from those encompassi
a
desirable planning system.
The act on
prbblems relate to the inadeauacies of
available tools for forecast ing the impacts
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of ac t ions under cons idera t ion.
A more
detailed probing of these inadequacies then
showed certain fundamental inadequacies in
the way planners handle necessary and sufficient conditions in applying causal relationships to be as if not more important than
inadequacies in the relationships available
to planners in projecting the consequences of

contemplated actions for decision makers.
The common consequence is that the sum of the
benefits achieved from a group of implemented
plans is often far less than the sum of the
benefits causally attributed to each of them
individually because of the interactions
among them. Planning models need to be
refined to deal with this problem more
explicitly.
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CHAPTER VI I I
RELATIONAL PROBLEMS IN MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE ANALYSES
Introduction

ocesses for reconciling individual diferences in a planning framework.
The
planner must reconcile differences in p1an
formulat ion in a way that the public served
is willing to accept as conforming to a
reasonable collective preference.
This
chapter addresses these issues by dealing
with the relational problems encountered in
the multiple perspective context.

;
Chapter VI I was used to explore the
re lat ional problems in single perspect Ive
planning. The effort identified the problems
in aggregating available data units to
obtain relevant information and in disaggregating the total planning system to an appropriate level for predicting the consequences
of action alternatives as major planning
issues.
Deeper exploration, however, showed
that the ideal of putting descr iptive data
together in a way that would permit the use
of physical laws to predict the consequences
of action alternatives is not in harmony with
the realities of how causes lead to effects.
The consequences of a contemplated course of
future action or of a monitored historical
choice cannot in actuality be separated from
what would have happened without that action.
Consequence~ for which an action provides
both necessary and sufficient conditions do
not continue over a long time frame but
rather are in fact soon altered in nature by
consequences stemming from other actions or
decisions.
Dynamically interacting real
world conditions make it impossible to
attribute long consequence time streams to a
single initial course of action.

Values Used in Multiple
Perspective Planning
Individuals form their values without
too much concern as to whether the procedure
used was proper or whether the results
are really in their own best interest.
Collective values thus include two kinds of
criteria in addition to values obtained for
society by reconciling differences in individual preference.
Consequently, the values relevant to
multiperspective planning can be classified
into three groups.
The first is composed
of substantive criteria, like efficiency and
en"i ronmental quality, that are applied to
probable
decision outcomes
themselves.
Second, procedural criteria guide the process
by which decisions are reached. For example,
procedural criteria are specified for use by
water resources agencies in estimat
costs
and benefits.
The third group is the source
of legitimacy or or in of the evaluative
criteria in use.
For agencies, the usual
sources of legitimacy are legislation and
executive orders, and thus failure to cite,
or, worse yet, to abide by the relevant
legislative or executive authorizations can
be sufficient to bring action to a halt.
Legislation and orders are also justified by
recogn ized purposes, so fai lure to ach ieve
goals can br ing changes.
Finally, agencies
are sensitive to public support and opposit ion, so that agency perceptions of the
public mood affects the commitment with which
an agency implements its programs.

Wh a t the n i s the p 1 ann e r t 0 do?
Is
he to recommend against all long-term actions
for social betterment because theoretical
limitations in the effects one can attribute
to a cause make it impossible to prove
action justified?
Such a policy can be
followed only at tremendous loss to social
welfare because none of the interact ing
actions would be taken.
The solution to the
dilemma must rather be found in defining a
test for project justification short of
reqUlrlng proven causal benefits to exceed
costs.
Benefits associated with some lesser
degree of partial causality must be accepted.
The not ion of acceptance leads to
the problems in multiple perspective plann
since acceptance is ach ieved through reconciling conclusions reached by diverse
decision makers on the basis of the perspectives that they have developed in coping with
their particular situations.
The relational
issues in reaching these conclusions combine
those already discussed as pertaining to
reaching the component single perspective
conclusions, the likelihood that contrary
to reductionist philosophy the process of
social decision making contains elements that
cannot be broken down into individual decision making units, and the problems of
duplicating realistic social decision making

The evaluative base for government
involvement in water resources has p.:radua tty
expanded (James and Rogers, 1976).
Consequently, social values that previously did
not enter into the analyses of benefits may
now be used to just ify government sponsored
water resources activities.
In general this
broadened evaluative base has stimulated
water resources development, but recent
experience with environmental quality standards has shown that the inclusion of add itional objectives can also dampen project
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low point Qn the curve Determines the optimal
SIze at unlt for pursuIng that purpose gIven
the existing technology.

activities.
It has been fairly easy to
des ign mult iple purpose projects partly
because the usual means for pursuing these
purposes are similar--for example, water
impoundments for water supply, hydroelectricity, agriculture, flood control, and
recreation.
More importantly, serious
problems have not arisen in evaluating these
projects because each purpose is interpreted
with reference to the overall objective of
economic efficiency.
In contrast, addition
of a second objective of environmental
quality has caused major design problems. l

In planning, particular values are
generally pursued by characteristic means
(Le., technology).
Thus the values, given
the available stock of knowledge and resources, are associated with optimal scopes
of decision and control; and given a scope of
decision and control, there is an associated
optima
level of pursuit for part lcular
values.
For example, water is generally
less costly to pump from a single well in
municipalities and from wells serving individual owners in rural areas.
These
differences affect pursuit of health values.

The lack of a common frame of reference
for compar ing the object ives of economi c
efficiency and environmental quality makes
the adopt ion of one or another of the many
possible frames of reference a political
issue, characterized by dispute and revision
of earlier
decisions
(Connolly, 1974;
Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963).
Where there
is divergence in op inions concerning which
values to pursue, the criteria used to
determine what to do are procedural.
Two
vague standards have general support:
policymaking should be rational and democratic.
The meaning and implications of
these standards have received wide attention
in political science.

Temporal Issues in Multiple
Perspective Planning
Since the identification of events
depends on planning perspective, different
planning groups attacking the "same" planning
problem from different perspectives will use
different events to describe the same time
period.
In order to achieve commensurability
for comprehensive analysis, one may need, for
example, to reconcile the diverse temporal
perspectives of irrigators (who think in
terms of planting, harvest, and possibly
future· subdivision), administrators (who
think in terms of budget and work schedules),
and legislators (who think in terms of
elect ions and legislat ive dockets).
When a
project reaches its construction phase, it
requires definition of the temporal relations
among events.
Wi th the adopt ion of a s tandard temporal reference, it becomes easier to
conceive of kinds of actions rather than of
particular actions. That is, we can think of
the temporal requirement of an action independent of any
particular
performance of

The ordering of values for social
decision making is very difficult to achieve
because incomparable values are distributed
in a variety of ways over diverse individuals.
The impossibility of making interpersonal comparisons of utility, assumed by
economists, leads to quite pessimistic
conclusions.
Arrow's famous theorem (1963),
for example, proved that any locus of control
composed of more than two individuals and
facing more than three alternatives will not
be able to construct a rule for aggregating
i nd iv idual preferences into we II-ordered
values and that is general and nondictatoria!.

it.

The interaction among agents with
different time horizons (e.g. the politician
seek ing payoff before the next elect ion v.
the environmentalist concerned with long run
ecological stability) in the planning system
thus presents two kinds of problems (U.N.
Economic Commission for Europe, 1970, p.
15-17).
First, differences in values being
pur sued must be reconci led.
Second, there
must be sufficient communication to avoid
inadvertent disruptive actions.
The latter
is made more difficult by the fact that
future actions are based on uncertain assumptions that can be ver if ied only wi th the
passage of time.
In an interdependent
system, a source of uncertainty for one agent
is the actions of other agents.

One aspect of the problem, outs ide the
scope of Arrow I s discussion, is the aggregative tendencies of certain values as opposed
to the disaggregative tendencies of their
pursuit. Some interests are more effectively
pursued by smaller and other interests
require larger units.. The reason for this
difference is related to the concept of
economies and diseconomies of scale. Given a
technology, one may expect a U-shaped Curve
relating average cost to total production,
where the downward-s lop ing port ion reflects
increasing economies of scale and the upward-slop ing port ion indicates increas ing
diseconomies of scale (Leftwich, 1973).
The

Over time, values change and technological advances are made, old alternatives
need to be reevaluated as do those that have

ITh .... costs of environmental quality
~an be measured by conventional means but
the benef its aJ'e more difficult to measure.
Some efforts hdve been made to bring some
aspects of environlli."~al quality into the
doma in of economics by the l 011cep t of ameni ty
rights (Mishan, 1969, p. 36-42).

only
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2The use of "optimal" here refers
to least average cost of production.

newly become possible (Baier and Rescher,
1969).
The history of federal involvement
in water projects can be seen as a process of
broadening the values to be enhanced by water
resources management (James and Rogers,
1976).
This trend corresponds with the
not ion that values tend to be pursued h ierarchically, so that as one value is attained
the next value becomes salient (Maslow, 1972;
Rokeach, 1973).3

If the identification of events is partly a funct ion of pract ical purposes, those
pursuing different purposes will generate
different temporal frames, creating problems
of commensurabili ty for comprehens ive analysis.
Project approvals, for example, must
fit into the institutional temporal perspectives of legislative sessions, budget cycles,
election years, and court dockets.
Construction requires a complicated sequencing of the
various construction activities, subject to
both man-made (e.g. strikes) and natural
(e.g. severe weather) interruptions.

Va lue changes can occur rap'idly.
A
dam failure rapialy Increases the Importance
of safety in the eyes of people in the
immediate vacinity.
The increase in concern
for environmental quality has been somewhat
more gradual.
The decline in relative
importance of irrigated agriculture to the
western economy has been much more gradual.

Jurisdictional Issues in Multiple
Perspective Planning
Jurisdictional assignments are made for
management purposes and bounded by territory
or function.
The jurisdictional authority
thus assigned is continually faced with
problems caused by interact ions with act ivities and decisions going on outside that
boundary and by limitations in its capability
to manage within the defined jurisdictional
boundary.
Furthermore, some duplication and
overlap, or redundancy (Landau, 1969), is
required to facilitate interaction.
Any
locus, then, will be faced with coordination
to avoid accidental conflicts of action.
In some cases, agents independently pursuing
different objectives may accidently create
for themselves unnecessary problems which
could be avoided by the adoption of some
common rule.
The convention of driving on
the right side of the street is an example.

Value changes with time often bring
concomitant changes in the structure of loci
of control.
The emergence of well-organized
articulation of Indian interests in heretofore unused water rights, for example, adds a
new twist to water allocation decisions
(National Water Commission, 1973, Ch.14).
The heightened prominance of environmental
i nteres ts is expressed in the growth in
membership and power of environmental interest groups, and in the creation of special
government agencies at the state and national
leve Is (Council of State Governments, 1975).
In general, the inclusion of new
groups in the decision process increases
the time required to make decisions, particularly when these groups have special
institutionalized methods for the promotion
and protection of their interests.
Bardach
and Pugliaresi (1977, p. 23) for example,
claim that "there can be little doubt that a
major effect of the EIS (environmental impact
statement) requirement has been to give
environmental groups a legal and political
instrument to cancel, delay, or modify
development projects that they oppose." This
impact of new interest groups in water policy
decisions has also been noted by Ingram

In cases where multiple agents are
independently pursuing their goals, the coordinative rules generally direct that
agents refrain from certain actions.
In
other cases, an agent incapable of independently achieving some goal must cooperate
with others. Cooperation to achieve specific
goals requires closer coordination than is
necessary to prevent interference among
independent activities.
The guiding rules
are likely to restrict activities not related
to the common goal.
Since different agents
have different incentives to cooperate (and
different priorities on the other activities
they will have to restrict), it is often
difficult to attain effective cooperation
through voluntary means (Olson, 1965).

(1972).

It should also be kept in mind that
values vary with locality.
Environmental
quality is a national interest, but this does
not mean that the salience of environmental
interests are uniform either within or among
localities.
Furthermore, the values and
their salience for all groups change with
time.

The difficulty in securing cooperation
is compounded by virtue of numbers alone.
Even in
conditions
that
seem most conducive--a cooperative attitude and basic
agreement on goals--success is difficult to
attain (Devons, 1971; Pressman and Wildavsky,
1973). Multiple loci of decision and control
imply differences in values and, therefore,
incentives to cooperate.

Problems of incommensurability would be
more serious if events were the only temporal
measure.
Planners minimize this problem by
using time un i ts that are independent of
events and with which all groups are fami1 iar.

Scope of Control Issues in Multiple
Perspective Planning
3This is not to imply that government
agencies follow the same pattern of development that Maslow described for individuals.

If scope of control for a value were
determined by maximizing efficiency in
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Without planning, water resource policy
is established by interactions among individuals and groups acting .from limited
i nformat ion in the market place and the
political arena.
Economists have long
recognized that market transactions have
external effects that cause some third
parties to profit and others to be harmed by
exchanges between buyers and sellers.
The
same sorts of externalitie
result from
political transactions. These
icial and
adverse external ef fects can be ident if ied,
quantified, and described.
Hopefully,
planners should be able to use this information to identify priorities for their efforts
to improve relational efficiency.

pursuit of that value (in a homogeneous
envi ronment), the plann ing s ys tern would be
structured as a collection of special-purpose
agencies whose jurisdiction (Le., scope of
control) changed only with changes in technology. Some values (those for which optimal
production units are of small size) would be
pursued by many agencies of fairly small
scope, some values would require only a few
agencies, and some values might be best
pursued by a single agency.
On the other
hand, if a given structure of scopes of
control were to determine what values were
pursued, probably no single value would be
efficiently produced.
Actual situations are controlled partly
by values and partly by scope of control.
Values tend to be pursued at one or another
existing level of government.
In cases where
all existing levels are seen to be inappropriate, incentive is created to form a new
level, of a scope more adequate to deal with
the problem (Ostrom, 1973; Bish, 1971). The
frequency of such cases is evidenced by the
pre li ferat ion of interstate commi ss ions,
interagency commi ttees, counci Is of government, and special purpos~ diitricts.
NeverthEless, these new levels are not created
frem "scratch," but are composed of units
already presept, and thus may not really have
ideal scope. The Colorado River Compact, for
exa:nple, is composed of seven states covering
an area much larger than the basin. One can
imagine a much different pattern of use for
basin water if drainage divides had been used
to determine state boundaries.
Denver and
Los Angeles, for example, would probably not
receive the major part of their water supply
from the Colorado River, as they do now.

The externalities occur as decision
making entities at all levels act in the
market place or in political bargaining. in
ways that affect others who do not part icipate in the action.
The effect may be
technological in that it generates phys ical
changes that helps or harms others or it may
be pecuniary in that it changes prices and
thus causes buyers to lose money to the
profit of sellers who gain money.
The presence and impol: tance of these
externali ties has been treated at length by
economists in the literature and has been
used repeatedly as a principal argument for
government water planning.
The fact is,
however, that externalities have not been
systematically evaluated when government does
the planning (some kinds have instead been
systematically ignored) and u.sed to produce
better plans.
Since most externalities
appear desirable from some perspectives and
undesirable from others, many of the most
impottant relational problems affecting
coordination efficiency are in fact rooted in
a failure of many water resources planners to
give adequate attention to the problem.
The need in multiple level analys is is thus
to determine what planners can do to 1) be
more systematic in the measurement of external costs and benefits and in the identif ication of who loses and who
ins and 2)
use this information in the
planning
process to improve relational efficiency.

Relational Problems in Coordination
One approach to the difficulty of
secur ing cooperat ion to ach ieve mutually
advant
eous objectives among multiple
jurisdi ions is to ask what would be done by
an omniscient, benevolent dictator.
Real
world water management policy falls short of
what such a dictator could accomplish because
1) real world policy makers are not omniscient in that they often operate from
incorrect or insufficient information and 2)
real world policy makers are not able to
dictate but rather are constrained by such
relational problems as having to work with
only a portion of the relevant system, the
1 imi ted perspect ive of key individuals, and
limited coordination among the loci of
decision making.
Relational efficiency can
b, df'fined 8S the net increase in the value
the f.
l:ece ;"es from water reSOUl:ces that
is actuo Ly being achieved by planning
divided by the net increase that would be
ach ieved by thf' d ictatC'r.
Total relat ional
effici
can Le divided into two components
associ
with the L.0 fActors listed above:
1) information efficielcY1nd 2) coordinat ion efficiency.
The second factor is of
primary interest here.

The activities most likely to require
government action are those dealing with
public goods and externali ties.
In the case
of water resources planning, "the provision
of most water services involves special
problems of a systemic character which are
not amenable to simple solution by provision
in a competitive market economy" (Ostrom,
1968, p. 125).
Optimal levels of provision of public
ji!,oods (or avoidance of public bads) are
determined by the net benefits.
The logical
political boundary for planning provision of
a given public good would be the service
area of the most
promising facility to
produce the good. The most rational unit for
most water resources plannin/l: appears to be
the watershed, but th is is not necessar fly
the best unit for the provision of other
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preferences recogniz
both additive components and new elements introduced by
socialization within the decision process.
Such an effort would
uire development of
practical composition ru
The state of
the art is such that "a
composition rule
may be int~oduced when a
some level (of
analysis), or for some range of problems, the
assumption of independence is inadequa.te."
Some axioms may have to be added, some
deleted, and collective criteria may have to
replace individual criteria at some aggregate
level of analysis (Staaf, 1973, p. 21).

government services.
The fact that relevant
political boundaries differ for different
public goods has suggested to some that
multiple jurisdiction in a political system
could be more efficient in the provision of
public services (Ostrom, 1973; Bish, 1971).
One justification for federalism can be made
9h these grounds, but interactive and coordinating working relations among these
~u1tiple
jurisdictions is difficult to
ach ieve.
It has been observed that the increasing
and interrelatedness of modern
society has made i t difficult for local
governments to fulf ill their responsibilities.
Many social problems do not seem
amenable to local treatment but require the
centralization of authority at a higher
level.
On the other hand, local governments
are thought to be more responsive to the
needs of the people than
ona1 governments
and can more easily promote citizen participation in the political process.
The need
to accommodate local variations thus provides
arguments for decentralization.
~omplexity

2.
Develop a theory of value on the
bas is of a system of eth ics that places
other than monetary values on human lives
and natural
resources
(Staaf, 1973, p.
12-13)
3.
Form interest groups to represent
the quiet majority, the disadvantaged and
inarticulate unorganized groups, to overcome
the unequal distribution of influence and
power.
Overt behavior of organized groups
and theiraec1ared preferences must not be
used as the only relevant indicators of what
is desirable (Staaf, 1973, p. 14).

The pragmatic problem with respect
to planning units is how to do the best job
with the political units we have.
The
study of interorganizationa1 relations has as
a primary task the identification of the
conditions that inhibit, and are conducive
to, cooperation among various organizations.

4.
Develop a theoretical framework for
defining social rationality. Social benefits
need to be defined with reference to human
needs and well-being, objectively determined
and politically accepted, instead of be ing
taken as given (Staaf, 1973, p. 16).

Finally, wherever product ion can be
increased at lower unit costs, economies can
be realized.
Obviously, this consideration
cannot be separated from the objectives that
are to be met by the out uts, and thus
unclear objectives make the
ion of
economies of scale more difficult.
In the
case of multiple objectives, an increase in
scale may be economical for some and not for
others.
Inefficiencies also arise when
benefits or burdens of the activities undertaken by one jurisdiction spillover into
6ther jurisdictions.
Such cases mean that
all the costs or benefits of production are
not being cons idered by the producing unit.
The ideal solution is to adjust boundaries
until all those who benefit or bear a cost
are within the producing unit; but with
mul t iple object ives, there may be no ideal
boundary adjustment.

5.
Generate a social welfare funct ion
that explicitly expresses the values of the
community (Bergson, 1964). Empirical studies
of values are needed so that the intangibles
of life can be incorporated into welfare
theory (Mishan, 1970).
6.
Deve lop an operat ional framework
for imp1ementat ion.
For e
, Ma rr is
(1974) has recommended "a commi ttee of wise
men to impose a social welfare function
(Le., draw up an extensive orderin!!. of
society's objectives, preferences and priorit ies) and then to promulgate this in a
system of prices" once the committee agrees
on units of measurement of public gains and
losses.
The public gains would be produced
by "social benefit corporations" with emphasis on responsibility to soc
at large
(Marris, 1974, p. 397-398).
The problems of
interpersonal comparisons would be overcome
by binding decisions wade by committees.
Such a social benefit corporation might be
patterned after the Yug:oslavian system
wherein the workers and public control the
decision making hierarch (Marris, J97 l "
p.
397-398).
However, Bacharadi (In U.N.
Economic Commission for Europe, J 970,
5
favors indicative planning: over an
welfare function.

"
Economi s ts have f or years de ba t ed
the po s sib 1i t y and p r act i cali t y 0 f de fin i ng
a social welfare function in order to determine the social benefits and costs of alternative courses of action.
They have con
s idered ways in wh ich winners could compen~ate
losers (financially) and elaborate
mathellwlical systems for estimating a reasonable compensation.
Some of the issues and proposals for
resolving them that have been raised are:
from

One can see form the nature of these
issues raised that the approach one favors
varies with highest level decisions in all
planning dimensions (Figure 1).
The appro-

1.
Construct a social welfare function
information on individual values and
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exceeds private cost due to the loss of
recreation, harm to the natural environment,
etc.
The price society pays for the products the factory produces thus equals either
the purchase pr ice plus the tax dollars for
pollution control or the purchase price plus
the loss in utility to recreationists and to
the environment. In addition to these market
responses, firms or governments of greater
size and power possess greater bargaining
power and can sh if t part of the ir cos ts to
society as a whole or onto firms or governments of less power.

pr iate approach for reconci ling water planning issues varies with choices between
capitalistic and socialistic elements in
government and with social choices between
individual freedom and authoritarianism.
Apart from these broader issues on the
philosophy of ordering individual and social
choice, resolution of choice conflicts has
been handicapped by the failure of welfare
economics and related disciplines to develop
a theory that can provide an ideal agai:ost
wh ich suggested methods of interpersonal
comparison can be judged (Baumol, 1966).

Since the destructive and construct ive
side-effects of production and consumption
are not reckoned into the choices made
by decision makers interacting in the market
place, they must be measured (Staaf, 1973, p.
12-13) for evaluation in planning.
Th,is
requires criteria of measurement and needs to
be done in recognition that economic rationality does not imply social rationality
and that the individual maximizat ion of
profit and satisfaction does not imply the
maximization of social benefit.
A large
gross nat ional product does not guarantee a
healthy, satisfied nation (Staaf, 1973, p.
13; Samuelson, 1973, p. 195).

Compensat ion of losers by gainers does
not hold up to theoretical criticism because
it assumes that the marginal utility of money
is the same for all.
Externality reflects
interdependencies as one's utility is affected by what someone else does.
Cost-benefit analysis by government
planne,rs has problems because "government is,
typically, at least partially ignorant of the
dimensions of the benefits, and very likely
also of the costs.
In many cases, decisionmakers are not even able to specify the
nature of the benefits and costs involved in
a given program" (Crocker, 1971, p. 18).
Furthermore, "because the gainers and losers
from any government action in general will
not be identical, the government must determine the magnitUde of net gains and losses
among various gro~ps and individuals, and
then somehow balance the desirability of the
distribution effects against the pure economic efficiency affects revealed through
straight forward benefit-cost analysis"
(Crocker, 1971, p. 19).
Even where government is informed and can estimate magnitudes,
it may not be feasible or realistic for
planners to estimate dollar values (prices)
for benefits and costs.

Because, in large part, the difficulties
multiple level planning systems have in
dealing explicitly with such issues, the
strategy of the government to handle the
externalities problem of water quality
control over the past two decades has relied
on detailed central regulation and construct ion subs id ies for such waste treatment
plants, proved excessively costly, and not
worked well (Kneese, 1975, p. 1, 7-8).
In
practice, "Regulatory agencies often become
the captives of the industries they are
charged, with overseeing" (Kneese, 1975, p.
7). Kneese concludes that new incentives and
institutions are needed to spur individual
decision makers, in their own self-interest,
toward socially des irable act ions.
He also
finds that subsidies for the construction of
capital facilities are inefficient in dealing
with social problems; as well as costly and
political (Kneese, 1975, p. 8).
Greater
efficiency could be achieved by region-wide
agencies that place stiff taxes that offer
polluters incentives to clean up the environment (Kneese, 1975, p. 2). "The market works
efficiently when costs can be imputed to and
levied on those who create them" (Walker,
1969, p. 73).

More generally "there is no universal
technology relating individual adaptations to
collective results, neither a benef icient
teleology nor, a pernicious one" (Marris,
1974, p. 55).
Conflicts between levels
(agencies) could also be resolved by reciprocal explanation, persuasion, and constructive
and understanding search for consensus or use
of incentives (U.N. Economic Commission for
Europe, 1970, p. 5).
Illustrated Planning Response to External
EconomIes and Diseconomles

Illustrated Planning Response to Internal
Diseconomies and Economies

Externalities occur when social costs or
benefits differ from private costs or benefits.
A commonly used example is in water
poilU n - wherp a factory manager responds to
his COSL_ 01 production (raw material, labor,
overhead, advertising, etc.) more readily
than he does to the costs others must bear in
cl~aning up the water.
If this cost is born
by society, the soci ,,1 cost of production by
the factory exceeds prlv~te cost.
If the
water is not cleaned up, then social cost

Internal economies are represented by
increasing returns to scale where the increase
in output
more than exceeds the
increase in input. For example, if the size
of a warehouse room is enlar~ed from 5' x 5'
to 10' x 10', the volume increases ~.~gQ.i
times.
Mos t power p 1<10 ts, wa te r t rei! t mE'nt
measures, and reservoirs for water suppl.y
follow t his p r inc i p leu n til the [ <l c i 1 i t y
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The problem that interdependency poses
for logical derivation of social criteria by
making the values of individuals not linearly
additive is analogous to the problem found in
the last chapter of logical prediction of
effects where causal relat ionships are not
linearly additive.
In both cases, the way
for planni
methodology to improve is to
develop 1)
tter understanding of the
dynamic, interactive relationships and 2)
rules for dealing with partial value fulfillment and partial causality in decision
making.

increases to a size where diminishing marginal returns to scale began to predominate.
Specialization of labor and overcoming
indivisibilities can also result in increasing returns to scale.
The important relational problems
with respect to returns to scale is that the
technology of the production process governs
the return to scale of the plant.
In contrast, organizational laws govern the size of
t:he firm (the management unit).
Decreasing
returns to scale can result when management
~is no 1
r efficient in responding to
hierarch
or bureaucratic information and
suffers communication breakdowns.
As the
firm grows too large, too many lines of
communication develop, breakdowns occur, and
the firm can no longer integrate its own
activities in its own interest. Since water
resources planning involves many complexities
not found in industrial management and the
same laws limiting organizational effectiveness apply, water planners must select some
limi ted number of control factors.
One of
the major relat ional problems is that planners operat
from different perspectives
choose different ones.
Differences result
which cannot be resolved without gett
into
a situation too complicated for a compre
pensive planning organization to resolve.

The principal measure of value in
economic markets is price. Price, however, is
only one among many political, psychological,
and other variables that affect resource
flows.
Chamberlain (1965, p. 362) even
claims that bargaining relationships are more
important and furthermore that "There is no
ground for predicting the behavior of any
economic unit, any more than physics can
predict the behavior of any atom. It is only
probability based on large numbers, that
permi ts us to
ize as to act ions and
reactions under given conditions" (Chamberlain 1965, p. 356). Even then, the generali zed micro relat ionships must be unders tood
within the context of given macro relationships (Chamberlain, 1965, p. 364).
In important areas of resource conserva
tion, prices signal false information.
The
waste-aSSimilating capacities of air and
water, as common property resources, do not
command a price in the marketplace.
Thus
their overuse is encouraged.
Collect ively
held common property goods will be too soon
exhausted unless they are given a value and
treated, not as free goods, but rather as
scarce goods to be economized and conserved.
Incentives imposed by government such as
effluent charges or tax breaks are one way to
get total price to reflect the true cost of
externalities and to get individual decision
makers to act in socially optimal ways.

Composition of Social Criteria
Composition laws govern extension of
relationships derived from micro units to
macro level applications. Laws that apply to
the individual firm are extended to apply to
the industry and the economy as a whole.
Total flood damages are estimated as the sum
of the damages suffered by affected individuals.
Composition laws, however, may
cease to apply at certain levels of aggregation. Flood losses become more than additive
when the cost of repair increases or getting
qualified help becomes impossible because
suppliers of
services cannot satisfy
the demand (Yancey et a1., 1976).
Inputs
,that possess qualitative differences which
give rise to increasing or decreasing returns
to scale cannot be made homogeneous by
placing a homogeneous monetary value measurement on them.
Only if the variables are
card inally homogeneous can one get cons tant
feturns to scale.

Effluent charges are essentally rents
charged for the lease of rights to dispose of
wastes in public
owned environmental
resources.
They are a nonmarket solution to
externalities in that government must externally, to market processes, determine the
effluent charges and coordinate them into an
overall
system
effective
in combat ing
interrelated environmental problems (Crocker,
1971, p. 87-88).
Several problems complicate government efforts to deal with externalities.
To
in with the technical
issues, the external e fects of air pollution
are very difficult to measure. Water pollution measurement is easier but still leaves
the question of assigning responsibility "all
the men who have put straw on the camel, or
just the last man before its back is broken?"
(Goldman, 1972, p. 16).

The major problem in applying available
composition laws to derive social criteria
is that the theorems and axioms have been
based on an assumed independence of the
individual units.
As one of the best known
examples, the pure competition model used
to define economic efficiency from market
expression of individual consumer preferences
and hence the foundation for benefit-cost
analysis assumes that the consumer
ences are independent of one another.
Furthermore, no laws nor relationships have
been defined for the case of interdependence
where individual peferences are not linearly
additive.

Assignment of administrative responsibility does not automatically solve these
technical problems.
Government intervention
is no panacea for the failures of the private
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systems and the results of their actions
beyond the lifetimes of their citizens.
For
long range planning in a democratic society,
where citizen participation and consent are
so important, the difficulty of ;ustifving
obligations imposed on future ?-eneiation~ is
greater than opt imizing for present members
of society. One writer (Bock,1970) suggests
that long-range governmental planning can
restrict not only the options for the present
generation, with possible deleterious effects
on individuals motivated by a possible
"brighter future," but can also restrict the
opportunity for the exercise of choice by
future generations.
Resolution of the issue
involves determination of the responsibility
of the present generation for the future
given that present actions can affect th~
self-determination of future generations and
that present values and technOlogy may be
quite different than those of the fut~re.

market system.
Central re~ulation cannot
handle the complexity of externalities, and
the basic failures of the price system must
be corrected not buried under concrete and
steel (construction subsidies) (Kneese, 1975,
p. 4-9).
Part of the problem is that it is
very difficult to define public interest
(Crocker, 1911, p. 113) and determine whether
externalities (Friedmann calls them "neighborhood effects") warrant government intervention.
Ne ighborhood effects impede voluntary exchan~,e because it is difficuI t to ide n t if Y the e f f e c t s on
third parties and to measure their
magnitude; but this difficulty is
present in government act ivi ty as
we 11.. Conseq uent ly, when government engages in activities to
overcome neighborhood effects, it
will in part introduce an additional set of neighborhood effects by
failing to charge or to compensate
individuals properly.
Whether the
original or the new neighborhood
effects are the more serious can
only be judged by the facts of the
individual case, and even then,
only very approximately (Friedmann,
1962, p. 124).

In a somewhat different form, the issue
concerns the product ion of temporal externalities, which su~gest that the adoption
of a given temporal horizon has implications
in terms of both efficiency and equity (Page,
1977).
One advantage of the extended lifespan of government organizations is that
projects which require long periods in which
to realize benefits can be more readily
undertaken than would be the case without
such organizations.
If organizations are
more likely than individuals to undertake
long-range programs, then at least some of
these programs will reflect a difference in
temporal preference between organizations and
individuals.
.

Basic microeconomic and value theory
have been based on individual tastes and
preferences and their aggregation based
on an assumption of independence.
A new
theory for aggregating social choice is
needed if social wants and needs are to be
ach ieved.
Perhaps such a theory could use
Arrow's Value Theory to go from individual
tastes to social preferences.
Perhaps, it
would more effectively be based on sociopolitical and psychological considerations
and factors (Staaf, 1973, p. 13).
Perhaps,
the answer lies in providing each participant
the resources and incent ives to use interpersonal and interagency compar isons of
utility in resolving conflicts by reciprocal
explanation, persuasion, and a constructive
understanding search for consensus (U.N.
Economic Commission for Europe, 1970, p. 5).
The main difficulty to be overcome is the
indeterminancy encountered wherever one
attempts to aggregate independent parts into
interdependent wholes or disaggregate interdependent t.i/holes into independent parts.

The preferences of both vroups and
individuals change over time . . This fact
makes ad hoc agreements involving many agents
very expensive and vulnerable to dissolution
in the case of unexpected implementat ion
delay.
A case study by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) documents the slow disintegration
of cooperation in one federal pro~ram, in
spite of broad agreement and generous funding
at the outset.
They recommend that, in view
of this
agility of voluntary agreements,
programs
kept as simple and direct as
possible.
In high conflict sitwations such as
that existing in allocating Colorado River
water, the cost of decisions through voluntary agreement may be very large.
The effort
required ~o ach ieve agreement is such that
participants are seldom willing to reonen
discussion, partly because of the unpleasant
ness of the process and the amount it detracts from other activities and partly
because of a fear that they wi 11 fare less
well next time.
No one is willing to reopen
negotiations each time new facts or chan~ing
conditions suggest the standing compromise as
nonoptima1. As the departure rroIl! optimality
increases over time, however, stro['~'er
regulat ions and the threat of grei'1ter sanctions are required to keep practice in line
with policy.
Over time one might expect the
jurisdictions that entered into the voluntary

I f society is to ach ieve its goals in a
world of externalities, planners must provide
decision makers information on the extent of
these effects and on how to equitably adjust
for imbalances.
However, democratic ideals
require r"jection of imperative or imposed
p::','''' '..,,,, (a benign dictator or group of
dictalu.
Between the extremes of firm
control to prevent externalities from happening and letting them freely occur lies some
acceptable midd'0 ~round.
Temporal IS!)tJes

;n S('C ial Choice

One cause of perplexing relational
problems is the persistence of political
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popular support diminishes and
lower the benefit cost ratio.

agreement to perceive continued enforcement
against the best interest of their constituents to be more undesirable than reopening negotiations.

rising costs

Just as legislative railroading can
produce inferior legislation, the use of the
jud idal system to defeat projects can lead
to results that are not in the public interest.
Most legislatures have undertaken
measures to improve the quality of legislat ion.
It may be similarly beneficial to
cons ider reforms in the jud ic ial process
whereby judgments of project acceptibility
may be made more rapidly.

The institutionalization of cycles
contributes also in other ways to the
temporal dimensions of perspectives at
all levels of decision making.
For example,
obvious short-term cycles are found in
the legislative process and the judicial
process.
The ju-d icial process tends to
emphas ize the sequence in reach ing a determination.
The legislative process is more
influenced by duration.
The basic contrast
resulting from this difference in emphasis is
the tendency for the judicial process to
become drawn out in an effort to reach a
definitive solution to an issue, as opposed
to the tendency of the legislative process to
periodically redecide the issue, with more or
less continual policy adjustment.

Recapitulation
The additional problems discussed in
this chapter as associated with expanding
from a single to a multiple perspective in
aggregate expand on the principal conclusion
of the last chapter, namely that the set of
available planning tools are based on an
assumption of additivity of basic units
whereas a dynamically interactive real world
is not that way. It is not realistic to plan
from concepts of individual values a?gregating linearly into social values, of
actions efficiently achieving values, of
decision makers being fully in control of
situations and able to implement their plans,
or of jurisdictional authority matching
management needs.
In every such situation,
what one instead finds is situations of
interacting perspectives and partial contribution.
The major thrust needed for more
effective planning is development of acceptable methodology for a real nonlinear world.

The combination of changing preferences
and the duration of institutional processes
are important considerations in choice of
political tactics. Legislative proposals put
to a vote near the end of a sess ion are
usually thought to have a better change of
passage than those introduced early, because
there is less time for examination and
debate.
At the other end, litigation has
proven to be an ef fect ive envi ronmentalis t
tactic for opposing development projects
because, even if the court battle is lost,
the project can be delayed long enough that
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion 2:
The orientations and
perspective--s0fpliJnners, or agenci!?s involved in planning, have a lI'ajor impact on
the manner in which relational and levels of
analysis problems are resolved.
The i!l'['ortance of the role of concepts and perceptions
in planning behavior is not generall~ re
cognized (to the extent that it car be
observed). The range of activities involving
definition of the problem, foal formulation
and classification, specification of objectives, and identification of alternative
courses of action, depend on the conceDtions
Bnd perceptions of those who do the planning.
Uncritical acceptanc!? of basic biases and
assumptions is the rule rather than the
exception in many planning efforts.

The general inference that can be made
from the research reported herein is that
water resources planners generally have a
poor understanding of the relational and
levels of analysis problems in policy making.
lhis lack of insight into the basic nature of
,these problems is imposing a high cost on
~ociety, particularly because many conflicts
that occur might othorwise be circumvented or
prevented.
The literature that deals I-lith
relational and lev£ Is problems is largely
unknown to practicirg vlater resources planners, and the literature has not developed to
a point where established principles about
improved methods for dealing with these
problems can be practically implemented in
large scale planning.
Critical knowledge
gaps need to be filled.
This means that
further exploratory or basic research must be
conducted before practical successes can be
expected. l
The specific conclusions presented in this chapter refer to basic
problems that should be resolved before
practical solutions are possible.

Pla~ninR
procedures
need
ed to Insure that the
role of basic conceptions and perceptions
is explicitly recornized wit:' respect to
their impacts on dealing with relational and
levels of analysis problems.

Conclusion 1:
Not much research that
has had practical significance has been
done, either analytically or institutionally,
to resolve relat ional and levels of analyl is
problems in large-scale planning.
If the
question were asked:
"What kinds of h,.rd
knowledge are appropr late and ava Hable to
understand and evaluate how the sociocultural, economic, and political activities
of farmers in the Ulntah Basin relate to the
same kinds of activities of businessmen in
Southern California?" only very little such
knowledge can be identified.
But that is
probably the kind of knowledpe that is
necessary in basin-wide planning.
Similarly,
if it is asked what institutions and institutional procedures are appropriate to relate
the activities of the two groups, pood
answers would be difficult to find and
substantiate.

Conclusion 3:
The syneqdstic effects
that emerge as the result of the systemic
interactions among different subsystems
of a river basin have major impacts that
need to be taken into account in bas in-¥!ide
plannirg.
As a planning analysis moves from
subbasin to basin, it is clear that patterns
of interaction emerge with results that
cannot be explained simply by combining. the
analyses of the subbasins. A new ana sis is
necessary from the viewpoint of the
in as
a whole.
For planning purposes, it is
critical that the differences between analvzin!,! the system as a whole versus combin-in?
the seDarate analyses of the subsvstetl's are
made ciear.
Thes·e differences rep"resent the
synergistic effects that emerp.e from inte
gratinr a larger system.
M!?thods are needed
to determine what these differences are, how
they emerge, and what their effects are.

Recommendation 1:
Basic and applied
research-rB-r1eeded-to develop specific
knowledge
about analytical/conceptual
i'!nd institutional procedures appropriate for
dealing with relational and levels of analysis problems in river basin planning.

Recommendation 3:
Srecific' research
support should-~provjdec! to investigate
how sjne
istic effects create relational
and leve s of analysis problems in river
basin. planning.
The enort should [OCLIS on
the way synerristic effects emer~~, their
impacU:, and their implications with respect
to plannin~ procedures.

lOne mi~hl even say thut, somewhat
inadverlently, an entire research area
of basic as well as applied problems in
policy making and planning lies virtually
untouched.

Conclus ion 4:
~:Llch
of the i nforfll,lt i ('n
and data that are colleCled for different
parts of a r jver bas jp iHP not COfllP<1t i b I (~.
thereby creating obstiJclcs th;lt hilD'L'pr
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processes that usually character ize interactions among organizations responsible for
various planning functions and activities.
mOne useful applicat ion of the idea of a
planning perspective developed here is that
it shows numerous possibilities for perceptual differences that, if unrecognized, can
lead to communication distortions.
Many of
the problems created by poor commun icat ion
could be avoided if planners 1) were more
careful in considering the potential impacts
of their activities at different levels and
on the performance of other funct ions and 2)
less optimistic of being completely understood.

efforts to cope with relational and levels of
analysis problems.
Relational and levels of
analysis problems present special difficulties that require a high degree of coordination and integration of planning
activities.
Such coordination and integrat ion is hampered by the fact that different
planners and agencies rely on data that
varies according to location or may be
i ncons istent in other ways.
Although some
efforts have been made to standardize data
collect ion procedures, much more rema ins to
be accomplished.
For example, different
levels of government need to put greater
effort into exchanging information and
standardizing collected data.

Recommendation 7:
Communication processes should be developed and des igned to
improve the quality of planning interactions
among organizations and agencies so they can
be more effective in integrating and coordinating the activities required in comprehensive river basin planninf,.

Recommendation 4:
An intergovernmental
task force should examine how data management
procedures can be improved so that incons istencies among planning agencies in a
region or river basin are minimized.
Conclusion 5:
The methods, techniques,
and models in river basin planning are not
generally suitable for analysis of multilevel
problems because they do not represent the
dynamic interactive elements in a real world
setting.

Conclusion 8:
Rules and ref,ulations
that are established to deal with one situation are often inappropriately applied to
other, different situations, or are inconsistent with one another when multilevel
problems are involved.
One of the most
frequent complaints made by state and local
officials concerns the difficulty in complying with the numerous, highly detailed
federal regulations.
The suitability of a
uniform national regulation in a region
depends on how well that region matches the
national norm used to establish the regulat ion.
To the degree western water quali ty
problems differ from those in the east,
national water quality regulations cause
administrative problems.

Recommendation 5:
Multilevel problems
in comprehensive river basin planning involve
not only hydrologic phenomena, but also
social, economic, and political variables.
Although multilevel problems are rare in
hydrologic applications and modeling of
physical phenomena is becoming increasingly
sophisticated, such is not the case with
social, economic, and political variables and
the related modeling efforts. Therefore, existing modeling methods, techniques! and
concepts should be evaluated to determine
their limi tations in .handling rela t ional and
level of analysis type problems and how
interactive elements can be added to do a
better job.

Recommendation 8:
In developing rules
and regulations, special attention should be
given to levels issues, so that significant
local variations in conditions will not be
ignored and cause inconsistencies in the way
various parties are affected.

Conclusion 6:
The planning activities
and functions that have developed are
frequently
inappropriate or
ineffective
in comprehensive river basin planning.
The dynamics of the planning system, as
discussed in this report, are such that no
ingle agency or governmental level is best
suited for all planning activities.
In a
completely centralized setting, important
considerations will inevitably be left out of
the planning perspective. On the other hand,
while special districts may provide the scope
that is best adapted to a function, proliferation of such districts increases
the difficulty of achieving coordinated
planning.

Conclusion 9:
Calculation of costs
and benefits is often done for only one
planning level, thereby ignorinf, costs and
benef its that would be recognized at other
levels, creating inefficiency and inequitable
dis t ri bu t ion.
Recommendation 9:
Traditional benefitcost calculation hRS takpn plocf' only ;It th;1t
1 eve 1. a t wh i c h t h f' pro j e c tim p ,1 C l s IV l' r e
es t ima ted.
For example, sma 11 projects
provided a benefit-c6st figure based only on
local impacts.
Large regional projects
provided a benefit-cost figure based only on
the aggregate regional impacts and ignor ing
the subsystem economics.
Therefore, techniques and procedures should be developed for
better benefit-cost estimation by area of
impact or by perspective dimension.
Such
tools would provide more accurate information
on the distribution of costs and benefits
wh ich accrue as a resul t of river bas in
projects that generate multilevel impacts.

Recommendation 6:
Studies should be
determine how planning functions should be distributed, and what planning activities are appropriate for different
organizations and agencies in regional and
river basin planning, particularly as these
concern relational and levels problems.
underta~o

are

Conclusion 7:
compounded by

Planning difficulties
the poor communication
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APPENDIX A
PROPDEMM II COMPUTER PROGRAM
DOCUMENTATION

Program PROPDEMM II is a revision· of
PROPDEMM written in FORTRAN IV and is
compatible with either an IBM system 860 configuration or Burroughs 6700. The documented listing is set
up to be used on a Burroughs 6700.
Compilation time is approximately 28 seconds.
Approximate storage required is 7650 words (48
bit words).
Execution time is approximately 7 seconds.
Since the Burroughs 6700 is a virtual memory
computer storage requirements are hard to estimate.
However. array storage is approximately 4862 words.
totsl program code of 2502 words. 11 program
segments. and 155 disc segments.
Printed lines of execution output is 1877 lines for
the current execution of the programs the numbers of
lines printed for the program listing and compilation is
(500).

The number of cards in the program deck is 500.
The number of cards in the data deck is 77.
The program deck is punched in EBCDIC code
using an IBM 029 keypunch. A utility program
available at the Utah State University Computer
Center will convert EBCDIC or 029 keypunch code to
BCD or 026 keypunch code, thus permitting compilation and execution on a UNIVAC 1180 computer.
The following deck setup is for a Burroughs. B6700
computer. All words written in capital letters must be
punched literally as they appear. To compile the
PROPDEMM II program card deck, the following
control cards must be used:
Beginning in card column 11:
2 USER necessary accounting information (this
will vary from computer center to computer
center. The user will need to contact the

computer center in question for correct
accounting information).
2 PASSWORD "password" (this card may also vary
depending on the computer center) where
password may be any character combination
known only to the user.
2 COMPILE PROPDEMM FORTRAN LIBRARY
where LIBRARY is an optional item. If the
user desires to store the compiles PROPDEMM program deck permanently on a
system program library disk, he need only
punch the word LIBRARY in the card as
shown. The advantage of such an action
permits the user to execute the program as
many times as desired without needing to
recompile the program deck each time. If
LIBRARY is not used. SYNTAX may be
punched in its place. This indicates that the
program will be compiled only and not
executed. In either case, the program will be
compiled only.
2 DATA
PROPDEMM program deck is placed here.
2 END

This completes the compilation procedure.
To compile and execute PROPDEMM in one
operation. arrange control cards as follows:
2 USER accounting information
2 PASSWORD "password"
2 COMPILE PROPDEMM FORTRAN GO where
GO mayor may not be punched, indicating
execution. If GO is left out, execution is
automatically assumed.
2 DATA
Program deck.
2 DATA CARD/DECK
PROPDEMM data cards.
2 END
The user should be aware that the decision maker
and objective vectors are treated in the same manner
as the other five groups in all computations. At the
present development of PROPDEMM these vectors

iA "2" represents an invalid character or a 1 and 2
overpuncbed.
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do affect the other groups and are affected by the
other groups.
No program-generated error messages will
appear in PROPDEMM.

place field. No (+) sign is necessary for
positive integers.

5.

PROPDEMM D DATA PREPARATION

column

All data input to PROPDEMM II must be
prepared in order as follows. Format specifications
included are written in FORTRAN IV for use on a
Burroughs 6700!computer.
L

~ Seven single digit integer values each

associated with the cost consciousness
of a group including both the decision
maker's value and an objective value
which may represent a hypothetical
group. Range of possible values: 1-7.

SWITCH CARDS: Format (2011). Four values
are entered on this card to represent the
variables SWSEL. SWESG, SWOVVG, and
SWID. All values are '1' or '0'. A '0' in any
column will suppress program execution of that
item.

9-37 The cost levels of all 15 courses of
action are punched as single digit
numbers within a range of -3 to+3.
When the value is positive, right justify
the digit in the given field as no (+) sign
is necessary.

column
I
1 SWSEL switch prints selected vectors
only when SWESG and/or SWOVVG
are turned on.
2 SWESG switch prints environme!'
tal,
state vectors modified by groups.

6.

3 SWOVVG switch prints outcome valu
vectors modified by groups.

INDICATED SALIENCE LEVEL: Format
(512). A single number is placed on this card as
follows:
column

----r any integer value between 0 and 7. The
remainder of the card is not used.

3.

GROUP DOGMATISM VECTOR:
(7F1.0). Input as shown:

Format

column
1-7 Seven dogmatism values, one for each
group. single spaced. The group information must be in the same order as
the groups will be analyzed. The
seventh group is the selected vector
group which may be used as a
hypothetical group. A positive integer
must occupy each column.

4.

PUNISHMENT -REWARD POTENTIAL VECTOR: Format (512). Five values are entered as
shown:
column

---riO Any integer value between -3 and+3. If
a negative value is entered then a (-)
sign and the integer value occupy the
two place field. If a positive integer is
entered, then the integer alone will
occupy the second place in the two

GROUP AFFECT VECTOR: Format (28F2.0/
21F2.0). The affect values require two data
cards and are input thusly:

~
1-14 Group 1 values
15-28 Group 2 values
29-42 Group 3 values
43-56 Group 4 values
(next card)
1-14 Group 5 values
15-28 Group 6 or decision maker
29-42 Selected vector
The values are entered in two digit fields using
values from -3 to+ 3. Where using '0' as a
positive integer right justify entry. The (.) sign
will occupy the first digit position in negative
entires.

4 SWID switch prints issue differences.

2.

COST CONSCIOUSNESS/COST LEVEL
VECTORS: Format (711, 1512). Values are
punched on the card as follows:

7.

GROUP VALUES VECTORS: Format (3(5A4,
1012, 5A4. 1012/) 5A4, 1012, 5A4, 1012). The
group value vectors require four data cards and
are prepared as follows:
column

---r:2if Group name
21-40 Group values (10)
41-61 Group name
62-80 Group values (10)
This format allows the use of seven groups. The
first three data cards will input two groups per
card and the fourth card will input the
remaining group. The group values are entered
in two digit fields using a -3 to+3 scale. Entries
must be right justified with the (-) sign
occupying the first digit position for negative
entires.

8.

GROUP VALUE NAMES: Format (2(4(5A4)/).
4(5A4». The value names require three data
cards as shown below:

46-60 Group 4 power for courses of action #11
through #115
61-75 Group 5 power for courses of action #11
through #15
(next card)
1-15 Decision maker power for courses of
action #1 through #15
16-30 Objective vector power for courses of
action #1 through #15
Each group power vector is contained in a 15
digit field representing the 15 courses of action.
Groups must be entered in the order listed. A
1-7 scale is used to rank group power.

column

---r.::r- Abbreviation of value #11 name
5-20 Value #11 name
21-24 Abbreviation of value #12 name
25-40 Value #12 name
41-44 Abbreviation of value #13 name
54-60 Value #13 name
61-64Abbreviation of value #14 name
65-SO Value #14 name

This pattern is followed on the second data card
for values 5,6,7, and 8. The third card follows
the same format for the input of values 9 and 10.
9.

12.

COURSE OF ACTION NAMES: Format (3
(20Af/). 20A4). Four data cards are prepared
thusly:

column

lTD

Group 1 positive information salience
11-20 Group 2 positive information salience
21-30 Group 3 positive information salience
31-40 Group 4 positive information salience
41-50 Group 5 positive information salience
51-60 Decision maker positive information
salience
Each groups positive information salience is
entered in a 10 digit field corresponding to the
10 environmental values. Salience rankings are
performed on a 1-7 scale and the 7th group-the
objective vector is omitted from input. At the
current time this data is not used in the
PROPDEMM II program but must be input to
fulfill format requirements.

column

---r-2O

Course
21-40 Course
41-60 Course
61-SOCourse

of action
of action
of action
of action

name
name
name
name

Each of the first three cards will input the
names of four courses of action. The fourth card
will input the names of three courses of action.
It is not necessary to fill all of the spaces within
a field.
10.

GROUP SALIENCE VECTORS: Format (70 I
1). Salience vectors for all seven groups are
entered on one data card.
column

13.

SALIENCE OF NEGATIVE INFORMATION
VECTOR: Format (6011). All input requirements are the same as presented in SALIENCE
OF POSITIVE INFORMATION vector above.
vector above.

14.

POSITIVE INFORMATION VECTOR: Format
(75 I 1/15 I 1). Two data cards are needed for
this vector.

--r:IO Group 1 salience vector
U-20Group 2 salience vector
21-30 Group 3 salience vector
31-40 Group 4 salience vector
41-50 Group 5 salience vector
51-60 Decision maker salience vector
61-70 Objective vector salience vector
Salience is ranked on a 1-7 scale and input
through single digit fields.
11.

SALIENCE OF POSITIVE INFORMATION
VECTOR: Format (6011). One data card is
needed to input this vector.

column
-"1-15 Group 1 access to positive information
16-30 Group 2 access to positive information
31-45 Group 3 access to positive information
46-60 Group 4 access to positive information
61-75 Group 5 access to positive information
(next card)
1-15 Decision maker access to positive
information

GROUP POWER VECTORS: Format (751 1/30
11). Two data cards are required to input the
group power vectors.
column

-TT5

Group 1 power for courses of action #11
through #115
16-30 Group 2 power for courses of action #11
through #115
31-45 Group 3 power for courses of action #11
through #115
46-60 Group 4 power for courses of action #11
through #115

Each group is ranked for access to positive
information for each source of action. This
ranking is performed on a 1-7 scale with 1
representing perfect information. The decision
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maker vector will always be equal to a series of
"l's" in a fifteen digit field. At the current time
this data is not used in the PROPDEMM II
program but must be input to fulfill format
requirements.
15.

16.

3rd card:

Dogmatism vector

4th card:

Punishment-reward potential vector

5th card:

Cost factor vectors

6th-7th cards:

Group affect vectors

8th· 11th cards:

Group values vectors

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT VALUE VECTORS: Format (24(2(4A4, 1112, 11)/), 2(4A4,
1112, 11)). Twenty-five data cards are used to
input the EIVV. They are prepared as follows:
follows:

12th· 14th cards:

Group values names

15th-18th cards:

Course of Action names

19th card:

Group salience vectors

column

20th-21st cards:

Group power vectors

22nd card:

Salience of positive information
vector

23rd card:

Salience of negative information
vector

24th·25th cards:

Positive information vectors

26th-27th cards:

Negative information vectors

NEGATIVE INFORMATION VECTOR: Format (75 I 1/15 I 1). All input requirements are
the same as presented in POSITIVE INFORMATION VECTOR above.

--r:nr Name of environmental factor (up to 16

characters)
17-36 Ten integer impact values-right justified in a set of ten two-digit fields. A -3
to+3 scale is used.
37·38 Probability value
39 Intensity of impact ranking between
the five levels of each environmental
factor. A scale of 1 to 5 is used with "I"
representing the most intense.
40-55 Name of environmental factor
56·75 Impact values
76·77 Probability
78 Impact ranking

53rd-77th cards:

Repeat as above on the next 24 cards. Column
79·80 may be used for any useful data
identifying information.
17.

28th-52nd cards: Environmental impact value vectors
Outcome value vectors

PROPDEMM ERRATA LEGEND

OUTCOME VALUE VECTORS: Format (24
(3312/), 3312). Twenty-five cards are required
to input these vectors. So there are 5 possible
outcomes per course of action, they should all be
grouped in proper sequence.
column

---r:2O

Ten integer values ranging from ·3 to
+3 right justified in a set of ten
two-digit fields. Positive values do not
require an indicating sign, but negative
values must be pr~c~ded by a minus (-)
sign always.
21-22 Probability value
23-42 Ten impact values
43-44 Probability value
45-64 Ten impact values
65-66 Probability values

Subscripts:
j
k
s
I
m
r

= impact values

=

conditions

=

environmental states

=

outcomes

= groups

= courses of action
= reference group

z = the No. of GRPSAL's > SL

Variables:

Repeat as above on next 24 cards. Columns
67 -80 on each card may he punched with any
information.

EMVj,k,s

= environmental

ESVVi,j,s

= impact values resulting from

GHPVALi,k

= the valu(!s on likes and dislikes

value modifica-

tion vector

specific environmental conditions.
of a specific group.

A summary of required data to be punched
follows:

GRPSALi,k

= the degree of significance of a
value to a group

1st card:

Program switches

2nd card:

Indicated salience level

XEMVj,k,s
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= environmental

value modification vector index

OMVm,k,I.s

= outcome value modification vec-

OVVi,I,m,s

= the

PROPDEMM

tor
impact values resulting
from specific course of action
outcomes

XOMV m k I s
, "

= outcome value modificationvec-

GPi,k,l,m,s

=

POVV m,k,l,s

= the position outcome value vec-

tor index

L EMV.j, k ,s

10

k

IESVV .. s - GRPVAL. kl

i= 1

GRPSALj,k

EMVj,k,s

the group position
tor

PIPI,k,s

= the partial issue position

NSIPI,k,s

= the nonsystematic issue position

k

(CLl.x x CC k )

= the cost

level of a course of

action.

ditions per environmental
state (ES).
i =impact value, there are 10
impact values per condition.

cost consciousness of a
group k as regards a course of
action.

= the

selected salience number
for group k.

k = groups, there are 7 groups.

= the salience level number representing the level of salience
considered significant by group

s =environmental states,
there are 3 ES's ESI =
most probable. ESII
most desirable. ESIII
least desirable.

k.
NSPFII,k,s

=

the nonsystematic political feasibility index.
ESVVi,j,s

= the power group k possessess
to block a course of action.
OCr,I,s

=

AFFr,k

= the degree of friendship or
hostility between group rand k.

the openness to change index.

= (NSIPr - NS1Pk), the issue
difference between the groups.
= the systematic issue p~sition.

SPF1k,l,s

= the systematic political feasibility index.

PClr,l,s

= the potential for change index.

XGVD r

= the group value difference index.

= The impact values resulting
from specific (j) environmental
conditions j = 1...10 for each
environmental state(s). The
ESVV's are given on a -3 to 3
scale.

GRPVALi,k = the values or likes and dislikes
of a specific group (k), k =
1.. .7. regarding each of the 10
values; e.g., water quality.
economic growth, etc. The
GRPV AL's are given on a -3 to
3 scale.

= the dogmatism of group r-its
political rigidity.

SIPk,l,s

= environmental value modification vector. There is a EMV for
each of the 10 conditions per
environmental state for each of
the 7 groups and 3 environmental states given the 10 values
per condition. There will be 210
EMV's; 3 ES x 10 ESVV's x 7
groups.

j =condition. there are 10 con-

= the

SL

I.

The SVV (selected value vector) and SSV (selected salience
vector) are included as objective vectors as groups 7. Group
6 is the decision maker.

7

k=\

I,j,

GRPSALi,k = the degree of significance of a
value to a group-a measure of
intensity of feelings regarding
each of the 10 values. GRPSAIls are given on a 1 to 7
scale.
expected
Thus as GRPSAL and

desired

ESVV + GRPVAL the EMV

and the more desirable the
environmental condition.
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IESVV (S,J,K)BRPVAL (I,K) I
2. XEMVj,k,s =

GRPSAL(,l)

XEMVj,k,s = environmental value modification vector index. There is an
XEMV for each EMV.
The smaller the index the more desired the
environmental condition; i.e., the closer the fit
between expected and desired values.
3. OMV

rn,k,I,s

10
~

=

lovvi

i=1

POVV m,k,l,s = the position ~utcome value
vector. There IS a POVV for
each group for each course of
action for each outcome for
each environmental state. 5
OVV's x 5 CA's x 3 ES x 7
groups = 525 POVV's. POVV +
if GP t or GRPSAL + . The
larger the POVV the more
favorable the outcome.
5
~ (pOVV

rn 1 s - GPRVAL. kl
, "
I,

m=}

7. PIPI,k,s =

OMV m,k,l,s = outcome value modification
vector. There is a OMV for
each ofthe 5 outcomes per each
of the 5 courses of action for
each of the 7 groups and 3
environmental states. There
will be 525 OMV's; 5 OVV's x 5
CA's x 3 ES's x 7 groups.

t and expected OVV

_

= the POVV weighted with the
probability of the outcomes for
each course of action. PIP , as
POVV t or PROB ,. The larger
the PIP the more favorable the
course of action. There is PIP
for each course of action for
each ES for each group. 5 CA's
x 3 ES's x 7 groups = 105
PIPS.

PIPI,k,s

PIP

8. NSIP

desired
GRPVAL

the OMV • and the more desirable the course of
action outcome.
4. XOMV
rn,k,l,s

= I(OVV(S,L,M,K) - GRPVAL (K,I) I
GRPSAL(K,I)

XOMVm,k,I,s=Outcome value modification index. There is an XOMV for each
OMV.

5. PXOMV rn,k,Ls

)

The PIP is the partial issue
position.

the impact values resulting
from specific (m) course of
action outcomes m = 1. .. 5 for
each course of action. The
OVV's are given on a -3 to+3
scale.

Thus as GRPSAL

S, ,ill

5

The SVV and SSV are included
as group 7 and the decision
maker as group 6.
OVVi,l,m,s

k 1 x OVV I

ill, "S

OMVrn,k,l,s
PROB
OVV
rn

PXOMV m k I s=probability outcome value
, "
modification vector index.
There is a PXOMV for each
OMV.

I,k,s

=

--...!&
XCLI,s

NSIPI,k,s

in which

7
XCLl,s = ~ (CL I s x CC )
k
k=j
,

= the nonsystematic issue position. It is nonsystematic since
political interactions with other
groups is not considered at this
point in the calculations. There
is a NSIP for each group for
each course of action for each
ES; 5 CA's x 7 groups x 3 ES =
105 NSIP's. As CC t and CL t
NSIP •.
CCk = the cost consciousness
of group k and is measured on a
scale of 1 to 7. A low CC of say
1 or 2 means the group does not
consider the CL of a CA
relevant or significant.
CLI s = the cost level of a CA
and'is measured on a scale of 1
to 7.

*Note: this is a change-the scale used to be -3 to
3 but for reasons of difficulties dividing by zero or
trying to get NSIP's that were not negative numbers,
the scale had to changed to 1 to 7.

The smaller the index the more desired the
course of action outcome.

A low CL means the group
feels that the cost of a CA is not
high.

(3-1 (OVV(S,L,M,I)-(GRPVAL(K,l)1 x GRPSAL(K,I)

10
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Thus NSIP , as CC t or CL t
the higher the CL and degree
of CC the less support a group
will give to a CA.

II.

z
L

OC

r,l,s

=

OCr,l,s

(GRPSALi,k)

i=l

9. SSN k =

Z

10

L GRPSAL. k - L (GRPSAL. k - ISL k )

i=l

1,

i=l

1,

10

L GRPSALi,k
+ i=1
10

AFFr,k

,

k

= the openness to change index.
It represents the measure of
influence of each group k on a
reference group r to determine
the OC of the reference group
r. As the Dogr , , PWR r t ,
SSNrt , ID t, AFFt , SSN r '
PWRk', the OCr •. There is an
OC for each grop for each CA
for each ES. 7 groups x 5 CA's
105 OC's.
x 3 ES's

= the reference group.

=the

degree of friendship or
hostility between r and any
group k.

=

=

indicated salience level.
The SL is that salience number
representing the degree of
salience considered significant.
Saliences<ISL are not used in
the "averaging" computation of
the SSN. There is only one
ISL.

=the

issue difference between
the r group and k group. IDr k
to prevent division by zero, and
the r group and k group. IDy
l(NSIP r - NSIPk)l; since 1D
can be zero on negative we
divide AFFr ~ by(l + IDr k)to
prevent div(slOn by zero,' and
we need the absolute value to
prevent OC from being a
negative number. The less the
ID the greater OC.

=

= the number of GRPSAL's > ISL

NSPFl I,k,s = (SSN k x PWR kl, ,s x NSIP I ,k , s)

PWRk,l,s

IS)

SSN k x PWRk,l,s

*Note, for math reasons the
scale has been changed from -3
to 3 to 1 to 7. 1
strong
negative affect or much hostility, 7 strong friendship. The
more friendly the groups the
more OC the reference group.

=the

NSPFII,k,s

(SSN r xPWR f,

Dog

k=1

r

for group k. This number is the
aggregate or "average" salience value for the GRPSAL
vector. Instead of GRPSAL
vector of saliences we now
have one salience number the
selected salience number. The
SSN is computed using GRPSAL's and the SL. There are 7
SSN's-one for each group.

10.

L

X

=

= the selected salience number

z

AFF k)
(II + iDr,kl-:~_-,-r?:.c'

7

= the dogmatism of r. This is

= the nonsystematic political fea-

=

given on a 1 to 7 scale. 7
very rigid politically or very
dogmatic. The more dogmatic r
is the less OCr is.

sibility index. It is nonsystematic since external political
interactions are not considered. It measures the support a
group will give to a CA without
external political interaction
effects. NSPFI' if NSIP t
PWR t , and SSN t . The
political feasibility of a CA' as
NSPFI t. There is an NSPFI
for each group for each CA for
each ES. 7 groups x 3 E ss x 5
CA's = 105 NSPFI's.

12.

SIPk,l,s

=the power a group possesses to

= the systematic issue position.
It is systematic

because it
takes into consideration the
political interactions of one
group on another (the OCr,k)'

There is a SIP for each group
for each course of action for
each environmental state. 7
groups x 5 CA's x 3 ES = 105
SIP's.

block a course of action. It is
given on a scale of 1 to 7. A
PWR of 7 means the group can
block a CA.
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SIP , as OC t and NSIP t , it
measures the support a group
will give a course of action
given that they are interacting
politically.

=the systematic political feasi-

SPFlk,l,s

bility index. It is systematic
because external political interactions are considered
(SIP). It measures the support
a group will give a CA given
that they interact. There is a
SPFI for each group for each
CA for each ES; 7 groups x 5
CA's x 3 ES's = 105 SPFI's.

~
14.

PClk,l,s

PClr,l,s

direction wanted by the decision maker. PCI + if DOGkt
SIPk. SSNk+and the PWRrt,
SSN r " Remember that group
6 is our decision maker. There
is a PCI for each group for each
CA for each ES. 7 groups x 5
CNs x 3 ES's = 105 PCl's.

k=1

15.

XCVD k

[

~

CRPSAL.I~r X (3-ICRPVAL\. )k-GRPVAL I, k ,!
7 . 1
~ \~=~----------~------------~k=1
10

= t.he group value difference

J

~)

in-

dex. It measures the differences in value positions of the
various group. The larger the
index the more similar the
values of the reference group r
and any other group. As
GRPVAL - GRPVALk. the
XGVD +. here is an XGVD for
each group.

[SSNr x PWRr,l,s
SIPk,l,s + SSN k + DOCk

= the potential for change index.
The PCI represents the extent
to which a group can be
influenced to change in the
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pnOPDEMM II

Compute
cnvirollm~ntal
CLl'lditi(ln~
C;lcll

f,>r

cllvironmental

Compute ES
modified by
selected
vectors

Compute ES
modified by
group values
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Compute
environmental
-----:;;lalue mOllificatiun
iodides

(0
_10
-

8

1
-------71

Write OVV
mudified by
grou p values

Compute OVV
closeness to
fit indicies

Compu te POVV
and

PIP

Compute OVV
modified by
selected vectors

Compute
'clectcd sllie'nce

numbers
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Compute
cost
indicics

Compute

NSlP

Compute

NSPfI)
TPFI

Compute
opimness to
change
indicies

Compute

!~roup

bSlIC

diflcrences
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Compute
SIP alld
Sl'I-"I

Compute
PCI

Compute

XGVD

,

IV)

APPENDIX B
PROPDEMM APPLICATION
Uintah Basin

A complete listing is available in Kimball (1979)
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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT VALUE VECTORS (Cont.)
Environmental Factors

ECON

lOOK BBL/day
50K BBL/day
Indian ~ater Claim
580K Af/Y Indian
387K Af/Y Indian
256K Af/Y Indian
193K Af/Y Indian
No Indian Water
Per Capita Income
$4000 Per Cap
$4500 Per Cap
$5000 Per Cap
$5500 Per Cap
$6000 Per Cap
Export Water
197K Af Export
149K Af Export
102K Af Export
50K Af Export
No Exports
Federal Acreage
10.6 Mill Fed Ac
10.1 Mill Fed Ac
9.6 Mill Fed Ac
9.1 Mill Fed Ac
8.7 Mill Fed Ac

RUM WATR REC

PVT

INUU

MUNI

COMM AG W ENV

2
2

-2
-2

2
2

0
0

0
0

2
2

1
0

-2
-2

-1
-1

-1
-1

P=.33
P".10

Rank=4
Rank=5

-2
-2
-2
-3
-3

2
2
2
3
3

-3
-3
-2

0
0
0
0
0

-3
-3
-2
-2
3

-3
-3
-2
1
3

2
2
1

3

-2
-2
-1
1
2

1

-3
-2
-2
-2
3

2
2
2
1
-1

P=.20
P=.45
P=.30
P=.15
P". 1

Rank=5
Rank=3
Rank=2
Rank=l
Rank=4

-2
-1
1
2
3

2
1
0
-1
-2

-2
-1
1
1
2

-2
-1
1
2
3

0
0
0
1
2

0
0
0
1
1

-2
-1
1
2
2

-1
1
1
1
-1

-2
-1
1
1

0
0
0
-1
-2

P=. 5
P=.10
P=.40
P".35
P=.37

Rank=5
Rank=4
Rank=3
Rank=2
Rank=l

-2
0
0
3

0
0
0
0
-1

0
0
0
1
2

0
0
1
1
2

0
0
0
0
0

-1
-1
0
0
1

-1
-1
0
0
2

-2
-2
-1
-1
0

-3
-2
-2
-1
3

-3
-3
-2
-1
2

P=.41
P=.30
P=.43
P=.25
P=.15

Rank=5
Rank=4
Rank=3
Rank"2
Rank=l

-1
0
0
0
1

1
0
0
0
-1

1

2
2
1
1
0

-3
-3
-2
-2
-1

-2
-1
0
0
0

-2
-2
-1
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

2
2

3
2
1
0
0

P=.lO
P=.lO
p=.38
P=.15
P=.10

Rank=5
Rank=4
Rank=3
Rank=2
Rank=l

-1

-1

1

0
0
0

1

1

1

0
0

COST FACTORS
COST LEVELS
CA2

CA 1
Environmental State 1
Environmental State 2
Environmental State 3
GRP 1
3

Cost Consciousness

3
3
3

3
3
3

CA4

CA3

3
3
3

3
3
3

3
3
3

CA 5

GRP 2

GRP 3

GRP 4

GRP 5

GRP 6

GRP 7

3

2

2

2

3

3

3.
-2.

2.
2.

1.
-1.

-1.

-1.

1.
O.

2.
O.
2.

1.

GROUP AFFECT
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

O.
2.
O.

O.
-1.
-2.
O.
3.
3.

-2.
O.
3.
O.
-2.
3.

1.

O.
2.
O.

-2.
-2.

1.
1.

1.

1.

1.

O.

1.

o.

O.
O.
11.

3.
O.

DOGMATISM VALUES
GRP 1
5.

GRP 2
3.

GRP 3

GRP 4

GRP 5

GRP 6

SEL V

4.

2.

3.

4.

3.

PUNISHMENT-REWARD VALUE VECTORS
GRP 1
-1

GRP 2
2

GRP 3

GRP 4

GRP 5

-2

2

3
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GROUP VALUE VECTORS

·
Interest

Grou~

Im~act

ECON

RURA

Values
INDU

NATU REC PVT

Agriculture
Energy Development
Indians
Developed Rec.
Control Development
Decision Maker

3
2
0
2
2

3
3
3
2

-1
0
2

1

-1
-2
1

Objective Vector

2

3

1

2

0

1

3
1

1

3
2

2
1

3
3
2

3
0
2

MUNI

COMM

AG W ENV

-3
3
0
-2
1
1

0
1
1
0
3
1

2
-2
2
2
3
0

3
-2
3
2
1
2

1
-1
2
-2
2
-1

0

1

2

2

1

GROUP SALIENCE
Interest GrouE
ECON
Agriculture
Energy Development
Indians
Developed Rec.
Control Development
Decision Maker

5
6
5

Objective Vector

RURA NATU

ImEac t Val ues
REC PVT INDU

MUNI

COMM AG W ENV

5

6
5
4
3
6
5

4
7
5
4
6
6

3
3
6
6
4
3

6
3
6
5
5
5

5
6
6
4
6
5

4
5
6
4
6
5

6
6
5
5
7
6

6
6
4
6
6

5
6
5
6
5
5

5

5

5

4

5

6

5

6

6

5

3
7

NAMES OF THE 10 IMPACT VALUES:
Economic Growth
Rural Atmosphere
Natural Resource Dev.
Rec Opportunity
PVT Control Property
Industrial Wtr.
Municipal Wtr.Fac.
Community Cultural
Ag. Water Supply
Env. Protection
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7

Environmental Factors

t-'

0
0\

Population
43795 People
41804 People
39814 People
37824 People
35833 People
Precipi.tation
19.2 Inches
18.3 Inches
17.4 Inches
16.5 Inches
15.6 Inches
M-I Water Supply
74456 M-I Ac Ft
71072 M-I Ac Ft
67688 M-I Ac Ft
64304 M-I Ac Ft
60920 M- I Ac Ft
Irrigated Acreage
287500 Irr Ac
275000 Irr Ac
262500 Irr Ac
250000 Irr Ac
237500 Irr Ac
Value of Mineral Products
$111 Mill Minr1s
$106 Mill Minr1s
$101 Mill Minr1s
$ 96 Mill Minr1s
$ 91 Mill Minr1s
Oil Shale Production
350K BBL/day
300K BBL/day
200K BBL/day

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT VALUE VECTORS
ECON RURA WATR REC PVT INDU MUNI
3
3
3
3
2

-1
-2
-2
-2
-3

3
3
3
3
2

1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

2
1
0
-1
-2

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
-1
-1

2
1
0
-1
-2

0
0
0
0
0

3
2
2
1
0

-2
-2
-1
-1
-1

3
3
2
2

-2
-2
-2
-1
-1

2
1
0
0
0

3
3
2
2
2

-3
-2
-2

3
3
2
2
1
3
3
2

3
3
2
1
1

-3
-3
-2
-2
-2

-3
-2
-2
-2
-2

-2
-2
-1
-1
0

P=.17
P=.32
P=.47
P=.29
P=.15

Rank=4
Rank=2
Rank=l
Rank=3
Rank=5

2
1
0
-1
-2

0
0
0
-1
-1

0
0
-1
-2
-3

1
0
-1
-2
-3

0
0
-1
-1
-2

P=.30
P=.45
P=.30
P=.25
P=.15

Rank=l
Rank=2
Rank=3
Rank=4
Rank=5

-1
-1
0
0
0

3
3
2
2
2

3
3
2
2
2

-2
-2
-1
-1
0

-3
-3
-3
-2
-2

-2
-2
-1
0
0

P=.15
P=.35
P=.38
P=.30
P-.20

Rank=5
Rank=4
Rank=3
Rank=2
Rank=l

0

2
2
1
1
0

3
3
2
2
2

1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

3
2
1
0
-1

3
3
2
2
1

1
1
0
-1
-1

P=.22
P=.30
P=.46
P=.17
P=. 5

Rank=3
Rank=l
Rank=2
Rank=4
Rank=5

-3
-3
-2
-2
-1

3
3
3
3
3

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

3
3
2
2
1

1
1
0
0
0

-3
-3
-2
-2
-1

-3
-2
-2
-1

-2
-2
-2
-2

-1

-1

P=.15
P=.35
P=.38
P=.20
P=.40

Rank=4
Rank=3
Rank=l
Rank=2
Rank=5

-3
-3
-2

3
3
3

-2
-2
-1

0
0
0

3
3
2

2
2

-3
-3
-3

-3
-2
-2

-2
-2
-2

P=.26
P=.40
P=.35

Rank=l
Rank=2
Rank=3

1

-1

2
2
11
1

COMM AG W ENV

1

OPENNESS TO CHANGE INDICES
FORMULA IS:

~

DC

(S)(AFF(K.O)!(l+ID))

*

«SSN(O)

* GRPPWR

(O))!(SSN(K)

*

GRPPWR (K))!Dog (K)

Level 1
Course of Action
UB
UB
UB
UB
UB

1
2
3
4
5

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

Selected Vector

0.7
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.2

-0.2
-0.2
0.2
-1.0
-1.3

1.0
-1.1
1.3
0.5
0.4

0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.0

0.8
1.5
0.4
0.7
0.4

0.9
1.0
1.1
1.4
1.4

0.8
0.9
1.0
0.9
0.9

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

Selected Vector

0.3
0.3
0.3
-0.2
0.0

1.8
1.7
1.7
1.2
1.4

-0.3
-0.3
-0.4
0.5
0.3

0.6
0.6
1.3
2.3
0.4

1.4
1.4
1.2
1.7
0.7

Group 5

Group 6

Selected Vector

0.3
1.0
1.3
1.3
0.3

2.2
1.2
1.0
1.0
2.0

Level 2
Course of Action

Group 1

UT 1

1.4
1.5
0.8
0.4
0.9

0.7
0.6
0.1
-0.0
0.6

Course of Action

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

CRB
CRB
CRB
CRB
CRB

1.6
0.6
0.8
0.7
0.7

1.2
-0.0
0.0
0.1
1.6

0.1
0.5
0.1
-0.0
0.0

1.0
0.4
0.6
0.5
1.6

ur

2

UT 3
ur 4
UT 5

Group 2

Level 3
1
2
3
4
5

0.1
0.3
0.8
0.7
-0.8

POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE INDEX
FORMULA IS:

PCI

(S) (SSN(O)

*

GRPPWR (O))!(SIP(K) + Dog (K))

Level 1
Course of Action
UB
UB
UB
UB
UB

1
2
3
4
5

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

Selected Vector

8.8
8.4
11.4
9.4
9.7

9.5
12.8
9.9
13.6
13.7

9.3
11.9
11.4
10.8
10.6

13.2
13.2
16.7
13.8
15.3

8.6
8.6
9.9
9.0
9.2

7.1
8.0
8.4
8.8
8.9

8.2
8.7
10.3
9.6
9.5

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

Selec ted Vector

5.2
5.2
7.5
5.6
3.6

5.6
5.7
4.8
7.7
4.9

4.4
4.4
6.7
6.7
3.2

6.9
7.0
9.3
8.5
4.8

5.9
5.9
8.0
7.0
3.9

4.9
4.9
5.9
6.0
4.2

5.2
5.2
7.0
6.5
3.5

Group 1

Group 2

Level 2
Course of Action
UT
UT
UT
UT

vr

1
2
3
4
5

Level 3
Course of Action

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Group 6

Selected Vector

CRB
CRB
CRB
CRB
CRB

4.0
2.6
2.4
2.5
4.6

4.4
2.9
3.2
3.3
4.0

3.6
2.6
2.6
2.7
3.3

6.0
3.8
3.4
3.5
5.9

4.4
2.8
2.4
2.4
5.4

3.7
2.3
2.4
2.5
3.7

3.7
2.3
2.4
2.5
3.7

1
2
3
4
5
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NON-SYSTEMIC POLITICAL FEASIBILITY INDEX
THE LARGER THE INDEX VALUES, THE MORE FAVORABLE THE COURSE OF ACTION
FORMULAE ARE: SSN = (S) SSAL/(TSAL-SSAL) + TSAL/10, (SEE TEXT)
NSPFI = SSN * GRPPWR * NSIP

~

NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

Level 1
CA 112
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 1/3
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 114
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 115
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

1.40
3
(22.7)
2.99
3
(51.1)
2.35
1
(13.2)
1.82
3
(24.9)
2.36
3
(44.2)
3.61
5
(97.5)
2.69
5
(74.0)

2.91
4
(63.0)
1.32
3
(22.6)
3.01
1
(16.9)
3.00
3
(41.0)
2.96
4
(74.0)
3.44
6
( 111.6)
3.89
5
(106.8)

0.73
2
( 7.9)
3.32
5
(94.5)
1.73
1
( 9.7)
1.45
3
(19.9)
2.33
5
(72.9)
3.37
6
(109.5)
2.40
5
(66.0)

2.71
4
(58.6)
2.31
3
(39.5)
3.61
1
(20.3)
5
2.85
(65.0)
3.06
6
(114.7)
4.26
4
(92 .1)
3.82
5
(105.1)

1.96
3
(31.6)
2.16
3
(36.9)
3.45
1
(19.4 )
1.61
5
(36.8)
2.37
6
(89.0)
3.47
4
(75.0)
3.25
5
(89.3)

(156.1)

(217.5)

(204.9)

CA III
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

Level 2
CA 112
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 113
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 114
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 115
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

2.13
1
(11. 5)
2.58
2
(29.4)
2.66
4
(59.9)
2.32
1
(10.6)
2
2.16
(27.0)
3.76
2
(40.7)
3.01
2
(33.1)

2.05
1
(11.1)
2.50
2
(28.5)
2.64
4
(59.4)
2.20
1
(10.0)
2
2.06
(25.7)
2
3.64
(39.4)
2.94
2
(32.3)

0.03
1
( 0.3)
3.82
5
(108.8)
1.00
3
(16.9)
0.89
1
( 4.1)
2
0.75
( 9.4)
2.72
2
(29.4)
2
1.61
(17.7)

3.26
4
(70.4)
1.32
4
(30.1)
2.91
3
(49.1)
3.41
1
(15.6)
2
2.75
(34.4)
2
3.28
(35.5)
2
3.63
(40.1) .

2.46
1
(13.3)
0.87
1
( 5.0)
2.17
3
(36.7)
2.49
1
(11.4)
3.09
1
(19.3)
2.10
1
(11.4)
2
3.35
(36.8)

(134.8)

(139.3)

(199.6)

( 69.6)

NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

Level 3
CA 112
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 113
PWR
NSIP
(NSPFI)

CA /14
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

CA 115
NSIP
PWR
(NSPFI)

1.84
1
(10.0)
2.65
1
(15.0)
2.58
3
(43.6)
1.81
1
( 8.3)
1.90
2
(23.7)
2
3.83
(41. 5)
3.11
1
(17 .1)

1. 74
1
( 9.4)
2.57
1
(14.6)
2.44
1
(13.7)
1.89
1
( 8.6)
2.13
1
(13.3)
3.79
1
(20.5)
3.03
1
(16.6)

2.66
1
(14.4)
1. 56
1
( 8.9)
2.71
1
(15.2)
2.71
1
(12.4)
3.25
1
(20.3)
3.11
1
(16.8)
3.89
1
(21.4)

2.34
1
(12.7)
1.21
1
( 6.9)
2.39
1
(13.4)
2.78
1
(12.6)
3.33
1
(20.8)
2.73
1
(14.7)
3.61
1
(19.8)

0.89
1
( 4.8)
3.56
1
(20.2)
1. 96
4
(44.2)
1.40
1
( 6.4)
1.64
1
(10.3)
3.75
2
(40.5)
2.34
1
(12.9)

(100.5)

( 59.7)

( 71.1)

CA III

GROUP

SSN

Agriculture

5.4

Energy Development

5.7

Indians

5.6

Developed Rec.

4.6

Control Development

6.3

Decision Maker

5.4

Objective Vector

5.5

Total NSPFI

GROUP

SSN

Agriculture

5.4

Energy Development

5.7

Indians

5.6

Developed Rec

4.6

Control Development

6.3

Decision Maker

5.4

Objective Vector

5.5

Total NSPFI

(138.4)

CAIIl

GROUP

SSN

Agricu1 ture

5.4

Energy Development

5.7

Indians

5.6

Developed Rec

4.6

Control Development

6.3

Decision Maker

5.4

Objective Vector

5.5

Total NSPFI
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(298.2)

(66.3)

(214.0)

( 85.9)

COST INDICES AND NON-SYSTEMIC ISSUE POSITIONS
THE NSIP AND XCL ARE INVERSELY RELATED
FORMULAE ARE: XCL = (S) (CL*CC)
NSIP = PIP/XCL
Level 1
Course of
Action XCL
UB
UB
UB
UB
UB

1
2
3
4
5

Course of
Action
UT
UT
UT
UT
UT

1
2
3
4
5

54 75.4
54 157.4
54 39.4
54 146.4
54 106.0

XCL
54
54
54
54
54

Course of
Action XCL
CBR
CBR
CBR
CBR
CBR

1
2
3
4
5

GROUP 1
PIP (NSIP)

54
54
54
54
54

(1. 40)
(2.91)
(0.73)
(2.71)
(1. 96)

GROUP 1
PIP (NSIP)
114.8
110.8
1.4
175.8
132.8

161.6
71.4
179.2
124.8
116.8

(2.99)
(1. 32)
(3.32)
(2.31)
(2.16 )

GROUP 2
PIP
(NSIP)

(2.13) 139.4
(2.05) l35.2
(0.03) 206.4
(3.26) 41.4
(2.46) 47.0

GROUP 1
PIP (NSIP)
99.6
94.2
143.6
126.4
48.2

GROUP 2
(NSIP)
PIP

(2.58)
(2.50)
(3.82)
(1. 3Z)
(0.87)

GROUP 2
PIP
(NSIP)

(1.84) 142.4
(1. 74) 138.6
(2.66) 84.2
(2.34) 65.6
(0.89) 192.0

(2.64)
(Z .57)
(1.56)
(1. 21)
(3.56)

GROUP 3
(NSIP)
PIP
126.8
162.4
93.2
195.0
186.2

GROUP 4
(NSIP)
PIP

(2.35) 98.4
(3.01) 161.8
(1.73J 78.4
(3.61) 154.0
(3.45) 87.2

(1. 82)
(3.00)
(1. 45)
(2.85)
(1.61)

Level 2
GROUP 4
GROUP 4
PIP
(NSIP) PIP
(NSIP)
143.8
14Z.6
54.0
157.2
117.4

(2.66)
(2.64)
(1.00)
(2.91)
(2.17)

1Z5.2
118.8
48.Z
184.4
134.6

(2.32)
(2.20)
(0.89)
(3.41)
(2.49)

Level 3
GROUP 3
GROUP 4
PIP
(NSIP) PIP
(NSIP)
139.4
131.8
146.2
129.0
106.0

(2.58) 98.0
(Z.44) 102.0
(2.71) 146.4
(2.39) 147.6
(1. 96) 75.8

109

(1. 81)
(1. 89)
(2.71)
(Z.73)
(1. 40)

GROUP 5
(NSIP)
PIP
127.2
159.8
126.0
165.2
128.2

(2.36)
(2.96)
(2.33)
(3.06)
(2.37)

GROUP 5
PIP
(NSIP)
116.8
111.2
40.4
148.6
167.0

(1.90)
(Z .13)
(3.25)
(3.33)
(1. 64)

GROUP 5
PIP
(NSIP)
102.4
115.0
175.4
179.6
88.6

(1.90)
(2.13)
(3.25)
(3.33)
(1.64)

GROUP 6
(NSIP)
PIP
194.8
185.8
182.2
229.8
187.2

(3.61)
(3.44)
(3.37)
(4.26)
(3.47)

GROUP 6
PIP
(NSIP)
207.0
Z04.8
168.Z
147.2
202.4

(3.83)
(3.79)
(3.11)
(2.73)
(3.75)

GROUP 6
PIP
(NSIP)
207.0
204.8
168.2
147.Z
202.4

(3.83)
(3.79)
(3.11)
(3.73)
(3.75)

SELECTED
VECTOR
(NSIP)
PIP
145.4
209.8
129.6
206.4
175.4

(2.69)
(3.89)
(2.40)
(3.82)
(3.25)

SELECTED
VECTOR
PIP
(NSIP)
162.8
163.4
Z09.8
194.8
126.4

(3.11)
(3.03)
(3.89)
(3.61)
(2.34)

SELECTED
VECTOR
PIP
(NSIP)
167.8
163.4
209.8
194.8
126.4

(3.11)
(3.03)
(3.89)
(3.61)
(2.34)

ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE MODIFICATION VECTOR INDICES

~

THE SMALLER THE INDEX VALUE, THE CLOSER THE FIT BETWEEN
EXISTING CONDITIONS AND A SET OF GROUP VALUES
FORMULAE ARE: XEMV = ABS(EIVV-GRPVAL)/GRPSAL
Level 1
Environmental
Condo

PROB

39814 People
18.3 Inches
57688 M-I Ac Ft
262500 Irr Ac
$ 91 Mill Minrls
300K BBL/day
387K Af/Y Indian
$5000 Per Cap
102K Af Export
9.6 Mill Fed Ac

47
45
38
46
40
40
45
40
43
38

GROUP 1

GROUP 2

GROUP 3

GROUP 4

GROUP 5

GROUP 6

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

6.0
3.3
6.2
2.7
4.6
7.6
5.3
2.8
4.2
3.6

1.6
2.5
2.6
4.3
2.1
2.2
6.0
2.7
2.0
4.0

5.2
3.7
5.0
2.8
4.5
6.5
5.4
2.8
4.7
3.9

7.6
4.1
7.3
2.5
5.6
8.8
5.2
3.9
3.9
3.7

4.4
2.8
4.6
3.4
4.2
5.7
4.9
2.6
4.0
2.5

2.9
1.9
3.2
2.0
2.4
4.5
6.0
1.7
2.8
2.9

GROUP 4

GROUP 5

GROUP 6

Selected
Vector
4.2
2.5
4.3
2.4
3.7
5.6
5.0
1.6
3.4
2.7

Level 2
Environmental
Condo

PROB

39814 People
19.2 Inches
60920 M-I Ac Ft
275000 Irr Ac
$101 Mill Minrls
350K BBL/day
193K Af/Y Indian
$6000 Per Cap
No Exports
8.7 Mill Fed Ac

47
30
20
30
38
26
15
37
15
10

GROUP 1

GROUP 2

GROUP 3

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

XEMV

6.0
3.3
5.1
1.6
5.7
7.7
3.5
4.7
3.7
3.8

1.6
2.7
2.9
5.3
1.5
2.3
3.8
3.3
3.2
3.5

5.2
3.3
4.9
1.9
5.3
6.7
3.9
3.5
2.5
4.2

7.6
4.3
5.9
3.1
3.1
9.0
3.5
6.1
6.0
4.1

4.4
2.4
3.9
2.7
2.7
5.9
3.3
3.9
2.5
3.2

2.9
2.0
3.3
2.9
2.9
4.7
3.7
2.6
2.3
2.8

GROUP 3

GROUP 4

GROUP 5

GROUP 6

XEMV
4.6
7.0
5.6
3.4
4.5
4.8
5.5
6.2
3.9

XEMV
7.3
5.2
8.6
3.2
5.6
6.5
5.2
5.3
3.9

XEMV
4:2
6.1
5.2
3.6
4.2
4.4
4.9
5.4
3.3

XEMV
2.7
5.4
4.7
2.0
2.4
2.6
4.5
4.4
4.1

Selected
Vector
4.2
2.0
3.7
1.9
1.9
5.8
2.8
3.7
2.3
3.0

Level 3
Environmental
Condo
15833 People
15.6 Inches
74456 M-I Ac Ft
237500 Irr Ac
$ 91 Mill Minrls
50K BBL/day
$4000 Per Cap
197K Af Export
10.6 Mill Fed Ac

PROB

GROUP 1

15
15
15
5
40
10
5
41
10

XEMV
5.2
6.2
7.8
3.2
4.6
5.1
5.9
5.5
3.3

GROUP 2
XEMV
2.1
4.2
2.5
3.7
2.1
1.9
4.3
3.2
5.6

:::l

llO

Selected
Vector
3.6
5.8
5.8
3.0
3.7
3.8
4.6
5.0
3.3

